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ABSTRACT 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY AND CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL 
AND EDUCATIONAL ESSENTIALISM 
September, 1985 
Mohammad Zaimaran, LLB (Law Degree) School of 
Law and Political Science, University of Teheran 
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts7Amherst 
Directed by: Professor Robert R. Wellman 
This dissertation is a comparative study of the educa¬ 
tional philosophy of four major thinkers: Plato and Aristotle 
in the West, Rumi and Mulla Sadra in the Muslim world. This 
study examines their educational philosophies in the light 
of essentialism. For insight into their perspectives on 
epistemology, four major dimensions i.e., knowledge, love 
(eros) , excellence (arete), and action (praxis) are con¬ 
sidered . 
In the case of Plato and Aristotle, recent translations 
of their works call for a reconsideration of their view¬ 
points. Utilizing these translations, this study takes the 
posit ion that essentialism is not fully supported by their 
thought. Some modern essentialists and progressive peda¬ 
gogues have associated Plato and Aristotle with essentialism 
VI 
partly because they have relied heavily upon Medieval 
Latin translations of classical Greek works. 
In the Muslim world, the renowned philosopher 
Avicenna (Ibn Sina) advocated an essentialist position based 
on Plato and Aristotle. In fact, he was the first philosopher 
who propounded the conception of the duality of essence and 
existence, and asserted that essence precedes existence. 
Thus, the birthplace of essence as a philosophical notion is 
to be found in the Medieval Islamic philosophy. However, 
Rumi and Mulla Sadra of the Muslim world challenge 
essentialist deductions of Ibn Sina. 
As a final point, pedagogical assumptions of an 
essentialist viewpoint are critiqued in the light of the 
thinking of Plato, Aristotle, Rumi and Mulla Sadra. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Problem and Purpose of Study 
Since the 1940's many books and articles dealing with 
various schools of educational thought have devoted a major 
portion of their study to essentialism.1 Perhaps the most 
important document contributing to essentialism as an in¬ 
fluential philosophy of education is William Bagley's 
"An Essentialist Platform for the Advancement of American 
o 
Education," published in 1983. 
Educational essentialists launched an overall attack 
against progressive education. They argued that the prin¬ 
cipal responsibility of formal education was to preserve 
and transmit the basic elements of human knowledge and 
culture. Therefore, they resorted to intellectual disci¬ 
pline and instruction in the basic subject areas. Their 
basic educational beliefs were exemplified in the following 
assumptions: 
1. Permanence has a greater reality than change; 
2. The universe is considered as orderly and highly 
patterned; 
3. Human nature is universal; 
1 
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4. The basic features of human nature recur in each 
generation; 
5. Human culture has an identifiable treasury of 
information and values; 
6. Core knowledge may be defined as the most important 
learning available within a culture; 
7. Certain basic values are absolute and enduring; 
8. Societal interest requires the preservation and 
transmission of the core culture; 
9. The primary goal of the school lies in the trans¬ 
mission of this cultural inheritance; 
10. Formal education has fallen under the influence 
of those who would divert the schools from their 
historical responsibility of handing down the 
established culture; 
11. Owing to misconceptions of democratic and 
egalitarian requirements, schools fail to challenge 
their most capable students; curricula and instru- 
tion have been "levelled down" to the lowest 
common denominator; 
12. Peripheral social and educational concerns have 
been brought to the fore; thereby obscuring and 
confusing the school's most important functions 
and goals; 
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13. Schools neglect the teaching of fundamental know¬ 
ledge and values of enduring significance; 
14. Incidental learning" and "learning by doing" are 
inadequate substitutes for mastery of the certain 
academic disciplines which should be taught in a 
systematic manner; 
15. Education should be oriented toward the cultiva¬ 
tion of rationality; therefore, formal education 
should stress more rigorous, intellectually 
demanding disciplines, the skills required for 
scholastic competence, and those traditional 
values that provide the foundations of the in¬ 
herited culture of the society and the accepted 
norms for personal morality. Schools should 
3 
emphasize "essentials." 
16. Since the funded wisdom of the human race is 
found in the classical works, they should con¬ 
stitute an integral part of the curriculum 
content.^ 
The more extreme essentialists came to be known as 
Perennialists. They advocated a fixed curriculum, certain 
minimal essentials, preconceived educational values and 
individual adaptation to absolute knowledge presumed to 
exist independently of individuals. 
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Most of the essentialists based their arguments on the 
themes and ideas of the Greek philosophers, Plato and 
Aristotle. These two philosophers were alleged to be the 
founding fathers of essentialism and its more extreme form, 
perennialism. 
The Latin Christian exegetical commentators apparently 
agreed with the essentialist or intellectualist position. 
They held that man is an entity composed of body and soul. 
The soul is the receptacle of knowledge and the body is 
the sensing and feeling dimension of man. They firmly 
attested to the superiority of soul over body (matter). 
They declared that man's distinctive characteristic is 
rationality. In other words, a Latinized understanding of 
Plato and Aristotle alleged that man attains his highest 
station when he uses his rational rather than his sensory 
capacities. Thus, the nature of man was expounded on the 
5 
basis of this dualism. 
The above position was carefully elaborated and the 
dichotomy of body versus soul, reason versus action, reason 
versus emotion, was institutionalized. The above inter¬ 
pretation furnished moral imperatives which continue to 
prevail in many schools of thought. 
The intellectualist approach to Plato and Aristotle 
had its own account of reality, existence, essence, 
substance, purpose, virtue, morality and value. For the 
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intellectualist, reality is a universal concept which is 
omnipresent and defies change and vicissitude. Reality 
lies in the most logical form which is embodied under the 
auspices of the intellect. Truth as arrived at by the 
intellect constitutes reality. Sensory or factual truth is 
of a secondary importance. As far as knowledge is concerned, 
rational truth is its object. Empirical truth may not be 
taken as the object of theoretical or rational knowledge. 
Being and essence are described in terms of what is 
first conceived by the intellect. Aquinas, as a Latin 
follower of Aristotle, stated that "essence and being are 
conceived first by intellect. Human knowledge about reality 
is by intellect." He adds that knowledge by intellect 
takes place by three different acts: 1) Simple apprehension 
the result of which is concept; 2) composition and division, 
the result of which is proposition; and 3) reasoning, the 
result of which is an argument. Knowledge is a penetration 
into being in the sense that truth and being are convertible 
Truth resides in the human intellect, but also in things 
insofar as they are designed and sustained by divine 
intellect. The senses are the media of comprehending the 
particulars and intellect is the medium to grasp the univer- 
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sal. Being and knowledge are correlatives. 
Intellect is a non-material power which grasps the 
non-material nature (essence) of things. The things aie 
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either substances or accidents. "The word 'being' is 
definitely associated with the priority of substances and 
only posteriorly with qualifications of accidents." 
The supreme good is the life of reason, not the blind 
compliance with passions and emotions. Training of the 
body is considered inferior; happiness lies in the life of 
reason. Logic, as a school discipline, should deal with 
products rather than processes. This discipline is 
superiorly important in the curriculum. Evaluation of the 
student's performance should be in terms of the mastery of 
content and the application of intellectual capabilities. 
Modern essentialists have adapted the above viewpoints 
based on a peculiar approach to Plato and Aristotle. They 
have tried to take into account the modern ramifications 
of science and society. They say that although man's 
functions can be classified into distinct operations such 
as those of body, mind or the emotions, educational goals 
should focus on mental and intellectual development. The 
highest essence of man is that of his mental functions. 
Man's rational capabilities distinguish him from other 
animals; the rational mode is typically human. Rational 
truths are universal and changeless, while empirical 
truths, since they do not involve the universal, but the 
particular, are of lesser-importance. 
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The main function of schooling is the development and 
education of the mind through the medium of the accumulated 
knowledge of mankind. The education of the whole person 
should be relegated to the domain of the extracurricular. 
They refer to a progressive curriculum as frills, such 
courses as child care, social grooming, driver training, 
and the like. 
They charge progressive education with an undue 
emphasis upon current issues and interests. They argue 
that this undermines students' logical capabilities and 
fails to provide the student with a knowledge of factors 
and causes preceding and determining the present issue. 
Arthur Bestor, a major spokesman for the essentialist 
position, says that the purpose of school is not to debate 
the controversial problems of the day but to present wide- 
ranging systematic knowledge. 
The praxis side of education is another dimension 
which is attacked by modern essentialists. They claim that 
vocationalism has destroyed the traditional notion of 
school as an agency devoted to the transmission of know¬ 
ledge and mental development. They have divorced knowledge 
from action and propose to educate creative thinkers rather 
than creative actors. They appear to favor personalities 
whose ultimate goal is limited to contemplation. 
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This study will argue that essentialism is inadequate 
and that it has largely rested its case on what amounts to 
misinterpretations of classical thought, especially that 
of Plato and Aristotle. 
This essentialist misreading of Plato and Aristotle 
is the result of many factors; especially the medieval and 
later rationalist inclination to elevate human reason above 
other dimensions of human nature, and the reading of 
classical Greek conceptual themes into Latin. 
In the course of the study I will examine the theories 
of knowledge, eros, arete, and praxis formulated by Plato 
and Aristotle in order to provide a comprehensive conception 
of reality. 
I will use recent translations of Plato and Aristotle 
for the entirely new way which they provide for looking at 
the perspective of these seminal thinkers. These recent 
commentaries acknowledge the presence of a more comprehen¬ 
sive world view than that which has been recognized by the 
essentialists. I will focus principally on Plato's 
Symposium, Meno, Parmenides, and Republic and Aristotle's 
Metaphysics, Physics, and Nichomachean Ethics. The 
principal secondary sources consulted include John Herman 
Randall, Jr., Martin Heidegger, Edward G. Ballard, and 
Michael E. Zimmerman. 
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Furthermore, in order to make Plato's outlook more 
pertinent in a modern educational context, Piagetian 
paradigms of cognitive development and Kohlberg's conception 
of moral development will be utilized. Thus, it will be 
shown that Plato's perspectives are quite germane in a 
modern educational context. 
Plato appears to suggest that an episteraic notion of 
pedagogy involves two interrelated dimensions. One dimen¬ 
sion is knowledge; the other dimension is moral judgment 
and action. He indicates that moral action may be under¬ 
stood to be the necessary consequence of knowledge. 
It may be said that the aim of education is the full 
and total development of a child. Therefore, education as 
a vehicle should attempt to translate the structure of 
knowledge into the cognitive structure of the learner. The 
process of translating the structure of knowledge into the 
cognitive structure of the learner may pave the way for the 
learner's moral growth and responsible action. For Plato, 
then, moral and cognitive growth is indivisible. Plato 
realizes that moral character apparently does not just 
happen in an incidental fashion. Moral character develops 
in a sequential and constructive way. Thus, its growth 
parallels the development of intellectual capabilities. 
For Plato and Kohlberg, cognitive development is a pre¬ 
requisite to the development of moral thought and action. 
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By the same token, Plato's epistemological and moral 
thought embraces the premise that moral development is not 
spontaneous: moral development is determined by inter¬ 
action with other people. 
As for Aristotle, his notions of being, essence, 
substratum, truth, knowledge, education, and morality have 
been utilized by various intellectualist scholars to 
reinvigorate their essentialist assumptions. In chapter 
three the tenability of the essentialist assumptions 
attributed to Aristotle by certain medieval scholars and 
modern philosophers of education will be examined. In the 
course of studying Aristotles own works, as translated by 
recent Greek language scholars, it will be shown that 
medieval thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas and post-medieval 
scholars such as Hutchins and Adler have interpreted 
Aristotle in a way that falls short of recognizing the full 
scope of his own thought. In addition, it will be 
suggested that some modern philosophers of education, on 
the basis of traditional classical scholarship, have im¬ 
puted to Aristotle certain epistemological and pedagogical 
assumptions that are not totally congruent with his own 
words and works. 
Essentialist educators such as Robert M. Hutchins, 
Mortimer Adler, and Admiral Richover, for instance, claimed 
that education implies teaching. Teaching implies knowledge, 
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and knowledge is truth. In other words, the truth is 
everywhere the same. Hence, education should be everywhere 
the same. In addition education should be understood 
solely as the "cultivation of the intellect" and single 
minded pursuit of "intellectual virtues." Hutchins attacked 
the modern trend that all education is formal education and 
that formal education must, therefore, assume total 
responsibility for the individual's total growth. He 
suggested that experience should be left to life itself 
and that emphasis should be placed on intellectual training. 
He proposed that specific curriculum would incorporate 
those "permanent studies" that reflect major components 
of common human essence. For Hutchins and other conserva¬ 
tive essentialists such as Mark Van Doren, Jacques Maritain, 
Gilbert Highet and others, the process of intellectual 
training will be accelerated by the Great Books. Those are 
works that through the centuries have attained the status 
of essential "classics" in fundamental areas of knowledge. 
In order to formulate their pedagogical hypotheses and 
assumptions, these scholars relied heavily upon Aristotelian 
classical scholarship. For that reason we will attempt to 
suggest that they inadequately read into Aristotle's corpus 
and that Aristotle's philosophy comprehends a broader 
perspective than what they -delineate of his thought. 
12 
In the comparative section of this dissertation 
(chapters four and five) considerable light will also be 
shed on these issues by carefully analyzing Islamic sources 
inspired by Plato and Aristotle. Within this context, 
notions of knowledge, action, morality and eros will be 
considered. In my judgment figurative thinking and com¬ 
paring are inherent in human thinking. They, in fact, 
represent a basic step in cognitive development. Today a 
great bulk of research has been conducted to ascertain that 
comparison, syncretism, and juxtaposition pave the way for 
alternative modes of thinking. By the same token, the 
growth of the comparative faculty is intertwined with the 
development of all cognitive processes. In other words, 
comparative capacity encompasses the means of drawing 
meaning from things and experiences of others and generat¬ 
ing new ideas from them. History attests to the fact that 
comparison and communication have been central to the 
progress of science and other areas of human knowledge. 
Comparative modes of study have always led to the solution 
of complex puzzles in scientific, philosophical, and social 
research. 
This preliminary premise raises the issue of the value 
of a consideration of Islamic philosophers' interpretations 
of the works of Plato and Aristotle. Therefore, this study 
includes works of Rumi and Mulla Sadra who challenged the 
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essentialist assumptions of peripatetic Ibn Sina. The 
comparative part intends to show that the position of Ibn 
Sina and his followers on the problem of knowledge, action, 
morality and eros, and the implications emanating from 
these positions, partly affected the educational thought 
of Muslims in a manner congruent with medieval and con¬ 
temporary classic scholarship in the West. Rumi and Mulla 
Sadra are considered to be two of the most significant 
precursors of an anti-essentialist camp within the Muslim 
world. 
Rumi, a thirteenth century Persian poet and philosopher 
(1207, 1273) embarked, for the first time, on an enter- 
prizing challenge against the time honored school of 
essentialism. In the chapter dealing with Rumi I will 
attempt to show that his philosophy reflects dimensions 
comparable to those of Whitehead, Hartshorne, Hegel, and 
William James. He sees reality in some respects surd. 
This means that reality is neither expressible in rational 
numbers nor capable of being explained away. 
He suggests that reality involves everything that 
happens. Reality may not simply be grasped by means of 
rational endeavor. For Rumi experience plays a major role 
in the knowledge of reality. Thus, knowledge of reality 
is not divorced from practical experience. His conception 
of knowledge, truth and reality, in fact, served as a 
cogent challenge to essentialism of the time. 
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Rumi indicates that the universe presents itself to 
our attention as a process of becoming, which reflects the 
transformation of actual entities. In the light of this 
view he puts forth a developmental paradigm to explain the 
process of knowledge and learning. Rumi seems to anticipate 
Kohlberg's stages of moral development. In the course of 
studying Rumi's thought, I will show that he challenges 
the essentialist emphasis on the intellectuality of 
reality. 
Rumi also raises the question of tacit dimensions in 
knowledge and learning. Tacit dimension is a term borrowed 
from Michael Polanyi, a British philosopher and scientist, 
to describe what Rumi calls an integrative metaphoric mode 
of thinking. Tacit dimension occurs when the somatic and 
psychic qualities of a person are projected into direct 
experience with objects, processes, and conditions existing 
in the external world. 
Ultimately, I will make a comparison between Rumi's 
conception of Ishq (love) and Kohlberg's stage seven, the 
metaphoric dimension of development. This comparison will 
be made within the purview of Plato's eros model. At this 
point, it will be suggested that knowledge and learning are 
not restricted to the rational domain. The view that some 
acts are mental and others are physical and that some 
knowable (theoretical) and others are practical 
objects are 
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will be criticized. Attempt will also be made to show that 
the denial of cognitive value to emotional and arational 
experience is inconsistent both with deliverances of 
ordinary language and with biological and psychological 
evidence. 
Another anti-essentialist figure in the history of 
Islamic philosophy is Mulla Sadra of Persia (1572/1640). 
I also study Mulla Sadra in relationship to the essentialist 
frame of reference. Sadra is often considered to be the 
first philosopher who challenged philosophical essentialism 
in a systematic way. His main philosophical contentions 
were designed to challenge Ibn Sina's position on Islamic 
essentialism. Western philosophers indicate that Ibn Sina 
was the first philosopher who forged the distinction between 
existence and essence by arguing that existence is some 
sort of an accident of the essence. Sadra first studied 
Ibn Sina's philosophy of essence. Then, he developed his 
revolutionary critique of essentialism, disputing Ibn Sina's 
philosophical contentions. Before dwelling upon Sadra's 
process philosophy, I will attempt to provide a historical 
and philosophical overview of Ibn Sina's school of thought. 
This procedure should pave the way for a careful examina¬ 
tion of Sadra's position. 
Finally, I attempt .to study philosophical implica¬ 
tions of Sadra's thought for education. In my research on 
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Mulla Sadra I pursue the same approach taken to examine the 
thoughts of Plato, Aristotle, and Rumi. 
To sum up, this study takes the position that 
essentialism, in its current form, cannot embrace the 
philosophical and educational dimensions of Plato's and 
Aristotle's perspectives. There are several reasons why 
Plato and Aristotle are misunderstood by modern essential- 
ists in general, and by some progressive pedagogues in 
particular. Among these reasons are contributions made by 
some medieval western scholastics inspired by certain 
Islamic philosophers such as Avecinna (Ibn Sina), and 
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Alfarabus (Al-farabi). In large measure, this misunder¬ 
standing appears to have arisen in connection with the 
translation of classical Greek concepts into the Latin 
language. I suggest that dualism (i.e., body versus soul, 
reason versus action, etc.), as a philosophical orientation, 
is not Greek in character. By this, I mean that dualism 
is not native in Greek culture in its pristine form. 
Furthermore, the comparative side of this study deals with 
the emergence of a duality of existence and essence within 
Avecinna's philosophy and from there it was carried ovei 
into the Latin environment. Thus, it is suggested that 
the birthplace of essence, as a philosophical notion, is to 
be found in the Medieval Islamic philosophy. 
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Studying philosophical and educational essentialism 
without taking its historical origins into account is 
tantamount to an historical non-sequitur. The comparative 
section of this dissertation attempts, within its limita¬ 
tions, to tackle the roots of philosophical and educational 
essentialism in the Islamic Medieval and post-Medieval 
intellectual domain. However, the major thrust of the 
thesis falls within the framework of Plato's and 
Aristotle's perspectives and their influence on Islamic 
philosophy and education. 
It remains to be added that for the sake of brevity, 
I have provided a list of abbreviations for classical 
Greek, Arabic and Persian works, and a glossary of Greek 
and Latin terms for quick reference at the end of this 
dissertat ion. 
18 
Notes 
William C. Bagley, "The Case for Essentialism in 
Education," Journal of the National Education Association. 
30 (October 1984), 202. 
2 
William C. Bagley, "An Essentialist's Platform for 
the Advancement of American Education," Educational 
Administration and Supervision, 24 (April 1938), 241-256. 
3 
William Chandler Bagley, A Century of the Universal 
School, (New York: Crowell, Collier, and Macmillan, 1937), 
P. 73. 
4 
Christopher J. Lucas, Foundations of Education, 
Schooling and the Social Order, (New Jersey: Englewood 
Cliff, Prentice ITall, Inc., 1984), pp. 31, 32. 
5 
Anton C. Pegis, Introduction to Saint Thomas Aquinas, 
(New York: Modern Library, 1948), p. XXII. 
0 
°Thomas Aquinas, Commentaria in Metaphysics 
Aristotelis, Lib II, Lect. 1. 
^Robert M. Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), pp. 66-67. 
Quotations are from the 1962 paperbound edition. 
Beatrice H. Zedler, "St. Thomas, Interpreter of 
Avicenna," The Modern Schoolman, 33 (1955-1956), pp. 1-18. 
CHAPTER II 
PLATO 
Shortly before he died, Plato dreamt that he had 
become a swan which flew from tree to tree, thereby 
causing the utmost trouble to the archers who wanted 
the to shoot him down. Simmias the Socratic inter¬ 
preted the dream as meaning that Plato would elude 
all the pains of his interpreters. Since archers are 
similar to interpreters who try to hunt out the hidden 
meanings of the ancients, but elusive is Plato because 
his writings, like those of Homer, must be understood 
in many senses, both physically, ethically, theologi¬ 
cally, and literally. Olympiodorus, Vita Platonis. •*- 
Even though Plato's philosophy is ubiquitous in the 
halls of academe, it is obvious to scholars who are well- 
versed in his works that he is one of the most misunderstood 
thinkers of Western philosophy. Arguments about Plato's 
views are diverse and some are clearly contradictory in 
nature. The views of certain scholars which are presented 
as faithful pictures of Plato are to others reckless carica¬ 
ture or phantasmagoric naivete. Some regard him as a dogmat¬ 
ic system builder; others see him as a mystic dialectician. 
Some scholars argue that he is the father of Western ration¬ 
alism while others consider him to be a proponent of irra¬ 
tionalism.^ He is sometimes called dogmatic. In some in¬ 
stances, however, he is even purported to be aporetic and 
skeptic. 
Many scholars of 
others, such as Warner 
view him with contempt 
Plato regard his works with respect; 
Fite, A.D. Winspear and Karl R. Popper, 
and charge that he is hostile to pro- 
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gressive social thought. They try to demonstrate that 
fascism and nazism are partial manifestations of Plato's 
thought.^ 
George Grote, in his famous book, Plato and the other 
Companions of Socrates, indicates that "Plato was skeptic, 
dogmatic, religious, mystic and inquisitor, mathematician, 
philosopher, poet (erotic as well as satirical), rhetori¬ 
cian, artist-all in one: or at least; all in succession 
throughout the fifty years of his philosophical life."4 In 
Grote's view Plato was a philosophical chameleon. 
However, some educational philosophers, including 
both essentialists and progressivists, have described Plato 
as the founding father of educational essentialism. They 
relied, to a large extent, on the classical Latin transla¬ 
tions of Plato’s works and medieval commentaries. Here, we 
are concerned with the analysis and critique of their as¬ 
sumptions and judgments about Plato. Therefore, the basic 
intent of this chapter is to study and critique the 
essentialists' understanding of Plato's theories on know¬ 
ledge and education. The critique will be based on recent 
linguistic research and analysis of Plato's original texts. 
Many philosophers of education have suggested that 
Plato assumed an innate mental power that is developed by the 
process of reflecting upon recurring intellectual problems 
of man. Thus, they argue that from Plato's point of view, 
thinking occurs in an orderly and rationally systematic 
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manner. It is the duty of the educator to organize the 
subject manner of instruction in such a way as to cultivate 
good habits of thinking. Effective thought, they claim 
Plato suggests, is never haphazard. It is fostered by a 
body of systematic content that paves the way for effective 
rational development. According to these scholars, Plato 
felt that education affects eternity; and since man is 
essentially a rational being, his nature is unchanging and 
his mind is rational. Hence, the purpose of education is 
the trasmission of certain elements of the cultural heritage 
whose importance is so great that they cannot be neglected. 
From an individual's point of view, the aim of education is 
to help that person achieve intellectual discipline.5 
They contend that from Plato's perspective, man has a 
dual nature (viz., body and mind/soul). Body is the sensing 
and feeling dimension of one's being. Mind is the knowing 
aspect of man. It is also inferred that Plato's works are 
construed to have promoted superiority of mind over body 
and intellect over feeling and emotions. There are subtle 
hints that Plato's dialogues give the appearance of indicat¬ 
ing that the salvation of an individual's soul should be the 
ultimate purpose of any educational process. 
Since rationality should control man's mind, then facts 
are essential in the exercise of education as an intellectual 
enterprise. In this way great importance is given to the 
student's memorization of factual materials. Some scholars 
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assert that, from Plato's point of view, every knowing 
process is characterized by a high degree of rational 
abstraction. Thus, students are expected to abandon the 
world of sense perception and dwell upon rational ideas. 
In such cases, educators are required to resort to the 
abstract verbal concepts and other ideational concepts that 
are beyond the world of sense experiences.® 
Many scholars suggest that education is the process of 
transmitting an essential core of subject matter, skills, 
and values to all who attend school. The oldest forms of 
content transmission are lecturing and the commitment of 
printed material to memory.7 
It is claimed that Plato appreciates that learning is 
hard work and requires strict discipline. Learning materials 
which are essential cannot always stimulate the interest of 
the child. It is often construed that the immediate needs 
of the learners are not so important. Effort should control 
interest. From time to time, effort would facilitate the 
interest necessary to understand a field of subject matter. 
Even though the terms, "effort" and "interest" do not appear 
in Plato's works as pedagogy, some modern scholars continue 
to suggest obliquely that in his philosophical dialogues, 
"effort" may be construed to take precedence over "interest.’ 
Because of such inferences, students are often led to think 
that, from time to time, Plato's dialogues encourage the 
belief that effort brings about the interest necessary to 
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understand a subject matter or academic discipline. In 
some instances, modern scholars embrace the belief that 
Plato's dialogues purport that: (1) teachers are the 
center of classroom authority; (2) the teacher is the only 
one who can appreciate the student's capacity to know; and 
(3) the teacher is the only one well-versed in the rational 
order of the subject matter; (4) the teacher is the best 
person to determine methods for presenting educational 
materials; and (5) the subject matter and not the student 
should determine the essence of educational activity, because 
the aim of education is to acquaint students with absolute 
and unchanging truth. Accordingly, suppositions abound 
that Plato's dialogues include the tenets that educational 
activity is a preparation for life rather than a living 
experience or real situation. Moreover, it is often thought 
that the dialogues may imply that schools are places where 
students are given the opportunity to foster their intel¬ 
lectual powers for a fruitful life of rational endeavor.8 
In general, many essentialists appear to take the 
position that methodology should hot be a preoccupation for 
teachers and educators. For example, one of prominent pro¬ 
ponents of educational essentials is Herman Horne. Horne 
argues that, "We overdo methodology.”^ Supporters of es- 
sentialism hold the position that recitation stands first 
as a teaching method. Recitation reinforces memory and 
recall, because it is based on the printed text. Moreover, 
they contend that since recitation is oral, it is the most 
appropriate vehicle through which good grammatical struc¬ 
tures are emphasized. 
The following section is designed to raise critical 
questions about some of the educational assumptions and 
propositions attributed to Plato. This critique will be 
based primarily on a detailed review of Plato's own words 
and works. Historically, pristine interpretations of Plato's 
philosophical dialogues have suffered for several reasons. 
In the first place, critical points in Plato's dialogues 
were lost when his works were translated from Greek into 
Latin. Secondly, when medieval Platonic scholars attempted 
to translate Plato's works, much was lost because the 
doctrines of these scholars differed drastically from the 
ethos of the Greek culture. This chapter will also attempt 
to examine the experiential dimensions of his educational 
philosophy by emphasizing his theories of knowledge, moral 
judgment and their practical applications. In addition, this 
chapter will attempt to examine the extent to which non- 
essentialist educational parameters fit within the context 
of Plato's corpus. 
Dialogue and dialectic 
As far as education is concerned, esssentialism is often 
predicated on the assumptions that: (1) knowledge is a 
product to be presented only by teachers; and (2) students 
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must then digest the propositions and formal treatises 
presented by teachers. Educational essentialism requires 
at least three phases. The first phase involves the 
preparation of formal educational materials. The second 
phase is characterized by the teacher's educational presen¬ 
tations. And, the third phase represents the way in which 
students assimilate didactic materials. In essence, essen¬ 
tialism is a process whereby the teacher gives and the 
students assimilates what is presented. 
Contrary to the process advocated by the educational 
essentialist, Plato's dialogues incorporate and encourage 
active interactions involving live and dialogical communi¬ 
cation. For example, Plato never speaks in his own name. 
He uses dialogue to raise questions which in turn encourage 
debate. Through debates participant's in a dialogue share 
many experiences. These dialogues provide a comprehensive 
treatment of philosophical questions. In fact, through 
dialogue he attempts to manifest the experiential dimensions 
of logos (i.e., reasoned and articulate communication). 
Plato creates space between men and then attempts to bridge 
the gap created by such space through dialogical communica¬ 
tion. Participants who engage in this dialogical process 
relate to each other through reasoned communication. 
Plato recognizes the effects of dialectical interaction 
among members of a society. Every participant tries to reach 
out to others by means of effective arguments. The encounters 
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created by the process of discourse signify a constructive 
approach which, in turn, may result in anticipated social 
verification and corroboration. In other words, by using 
dialogues, Plato is saying that "thought and speech antici¬ 
pate one another. Philosophy in general, and education 
in particular, are not isolated issues. Plato uses dia¬ 
logue to represent the fact that man exists in the plural. 
Therefore, man's understanding and thinking need to be com¬ 
municated in order to manifest his relatedness to the world. 
Thus, disclosure and unconcealment (aletheia) of truth and 
knowing (noein) is possible only in the course of dialogical 
relationships. For Plato, dialogue is an effective educa¬ 
tional method which paves the way for the discovery of 
truth. 
Dialogue as used by Plato involved words. A word is 
more than a means of simply communicating one's ideas. It 
conveys both reflection (logismos) and action (praxis). 
Plato was not advocating verbalism and idle chatter when he 
used dialogue. Human existence, he realized, is not in a 
silent and static mode, nor is it nourished by empty gar¬ 
rulity. Man is born in a social context which empowers him 
to communicate intellectually with others and to grow edu¬ 
cationally by means of dialogue with others. Dialogue is 
an encounter between people, mediated by the world, in order 
to name the world. Paulo-Freire articulates this point suc¬ 
cinctly when he states that "dialogue cannot exist in the 
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absence of a profound love for the world."11 Dialogue 
involves the contribution of others in one's challenge to 
an impending issue. Plato used the dialogical method of 
education to change the "technology of communication." In 
the words of Eric A. Havelock, Plato intended to "challenge 
the habit of poetic identification" (mimesis). As a method 
of education in the Greek culture, poetic identification was 
based on the memorization of group traditions. In addition, 
it was applied in the form of dramatization, imitation and 
impersonation of the original characters. In other words, 
according to this method, the teacher tried to make his 
verbal medium and his character resemble the creator of a 
particular piece of work. The method was designed to make 
the "audience," i.e., students, "almost pathologically and 
certainly sympathetically identify with the context of what" 
he revealed.1^ This method of mimetic identification re¬ 
vitalized the experience in memory without being either ana¬ 
lyzed or clearly understood. In terms of education, Plato 
believed that the mimetic method was useful in a limited 
way. Therefore, he questioned the extent to which the method 
could be used as a comprehensive approach for teaching and 
learning. Plato maintained that a "degree of identification 
is possibly useful to the pupil in primary education if it 
helps him to imitate models which are morally sound and use 
ful."13 By undermining the comprehensive plausibility of the 
mimetic method Plato tries to address the question of the 
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autonomy of the psyche and its power of independent thinking. 
Here he attempts to promote the importance of scepsis, a 
Greek term meaning inquiry. Thinking, in his view, is a 
power of the psyche. It is an arete (excellence). It needs 
to be educated. The psyche is supposed to resolve ambiguous 
situations and propose alternatives. Dialogical communica¬ 
tion involves thinking and, therefore, intellectual develop¬ 
ment. Dialogical process is multi-dimensional while mimetic 
process can portray only one aspect of an object. Thus, the 
mimetic method seems to be antithetical to science (episte- 
me).14 The mimetic method of education lacks thinking and 
fails to create a working relationship with calculative 
faculty. 
It should be borne in mind that Plato speaks of noetic 
dialogue,-1-6 as opposed to poetic mimesis, which involves in¬ 
tellectual development. Noetic dialogue, for Plato, serves 
to force the speaker to "repeat statement already made with 
the underlying assumption that there was something unsatis¬ 
factory about the statement" and that it needs to be re¬ 
thought and rephrased in an understandable form. When such 
a statement is challenged by a critical question addressed 
by a participant, then the speaker of the statement has no 
choice but to cogitate reflectively in order to rectify any 
possible flaw therein. In other words, this is a shocking 
method for anyone who lives in a dreamy aura of phantasy. 
One important aim of dialogue is to "awaken the prisoners m 
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the cave from their long illusion," as Havelock put it.17 
When dialogue as a technique is involved, then speak¬ 
ing of system is incompatible. I agree with Paul Shorey who 
maintains that a true philosopher can not have a system. 
Subsequently Plato has none. Plato shows no scruples over 
rigid consistency in questions of ontology. Plato is a 
great educational scholar who subordinates logic, metaphy¬ 
sics and physics to education which, in its own right, en¬ 
tails ethics. The so-called Unitarian school of philosophy 
which attempts to find unity in Platonic thought, often 
entangles these scholars in a web of contradiction, incon¬ 
sistency and sometimes obfuscation. I do not want to deny 
the presence of unity in Platonic dialogue; what I want to 
stress is that this unity inheres in the dynamic process. 
The philosophical development of Plato, as is evident in his 
dialogues, manifests a living unity. Those scholars who 
strive for a strict unity in Plato's thought often disre¬ 
gard his main objectives which are represented in the tenets 
of his paideia. They normally labor to find a real close- 
knit system with a fixed technical terminology which excludes 
important variations, seeming contradictions and incon¬ 
gruities.^-® They are oblivious of the fact that Plato s 
purpose is paideia, cultivation of man, both education and 
knowledge. He is the recaptulator and evaluator of his past 
culture and tradition. Plato is the first educational philo- 
He tries to formulate the philosophical 
sopher of the West. 
30 
basis of paideia. His use of dialectic, logic, and meta¬ 
physics is to be viewed from an educational standpoint. So 
the claim made by Rousseau that Plato's Republic is the best 
work on civic education ever written is quite understandable 
within the purview of the above argument. 
The essentialist interpretation of dialogues in .general 
and dialectics in particular is limited merely to abstract 
reasoning. According to the view of this school, a dia¬ 
logue is undertaken only by the individual called the dia- 
lectrician who poses questions while the respondent provides 
logical answers. Within this framework the answers are chal¬ 
lenged if terms are ill defined or if a logical explanation 
is not provided. All of this purports to lead the partici¬ 
pant in the dialogue to the immediate apprehension of Pla¬ 
tonic Ideas. They confine the scope of dialectic to the 
technique of reaching truth through philosophical discussion. 
Their main canonical reference is Plato's Cratylus (390), 
which deals with the meaning of dialectics. They see dia¬ 
lectic in the method by which Platonic ideals are known and 
understood.19 They say Plato has arranged various mental 
states of cognitive activity in a hierarchical order as 
follows: 1- imagining; 2- believing; 3- thinking and 
, . v 20 
dialectical cognizing (knowing). 
They do not realize that each dialogue represents a vig¬ 
orous dialectic in the sense that it is both holistic and in¬ 
tegral. It is integral because each portion of the dialogue has 
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to be meaningfully treated in relation to the other parts and 
from a Unitarian point of view. It is holistic since it re¬ 
flects a total picture of human place in the world. What 
essentialism represents is an inadequate image of dialectic 
in that it is a merely logical and metaphysical device to 
resolve rational disputes. In Plato's works the notion of 
dialectic is discussed differently in different dialogues. 
Thus, the definitional understanding gleaned from a parti¬ 
cular dialogue cannot be utilized in a general way. The in¬ 
terpretation of the concept of dialectic as an extension of 
the ordinary sense of the word is as simplistic as that of 
those who hold that dialectic is an abstruse and mysterious 
activity.21- Plato's view of dialectic within the context of 
the dialogues allows for the partial validity of both of the 
above positions. Dialectic is the soul of encounter. At 
the lower levels it includes inconclusive arguments based on 
short sighted opinions as are found in the Euthyphro. At 
the higher levels it provides a kind of argumentation which 
represents a supreme level of consistency and coherence. 
Plato attempts to combine the power of both the spoken and 
the written word and avoids the limitations of either. Dia¬ 
logue involves an open ended discussion of a problem.22 Edu¬ 
cation and philosophy in the form of "treatise" as distinct 
from dialogue, leaves no room for live argumentation. I ap¬ 
preciate Alfred North Whitehead's saying that "the exactness 
elevance and vividness at the 
is fake." Plato has chosen r 
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expense of narrow exactness. Dialogue involves motivation 
while "treatise" with all its exacting precision and arti¬ 
culation hardly motivates the reader. As it was indicated 
earlier, dialogue is an active process while the study of 
"treatise" lacks activity. Treatise or textbook does not 
convey the vitality of any subject or discipline. It is 
said that "when a young student wrote a textbook of Platon¬ 
ism," Plato countered (in the Seventh Letter) with one of 
the most unfavorable "book reviews" on record. No one who 
understood his philosophy, he argued, would try to reduce it 
to textbook form."23 Plato realized that when ideas are "im¬ 
mobilized and nailed down in the form of treatise, the risk 
of misunderstanding and rote memorization will be impending." 
From an educational point of view, Platonic dialogical 
method makes learning ideas very significant. Thinking in¬ 
volves idea formation. Inquiry is an active process and 
learning should take place as a result of inquiry (scepsis). 
Platonic dialectic, in one sense, does not sanction trans¬ 
mission of ideas or thought from one person to another in a 
mechanical way. Since Plato appreciates that such a method 
stifles the student's initiative effort at thought, education 
with dialogical method is much more than the mere transmis¬ 
sion of the known data. It should arouse the tendency toward 
inquiry. It is not extravagant to declare that Platonic dia¬ 
logical method, if it is understood correctly, does include 
the essence of a method of discovery and an approach toward 
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problem solving. It is well understood that Plato does not 
agree with reception or the expository learning method. Dia- 
logical method does not allow for the gathering and the sup¬ 
ply of ready made solutions. Thus, listening and reading in 
order to acquire knowledge would not be considered as an ap¬ 
propriate way of learning. If Plato were alive, he would 
agree with Jean Piaget who states that every new truth to be 
learned is to be rediscovered or at least reconstructed by 
the student. Dialogical method takes a teacher to be a 
moderator, rather than a lecturer engaged in the transmission 
of ready made ideas. My understanding of Plato's education¬ 
al theory is also acceptable to Paul Friedlander when he 
states that "Plato also inherited the insight from Socrates 
that there is no ready-made knowledge simply transferable 
from one person to another, but only philosophy as an acti¬ 
vity, the level of which is invariably determined by one's 
partner. Every philosophical conversation conducted by 
Socrates is new and different according to the partner-this 
is the socratic principle of education."24 
I imagine that Plato could easily agree with Alfred 
North Whitehead's two types of learning, i.e., external and 
internal. External method (i.e., transmission approach) man¬ 
ifests "rote memorization, accurate touch typing, repeated 
rules of conduct, all can be learned without any real en¬ 
gagement on the part of the learner."25 The motivation for 
learning of this type is extrinsic-it is based upon the well 
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known formula of stimulus and response. Behaviorist and 
neobehaviorist psychologists such as Edwin Gutherie (1886- 
1959), John Watson (1878-1958), B.F. Skinner and Clark L. 
Hull (1888-1952) based their psychological framework on 
stimulus-response formula. Plato does not vote for the view 
that learning is a change in behavior, in the way a person 
acts in a particular situation. He does not overemphasize 
observable behavior and behavioral changes. He would pos¬ 
sibly agree with the second group who maintain that learning 
is an internal process (i.e., reconstruction of experience) 
that cannot be observed directly.26 The internal process of 
learning involves internal motivation. It is not based on 
a hedonistic notion that we tend to behave in such a way as 
to increase pleasure and decrease pain. The internal pro¬ 
cess manifests the tendency in the learner to investigate 
what he thinks is important to know. The learning is tied 
to a desire for self-realization and improvement. Socrates 
as depicted in Meno is the master of motivation. He is cap¬ 
able of motivating the most refractory student with a desire 
to inquire. Plato tries to show that by dialogue he is able 
to inspire any student to think and cultivate himself. By 
virtue of dialogical method the student learns through his 
own involvement. The teacher provides the appropriate materi¬ 
al and persuades the student to discuss, observe, form hy¬ 
potheses, and test solutions. The teacher guides discovery 
by asking questions. This method helps the student learn 
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how to learn. It produces a sense of excitement and self 
motivation. It helps the student strengthen his self-con¬ 
cept. It removes a simplistic approach to problems and de¬ 
velops a sense of reasonable scepticism in the student so 
that he may approach realities in a critical way.2? As it 
was mentioned earlier, educational programs normally aim at 
developing the capacity of problem solving. Problem solv¬ 
ing is usually defined as formulating new answers, going be¬ 
yond the simple application of previously learned principles 
or rules to create a solution to a novel problem. Gagne be¬ 
lieves that problem solving involves combining previously 
learned rules into a new, never-before-used higher-order rule. 
Thus, problem solving dramatically changes the student's 
capabilities.^ For Plato learning is an active process. 
Plato seems to hold that knowledge is a construction 
from within. Knowledge is not a direct acquaintance, as in 
perceiving, but an activity involving memory, judgment, mean¬ 
ing, asserting, synthesising and thinking.29 The child then 
should undergo the above process in order to acquire know¬ 
ledge. Plato rejects mere perception as knowledge. 
Plato says that knowing can be having knowledge, but 
it can also be possessing knowledge, but not necessarily hav 
ing it in one's grasp. "Possessing knowledge," he says, 
"without having it is like someone who has caught some wild 
birds, pigeon or whatever, and keeps them at home m an 
O Q 
aviary he has made." 
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In light of the aviary model, Plato indicates that 
learning to know is enclosing, putting in the aviary. Know¬ 
ing is possession, having in the aviary (198 B). So teach¬ 
ing, involves more than taking from an enclosure and handing 
over. The learning process may be said to be similar to a 
hunting activity in the sense that it entails two phases as 
follows: 
Well, using the simile of possessing birds in an aviary 
and chasing them, we shall say that there are two kinds 
of chasing: The first before acquiring and for the 
sake of possessing, and the second the phase by the 
owner to take and have in his hands what he acquired 
sometime before, It is possible, in the same way, to 
come to know again things of which one had knowledge 
some time before, when one learnt them, and which one 
knew, by taking up and holding the knowledge of each 
which one acquired some time before, but did not have 
in hand in one’s mind?^! 
The explanation of Plato, regarding the learning process, 
may be clarified by appealing to the discovery method in the 
sense that although data and information are provided, the 
formation of knowledge should take place in the form of con¬ 
struction. Knowledge is as flighty as the bird and achieving 
it requires participatory effort on the part of the learner. 
Possessing knowledge and not having it may be construed as 
being the potentiality of knowing, and having knowledge may 
be described as the realization of that process which, in it 
self, involves the personal activity of the learner. Plato, 
in the above passage, tries to construct the model of educa¬ 
tion as an internal process. Every learner has to construct 
his own knowledge. Sometimes we may be helped by what others 
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provide us with, but we still have to do the work ourselves. 
Often we can say things we have been told without understand¬ 
ing what we say. In other words, Plato has offered a non¬ 
mechanical, creative or constructionist conception of the 
process of human learning and knowing. In the above instance, 
Plato may agree with Piaget's constructionist approach to 
knowledge. If we agree that the knowing process, in Plato's 
view, takes place as a result of construction on the part of 
the learner. Then it is difficult to believe that Plato 
understands learning in terms of cognitive assimilation of 
known information, the theory adhered to by David Ausubel.22 
Accordingly, if the above passage is carefully analyz¬ 
ed it would be plausible to infer that the learning process 
involves greater activity than teaching. We could conceptua¬ 
lize the learner, according to Plato's aviary model, as more 
central and important than the teacher. Plato insists that 
the truth (aletheia) sought by the dialogical method is, in 
fact, a vision of the way one should live in an excellent way. 
The aim is practically efficacious arete. According to this 
model one cannot be taught by way of transmission from one 
mind to the other, like passing a cup from one hand to the 
other. In reality, learning can be facilitated, but it is not 
so casually dependent upon teaching. Plato's dialogical method 
is to be considered as the "context for learning, as Alvin 
Gouldner has put it, and not for teaching. The idea 
learning as remembering and recollection (Anamnasis) is also 
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one more positive attitude toward the knowledge process as 
construction. Plato has repeatedly pointed out that "know¬ 
ledge" is not a thing that can be handed over and imparted by 
one person to another: 
"Education is not what the professions of certain men 
assert it to be. They presumably assert that they put 
into soul knowledge that isn't in it, as though they 
were putting sight into blind eyes." (Republic, 518 C) 
The above statement by Plato, explicitly challenges the 
position of Skinnerian behaviorism and adumberates the idea 
that knowledge is an interaction between "subject" and "ob¬ 
ject." If we try to reconstruct Plato's thought in a modern 
context, we may say that there is a dialectical movement in¬ 
volved in the process of epistemic construction. Thus, it 
would not be grotesque to aver that Plato would withstand both 
crude empiricism and immanent innatism. A student, in his 
view, is not a mere recipient of data input, but he is an 
epistemic subject. For Plato, we may, assume, operant con¬ 
ception of learning is not defensible since it is, to a large 
extent, dependent upon environmental reinforcement. Unlike 
respondent learning, operant learning has no known physiologi¬ 
cal stimulus. Operant behavior is not "elicited, " it is 
"emitted." This idea is sometimes referred to as instrumental 
or as emitted conception of learning. Respondent learning, on 
the contrary, involves the elicitation of a response b\, a 
known stimulus. The typical example of the respondent con¬ 
ception of learning is the well-known conditioned response of 
34 Ivan Pavlov. 
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Flanders (1965) studied the relationship of teacher and 
pupil in three different countries. He recognized two ex¬ 
treme types of teaching-direct and indirect methods. In the 
direct method, teachers normally lectured, gave directions 
and closely supervised students performance with a critical 
attitude. The indirect method encompassed the function of 
those teachers who considered the pupil's feelings, asked 
them questions and involved them in group discussions and 
dialogues. The observations of Flander showed that dialogi¬ 
cal methods had significant advantages, since teachers who 
used the indirect method of influence obtained significant 
results and scholastic achievements.35 Bruner rightly states 
that "One of the most crucial ways in which a culture pro¬ 
vides aid in intellectual growth is through a dialogue bet¬ 
ween more experienced and less experienced, providing a means 
for the internalization of dialogue in thought. The courtesy 
of conversation may be the major ingredient in the courtesy of 
teaching."3® Today the research carried out by scholars such 
as Trosky Wood (1976) and Wilcox (1976) and others demonstrate 
the validity of this educational method.37 
Plato seems to believe that if dialogical method of 
education is appropriately used in teaching, it encourages the 
students to participate, think and discover the truth for them¬ 
selves. Motivation stems from a feeling of success and, thus, 
the sense of the love for.learning (philomathia) is enhanced. 
Here, Plato implies that if motivation and success are married 
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then a sense of inquiry into being is aroused. Plato, by 
raising the theory of philomathia, shows that he realizes 
that success tends to create interest in continuing the pur¬ 
suit of an activity. He points to the fact that love of 
learning creates a sense of challenge to encounter reality. 
The readiness to encounter reality is accompanied by a sense 
of readiness to engage oneself in the activity of existence.^ 
Dialectic versus eristic 
As it was mentioned earlier, dialogical method entails 
a struggle to achieve truth (aletheia). Truth is to be under¬ 
stood in light of an activity of "unconcealment." Such a no¬ 
tion of truth is not to be confused with "orthoses," which 
"presupposes fixed standards of judgment and is therefore like¬ 
ly to foster a certain rigidity of outlook." Truth in the 
sense of orthoses, implies correctness. Heidegger says that 
because of the decline of aletheia and the rise of orthoses 
there is a persistant ambiguity in Plato's writings. Plato's 
understanding of aletheia involves a dynamic activity rather 
than a passive dogmatic rigidity. In Heidegger's view, Plato 
teaches by indirection, since he is concerned more with moti¬ 
vation and "subsequent direction of thought rather than an ad¬ 
vocacy of specific doctrines." Plato, to all intents and pur¬ 
poses makes every endeavor to cause a shocking event to take 
place in the participants of the dialogues or anyone who shares 
such an enterprise.39 Truth is born of a challenge and strug- 
gle. It is not a given product. Thus, truth Is not attained 
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by virtue of eristic which involves a kind of friction of 
minds or contentious discussions with no commitment to truth. 
In eristic, the truth finding odyssey is subverted by the aim 
of ringing up the debater's points. The participants in eris¬ 
tic do not intend to attempt the truth; their aim is realized 
in the light of personal subjugation and domination. Eristic 
aims at public support. In an eristical contention the ob¬ 
ject of debate is not actualized in discovery of the truth. 
It is embodied in a series of arguments which purport to win 
public acclaim. In Plato's view, the aim of paideia should be 
crystallized in the revelation of truth as unhiddenness. This 
may be understood when one carefully examines the allegory of 
the cave. Plato, thus, declares ironically that, "for surely 
we are not simply contending in order that my view or that 
yours may prevail, but I presume that we ought both of us ti 
be fighting for the truth."40 In other words, those who en¬ 
gage in eristic are lovers of fame and those who engage in 
dialectic are lovers of learning (philomates). 
Thus, eristic education may be said to aim at personal 
fame and fortune at the expense of truth. The motive in 
eristic education is oriented towards personal success in a 
competitive society at any cost. Those curricula which aim 
at merely educating students to go to the hot markets of com¬ 
petitive politics and diplomacy to achieve positions at the 
price of sacrificing truth for simple promotion and material 
success may be said to fit the aims of eristic education. 
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Plato explains the content of eristic education in the fol¬ 
lowing passage from Letters VII: 
Now in cases where as a result of bad training we are 
not even accustomed to look for the real essence of 
anything, but are satisfied to accept what confronts 
us in the phenomenal presentations, we are not render¬ 
ed ridiculous by each other-, anyone who pleases 
among those who have skill in confutation gains the 
victory and makes most of the audience think that the 
man who was first to speak or write or answer has no 
acquaintance with the matters of which he attempts to 
write or speak... .^1 
As it Is explicitly stated in the above passage eristic 
method is a type of miseducation, since it does not aim at the 
unconcealment of truth (aletheia). The purpose of such a 
method is indoctrination, manipulation, juggling and ultimate¬ 
ly domination. Eristic method has no care or concern what¬ 
ever for the truth. Its techniques and means are presumably 
used to "muddle everything up without disturbing their own 
self-complacence."^^ The eristic method, as opposed to dia¬ 
lectic, pursues merely "verbal opposition," in the sense of 
defeating one's opponent. It does not divulge any truth what¬ 
soever. Eristic method intends to reduce serious issues to 
"a tug of war," wasting "ones pains on a triviality," in order 
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to win public acclaim and finally social lauiels. 
If the operant conception of learning is taken in a 
negative sense, that is to say, if it is used in an irrespon¬ 
sible and socially opportunistic way, then the charge may be 
made that the conditioning techniques are used in a manipula¬ 
tive and controlling manner. When the operant techniques ate 
used to reduce normal cognitive activities of children, then 
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it may be said that they are used for undesirable goals and 
unethical purposes. In Plato's view eristic is an unethical 
method, since such a technique is used to change attitudes, 
values, beliefs and knowledge of a kind that ought to be 
based on rational, intellectual processes rather than the 
irrational processes of operant conditioning. It is terrify¬ 
ing to conceive of having a person's political views "shaped" 
by conditioning processes that he is not aware of and cannot 
control. If operant conditioning is not hinged to the dis¬ 
covery of truth, it does not provide the chance for the 
child to determine for himself what the contents of the cur¬ 
riculum means to him. Learning, thus, differs from being 
trained and being conditioned to perform in a certain way.44 
I have tried here to elaborate the intention of Plato 
by means of amplifying his argument in a modern context in 
order to capture the relevance of his position. Although, I 
am aware that the way I have approached Plato with regard to 
his conception of eristic may seem rather overblown. I should 
emphasize that my understanding is based on his passage studi¬ 
ed in a holistic way rather than concentration of different 
fragments in a desultory manner. 
Finally, I should add that if behavior modification, 
which is favorable to the operant conditioning conception of 
learning, is used to reinforce mercenary motives, limit the 
expression of discontent,'substitute payoffs for reasoning 
and choices, place responsibility for learning on the teacher 
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(rewarder) rather than on the students, stress short term 
rather than long term motives and accomplishments, it will 
inhibit not only creativity and self-realization, but it will 
pave the way for a totalitarian and authoritarian life style^S 
which favors domination and subjugation rather than freedom 
and self-actualization. I entertain no doubts in asserting 
that Plato identifies the above conception of learning as 
eristic, since it aimsat control, manipulation, regimentation, 
restraint and arrogation of authority, reduces the rich and 
multidimensional life of mind to the one-dimensional relation¬ 
ship of command and obedience, although in a cunningly so¬ 
phisticated and Machiavelian way. 
Plato's theory of knowledge 
The English language can hardly do justice to the sub- 
telties of Plato's theory of knowledge. The main difficulty 
lies in the structural and morphological constitution of Greek 
words and syntactical structures. A great deal of misundei- 
standings and misrepresentations regarding Plato s thought 
emanate partly from the inadequacy of Latin translations of 
Greek concepts and ideas. In order to clarify the latter 
claim one has to deal with the key concepts and words used by 
Plato within a linguistic and semantical context. As mention¬ 
ed before, many arguments and justification of the essential]sts 
who identify Plato to be their founding father m forerunning 
the idea of essentialism seem to be based on inadequate and 
sometimes inaccurate translations of Plato. 
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In order to understand the fundamental principles of 
Plato s theory of knowledge one has to make a critical inqui¬ 
ry into the relation between noein (thinking and knowing) 
and einai (being) as discussed in Parmenides.48 Parmenides 
holds being to be that which is complete, self-revealing, 
holding sway,47 For Parmenides being as hen (one), the pri¬ 
mordial unity, is to be taken in a dynamic sense. It is not 
sameness, or empty identicality. Hen for Parmenides involves 
physis, logos and polemos. It is, in fact, the inter-depen- 
dent correlation of things amounting to dynamic reciprocity. 
Thus, Fragment 5: To gar auto noein estin te kai einai, can 
be literally translated as: "For the same is both to think 
and to be." Here, the inter-dependent correlation between 
being and thinking is expressly stated. Thinking and being 
are interdependent. For Parmenides being constitutes a dyna¬ 
mic which is in the constant process of interaction with 
noein (knowing and thinking). The noein is in reference to 
thoughtful encounter. There is no duality between res cogitan 
and res extensa. Noein (thinking and knowing) and einai (be¬ 
ing) are involved in an active and challenging tango. Absence 
of either one of these two partners makes the dance impossi¬ 
ble.48 
Heidegger rightly rejects the idea that Parmenides ex¬ 
presses a kind of rationalism (essentialism), claiming that 
being belongs to thought.. Thought, in Parmenides' view be¬ 
longs to being. Thus by pure thinking and reasoning one can- 
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not arrive at substantial knowledge about the nature of 
reality. 
Now, in order to understand Fragment 5 of Parmenides 
one has to analyze the elements of the Fragment. Parmenides, 
by using the phrase to auto, (the same) means no mechanical 
identity between noein (thinking and knowing) and einai (be¬ 
ing). To auto implies a dynamic or functional correlation. 
This correlation is reflective and constructive. In other 
words, to auto embarks upon a dialectical construction bet¬ 
ween noein and einai. Thus, in this correlation, there is a 
process of "emerging and abiding holding sway," (physis) a 
self-prevailing collectedness (logos), and a putting asunder 
of conflicts (polemos), which unifies within itself opposites. 
It could tentatively be said that, in a modern sense, to auto 
involves the equilibrium between accommodation and assimila¬ 
tion. This equilibrium is understood in terms of the function 
of hen, "the one." 
So einai (being) and noein (thinking and knowing) con¬ 
stitute a whole which should be distinguished from an aggre¬ 
gate. Aggregates are comprised of elements which are inde¬ 
pendent of complexes into which they enter, while elements of 
the whole can not be singled out or defined independently of 
the connection involved. There is an isomorphism involved in 
the complex of noein-einai. In other words, thinking belongs 
to being, as Heidegger had put it. Heidegger wants to over¬ 
come the domination of thought over being in the typical under- 
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standing of the Platonic world-view. He explicitly declares 
that the translation, stating that being and thinking are 
the same," is totally un-Greek (ungriechische). He, then, 
indicates that subjectivist interpretations of the presocra- 
tics are out of the question. "This misinterpretation as un- 
Greek as the falsification of the Heraclitean logos, under¬ 
stands thinking as the activity of the subject; being as the 
object of that thinking. And since being and thinking are 
declared the same, then, Parmenides is believed to be the 
first subjectivist."49 If being is understood in terms of 
physis (dynamic becoming), then it should be conceived in 
terms of movement, change, becoming, process. Movement or 
process is, thus, the essential characteristic of physis (be¬ 
ing and becoming). As a generic term, physis indicates "the 
sum of the determinate power possessed by things, what every¬ 
thing has power to do, the concrete order or pattern of the 
processes that are taking place by themselves."50 Physis as 
a noun is derived from the adverb, physei, meaning a way of 
acting. Thus, it has a power or tendency to act in a certain 
way. 
Between noein and einai there is a belonging which con¬ 
tains a unity of opposites. Hen (one) indicates a oneness 
which is the result of the unity of opposites. There are two 
sides to this isomorphism-one side noein (knowing and think¬ 
ing), the other einai (being). It should be borne in mind 
that thinking (noein) in Greek also involves action in the 
Heidegger says that Plato and Aristotle in sense of swimming. 
fact represent the completion and fulfilment of pre- 
socratic thought in the sense that they do preserve the 
harmony and interplay existing between the realms of einai 
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and noein. He sees the crisis of Western thought in the 
emergence of a wide gap which creates a duality between these 
originally intertwined concepts.51 
It may be said that Plato does not subscribe to the 
notion of dualism as attributed to him by his essentialist in¬ 
terpreters. In Parmenides he paves the way for a kind of 
dialectical isomorphism. It should not be inferred that 
Plato in Parmenides subscribes to a kind of radical monism, 
since such an understanding of the Platonic theory of hen is, 
as demonstrated above, out of the question. 
One of the important topics examined by Plato in 
Parmenides is the notion of aletheia (truth in the sense of 
unconcealment). Aletheia has been rendered as truth by many 
translators. But we should see what kind of truth aletheia 
implies in the language of Plato. The etymology of aletheia 
seems to describe what is not hidden, forgotten or concealed. 
We should see that if aletheia implies unhiddenness, is it 
possible to confine it to the realm of the agreement of the 
mental concept with the external reality in a representation¬ 
al form, adaequatio intellectus est rei? (correspondence and 
coherence theory of truth). Heidegger maintains that the 
aletheia rests in lethe (hiddenness), drawing from it and 
laying before us whatever remains deposited in lethe." 
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Lethe, in view of Heidegger implies the self-concealing 
absence needed for concealment.52 Thus, truth is made pos¬ 
sible by untruth (self-concealing absence, lethe). Heideg- 
&er, in his famous article, Platon Lehre von der Wahrheit, 
states that in order to gain the essence of truth one has 
to undergo a radical transformation from a-paideia the state 
of being uneducated to paideia the state of being educated. 
Heidegger adds that, in this sense, paideia and aletheia 
constitute two dimensions of a functional unity.52 
Thus, the notion of aletheia used by Plato in his dia¬ 
logues, especially in Parmenides, should be distinguished 
from truth in the sense of the Latin veritas (truth in the 
sense of correctness), which implies an end product, a for¬ 
mal conclusion. Aletheia is a functional process, which 
requires the participant to make every endeavor to bring 
forth that which is hidden, forgotten or concealed. In this 
way we may notice the relationship between aletheia and 
anamnesis (recollection) which involves the recollection and 
reminiscence of what is forgotten. As it was pointed out 
earlier, truth in the sense of aletheia is a notion which is 
to be distinguished from both orthoses and veritas (truth in 
the sense of correctness), since it is a situation-directed 
notion, requiring flexible mind, sensitive to the flux of 
things. Aletheia presupposes a liberation from apeideusia 
(state of being uneducated) and transformation to paideia. 
The essentialist dilemma lies in the fact that the fol 
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lowers of this school of thought presume that truth comes in 
orthoses and veritas, which, in turn, entail a subjectivistic 
rationalism. The essentialist position is overwhelmed by the 
domination of homoiosis or adequaetio (correspondence and co¬ 
herence theory of truth). Finding truth as an educational 
activity, according to Plato, is an art of turning around the 
psyche toward truth. Such a task represents a journey which 
involves a never ending transition. In order to better grasp 
Plato's theory of education in general and knowledge in par¬ 
ticular, we try to reexamine the allegory of the cave in an 
attempt to understand the relationship between aletheia and 
paideia. Reconstruction of the allegory of cave: Heidegger 
has tried to provide an analysis of the increasing domination 
of the world by Western scientific-technological thought. He 
says that the Western way of life is inadequate in two inter¬ 
connected ways: subjectivity and overaggressiveness. There 
is an aggressive domination over the world both in thought 
and action. In the process of such a domination, Western man 
loses touch with those experiences of the world that could 
guide him with regard to his situation and limitations. Man 
gradually turns into an omnipotent nihilist as a result of the 
increment of his power and the concomitant decrease in his 
knowledge of its purposes. Heidegger sees the diagnosis of 
Western man's state in the proper analysis of the Westein 
tradition. He tries to expose this tradition. He says that 
an appropriate understanding of Platonic thought may, somehow, 
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help man to diagnose the syndrome of the Western problem. 
He deals with this problem in his famous article, 
Plato's Doctrine of Truth, claiming that the core of Pla¬ 
tonic thought should be sought in the allegory of the cave. 
Heidegger argues that the allegory deals with the understand¬ 
ing of truth which constitutes the ultimate goal of education. 
The main problem lies in the apprehension of truth as 
such. Heidegger contends that, prior to Plato, the Greeks 
viewed all beings as hidden and truth constituted "what was 
wrested from hiddenness." The attempt to "extort" the 
aletheia from concealment represents an everlasting process. 
The allegory of the cave delineates this original conceal¬ 
ment, camouflage and disguise. Truth has an extortive, 
elicitational and educible character. Because of this char¬ 
acteristic of truth, an understanding of truth involves con¬ 
stant struggle. Heidegger argues that Plato is understood 
by some interpreters to offer a new and strange view of 
truth possible only by ignoring Plato's reference to the 
original concealment, the forcible removal of the prisoner, 
the exhortive essence of truth. "True beings are for the 
.first time called "ideas," and Being itself is called the 
"Idea of Good." The essential relation of knower and the 
known is conceived to be the perception of what appears. 
Ideas, thus, connote outward appearance and truth is reduc¬ 
ed to orthoses, correctness of the ability to perceive and 
declare something. This conception of truth as correctness 
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(homoiosis, or adequaetio). Heidegger contends, prevails in 
tradition of Western thought. 
Heidegger asserts that the conception of truth as 
homoiosis (correspondence and coherence theory of truth) 
entered into Western thinking in the form of the adaequatio 
intellectus ad rem and the adaequatio rei ad intellectum 
and was not abandoned until Hegel. It could be said that 
the usual meaning of adaequatio is provided in terms of the 
correspondence of knowledge and its object or the formal co¬ 
incidence of our representation and its content. This notion 
signifies correctness as distinct from the actual truth 
(aletheia). Truth in the sense of aletheia occurs as a pro¬ 
cess. "It is a process in which the opposition between 
reality and concept, or between objectivity and concept, or 
between content and concept is sublated to unity."^5 This 
process involves the unity of the ideal and the real. 
The essentialist understanding of being, as Heidegger 
describes, is embodied in the one-sided scientific under¬ 
standing of nature expressed in mathematical terms. There¬ 
fore, such a view of being, in general, and man, in particular, 
obfuscates and aberrates the most revealing human experience. 
The shift in the locus of truth leads to a far-fetched sub¬ 
jectivity, ignoring any examination of the subject. This 
kind of subjectivity, according to Heidegger, ultimately 
culminates in nihilism. 
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In order to appreciate Plato's theory of truth and 
education in a non-essentialist line, the reconstruction of 
the allegory of the cave in a functional form seems appropri¬ 
ate here. Socrate imagines with Glaucon a situation with 
four successive moments: 
(a) World of Shadows. A group of men dwell in a cave. 
Daylight does not enter the long passage of the cave. The 
only light in the cave is that of a fire kindled in the cave. 
The inhabitants of the cave can not see the fire; and, there¬ 
fore, know nothing of its existence. Men live chained in the 
cave and are encompassed in whatever they immediately en¬ 
counter. "In every way, then, men so chained whould recognize 
as the unhidden nothing but the shadows of these artifical 
objects" (Rep: 5156, 1-2). The cave-dwellers, inevitably, 
would take the shadows to be the only beings that are true 
(unconcealed). The silhouettes are carried in front of the 
fire by human bearers who evidently are not chained. The 
fire, the source of the shadow, is an artifact. 
(t>) World of Fire. At the second stage the chains are 
taken off. But the prisoner is not permitted to come out of 
the cave. What he can do is to freely turn around to all 
sides. So he is now able to look at the forms which had cast 
the shadows. The forms seem so strange that he feels, at 
first, that the shadows to which he had been habituated all 
his life were more true than the forms (Re£: 515-2-3-4-6). 
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When forced to look directly into the fire, the pain of the 
unaccustomed light makes him yearn for the shadows again. 
World of Sun. Socrates then assumes that should 
the cave-dweller be dragged "by force up the ascent which is 
rough and steep," he will require a long period of time to 
adjust himself to the new situation in order that he may be 
able to accept the things on earth, illumined by the sun, as 
genuinely true (truly unconcealed). "There everything lies 
openly manifest" all day long. A gradual process of education 
is required to enable the newly liberated cave dweller to look 
upon the sun itself and recognize it as the source of all 
light. But once the education required for him to adjust to 
this new genuine truth is carried out, a new self-conscious¬ 
ness emerges which gives him enjoyment of the liberation. Le 
comes to appreciate the new experience and starts to prefer it 
to the life in the cave. 
(d) World of Shadows. This stage involves the return 
into the cave and a process of readjustment. There, in 
Heidegger's view a life and death struggle takes place which 
the liberated man encounters. "He would leave cave-dweller's 
eyes incapable of seeing anything at all. He would be a 
laughing stock to those he had left behind, who jeer that he 
left the cave only to return with worsened eyesight."56 
The prisoners in such a case, Plato states, may not onl> 
resist any liberation, but also they may try to kill the lib¬ 
erator (Rep. 517a). 
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Here a typical example of the process of paideia in 
the sense of education is dealt with. According to Heidegger, 
schooling takes place in a meaningful and contextual situa¬ 
tion. In the first stage, that which represents itself to 
the cave-dwellers is the shadows. The prisoners hold that 
the truth is nothing else than the shadows of artificial 
things. In the second stage the unchained prisoner stumbles 
around and imagines that the shadows are more unconcealed than 
the figures. They thus, ask: "Don't you suppose that he'd 
be at a loss and believe that what was seen before is truer 
than what is now shown?" They try to allege that the reverse 
is true. In the third stage, the man who has been dragged 
into the light of the sun is related to be "unable to 
see even the one of the things now said to be true." In 
fact, in the process of self-revelation, beings gradually 
become visible and accessible. Liberation and education do 
not take place as the mere result of getting free from the 
chains, but they involve orientation. Freedom, in the real 
sense of the word, is realized if the exhortive and educible 
function of paideia (education) is carried into effect. The 
process of education is consummated in the course of wrestling 
aletheia from the realm of lethe. A reflective interplay op¬ 
erates between the realm of paideia and apaideusia. This pro 
cess involves the constant overcoming of the state of educa¬ 
tedness. It leads to growth and development aiming at 
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added capacity for further growth. The liberated cave-dweller 
has a moral commitment to his peers. He is supposed to di¬ 
charge his human duty. Balanced growth of mind relies heavi¬ 
ly on appreciating one’s liability toward society. He is a 
responsible member of human community whose existence depends 
to a large extent, on the reciprocity and mutual sharing of 
experiences, and building up common aims. Thus, men accord¬ 
ing to Plato are obligated to associate together in such ways 
that ideas and values are exchanged, transmitted, and made 
known. Thus, it should be noted that the fourth stage in¬ 
volves a political and ethical encounter. This stage indi¬ 
cates a painful and novel process of reeducation. It may 
cause danger and threat. "The would be philosopher needs 
both the fortitude of the warrior and the sensibilities of 
the lover."57 The proper understanding of the allegory of 
the cave is possible only when the sense of heroism and 
courage to reveal the truth is accompanied by the feeling of 
love and devotion to that truth, and this fact is explicitly 
expounded in the Symposium. Therefore, for Plato, the true 
beings are to be sought courageously and erotically. 
However, the notion of being, for Plato, leads to 
insight into the idea of agathon. The form of the agathon 
(ultimate good) in fact, stands at the center of the Platonic 
state, and it is the chief duty of educators to contemplate 
it (Rep. 504e) . Plato maintains that the "greatest thing to 
learn is the idea of Good by reference to which just things 
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aid all the rest become useful and beneficial." (Rep. 505-a). 
Heidegger maintains that, the idea of Good, like the sun is 
shining; and, therefore, is itself seeable and knowable. For 
Plato, the Good does not mean "moral good" or values. This 
understanding results from a nineteenth century misinterpre¬ 
tation. It is rather the "beneficial" and "useful." For 
Heidegger, the main dilemma of truth in the sense of orthoses, 
adequaetio, homoiosis, (coherence and correspondent theory of 
truth) transpires as a result of misunderstanding the relation 
of Idea to outward appearance within the framework of the ex¬ 
clusive concern with "the correctness of the glance." Thus, 
in such cases truth comes to mean simply "correctness" or 
agreement.The ideas derive their power of illumination and 
clarification from the agathon (good), which, in Platonic terms, 
is symbolized by the sun. Agathon (good) may be understood as 
the "supreme idea," since it provides the possibility of 
grounding for all other ideas. 
Agathon (good) in another sense seems to be ubiquitous 
and always manifest. This is the case even for those who are 
prisoners and are confined to the world of shadows where day¬ 
light can not penetrate, for the fire that reflects the shadows 
on the wall is itself "a shoot of the sun...Within the cave the 
sun remains invisible, and yet even the shadows feed upon its 
light."59 Thus, it may be noted that the eminently unhidden 
(ideas) are themselves grounded in the To agathon, which 
signifies the most radiant, luminescent and unconcealed real¬ 
ity. 
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Stage four is a privative phase. It once more deprives 
the liberated cave-dweller of his former state of manumission. 
The liberating activity never ends. The process of truth 
makes struggle (for unconcealment) absolutely indispensable. 
Essentially the process :of truth and education is just a per¬ 
petual wrenching-away in the manner of uncovering, disclosing, 
discovery, finding and espying. 
Finally, the task of education is the cultivation of in¬ 
sight into the idea of the Good (agathon). The art of paideia 
(education), in fact, is embodied in training to become human. 
The function of education is not detached from the living of 
life itself. The identity between being human and a good 
citizen is conceivable in the value placed upon the end and 
goal of education. This end is expressed within the frame¬ 
work of the notion of Idea of the Good (to agathon). Good in 
this case is a kind of sun. "As the sun moves diurnally across 
the sky, it becomes not only the source of light in which ob¬ 
jects become visible, but it is the origin of those objects 
as well. It is at once the highest intelligible object, yet 
being their source, it is beyond intelligible objects. It 
is epekeina tes ousias (Rep. 509 b), beyond being in the sense 
of form."60 Thus, an unfailing and indefatiguable exercise of 
dialectical process is required to destroy the mind's propen¬ 
sity to fix its good in some passive, indolent and sluggish 
engagement and embark upon' a propulsive activity which can 
anticipate human growth and maturity. An upward movement is, 
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indeed, needed to increase clarity of the vision of truth. 
But this upward movement runs the risk of relinquishment 
from concrete life. It may lead to irrelevance. Plato 
has resolved this paradox by means of descent back to the 
cave (Stage four). He has drawn a picture where the brus¬ 
que quandary of recondite abstraction is overcome. Thus 
he establishes an intimate relation between theory and 
practice, contemplation and action. He manifests this 
awareness of the importance to the daily life situation 
and its impact on the process of education. Here another 
proof is invoked to repudiate the claim of essentialists 
who make every endeavor to exemplify Plato as the precur¬ 
sor of essentialism. For Plato, action is not divorced 
from theory. Learning is achieved by thinking and doing 
and, especially, in association with other members of the 
society. On the other hand, Plato acknowledges the fact 
that minds are, primarily, opposed to learning. How¬ 
ever, mind is not a passive spectator of the reality. It 
needs to be engaged in the actual process of education. 
The cave represents the human world. The cave-dwellers 
exemplify members of the human community, and the ascent 
from the cave illustrates human travial to be exonerated 
from the plight of self-ignorance, which is accompanied 
by a mistaken notion of human qualities and situation. 
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Socrates always respected two fundamental maxims of the 
Oracle at Delphi: "know thyself" and "nothing in excess." 
He knew the tragic consequences of hubris. Self-actuali¬ 
zation necessitates self-knowledge and the achievement of 
integrity as a result of the harmonization of the inward 
(self) with the outward through self-knowledge.61 Since 
our awareness of ourselves is never complete, therefore, 
the process of self-integration constitutes, perforce, a 
life long modus operand^. "Self acknowledged ignorance, 
in the words of Ballard "is the power in the soul which 
leads one to begin the practice of the dialectic."62 
Persistent application of self-inquiry manifests a man's 
ignorance. Thus, self-acknowledged ignorance motivates 
discovery and exploration. 
In conclusion, the allegory of the cave symbolizes 
the difference between episteme and doxa. Plato describes 
two kinds of seeing in sun-light in order to reveal the 
difference between two kinds of episteme: dianoia and 
noesis. The latter two kinds of seeing in the sunlight 
recur in the world outside the cave. The cave itself is 
illuminated by the inferior light that results from the 
fire. The inferior light suggest two kinds of doxa: 
eikasia and pistis. 
It may be said the Plato's divided line can be elu¬ 
cidated in a modern perspective by considering it as an 
an 
tlei pat ion of the modern theories of stages of development. 
Plato in his theory of divided;line portended much of 
what Jean Piaget elaborated in the form of the theory of 
cognitive development. The stage of eikasia, the bottom 
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segment of Plato's line, is described as a state where 
the child resorts to the world of myth, fiction and ima¬ 
gination. The child makes no distinction between true 
or false. He has not concept of cause and effect. He 
has not yet grasp the categories. He has not a concep¬ 
tion of objects of causality. In the stage of Pistis, 
R.S. Peters maintains, the child reaches concrete opera¬ 
tional development. In this stage the world in the view 
of the child is not imaginary and therefore, is not 
based on fiction and simply myth. "The world now consists 
of har^, solid objects which have palpable properties 
which can be perceived through the various senses." 
Pistis refers to a "public" world, while eikasia, em¬ 
bodies a private world. In the stage of pistis the child 
gradually attains the ability to conserve each of the 
quantitative aspects of objects. It is at this stage that 
we first encounter the idea that if something is true, it 
is true for all men. "True for me only" constitutes the 
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first stage of development (eikasia). 
Plato divides the stage of formal operations into 
two lines. He distinguishes between dianoia and noesis 
within the scope of formal operations-between the apprecia 
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tion of particular forms and "the kind of synoptic vision 
of how they they all fit together, and how the particular 
forms can be linked with the supreme form, the Form of the 
Good."64 
Plato realizes the implications of his theory of learn¬ 
ing. He holds that the learner is an active participant 
in cognitive functioning, not a passive receiver of input 
from the outside. Learning for him is a process of adapt¬ 
ing pre-existing cognitive structure to current environ¬ 
ment. The engagement of the child in dialogue removes 
the necessity for such tactics as the granting of gold 
stars, grades and candies. So I do not agree with R.S. 
Peters who asserts that Plato is the first systematic 
environmentalist, who maintains that human nature is more 
or less infinitely malleable in a behaviouristic sense.65 
In short, paideia is defined by Plato as the art of 
turning around (periagoge). A person's education to the 
full appreciation of reality in insufficient as long as 
he has not undergone the periagoge. Such a process of 
periagoge is not an external phenomenon. In other words, 
knowledge can not be put into the soul (Rep. 518-b-c). A 
kind of opsis (vision) within a man enables him to see 
agathon (Rep.518c). The educator can only turn this or¬ 
gan of vision around from the realm of doxa toward noesis 
(518c). On the basis of this explicit statement, it 
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could be declared that the allegation of Peters, who 
says that "human nature is more or less infinitely 
malleable," is a gross misunderstanding since Plato 
seems to deny any crude environmentalism. As it was 
argued previously, Plato could be said to hold an inter- 
actionist constructionist view of human nature as far as 
learning and education is concerned. Maybe one reason 
for misunderstanding results from rendered periagoge as 
conversion in a religious sense, although it has the 
overtone of conversion, it conveys no more than the 
overtone.66 
I would like to argue that paideia, periagoge and 
agathon are closely linked together. If paideia is 
understood in terms of a living experience it therefore, 
willy-nilly, involves an active engagement on the other 
hand, and a passive undergoing, on the other. The active 
encounter indicates a dynamic and enterprising travail 
which, in turn, brings about consequences. Such conse¬ 
quences may entail change which is intimately related to 
the said consequences. This change is described by Plato 
as periagoge. Periagoge is, thus, a meaningful transi¬ 
tion which is related to the repercussion of the impli¬ 
cations emanating from it. Such a meaningful transition 
comprises an eudaimonic state which gives impetus to the 
learner to keep on striving more for the agathon, Idea 
In other words, this experience constitutes a of ideas. 
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moving force towards agathon. So agathon exemplifies the 
ultimate goal of paideia. It embraces a direction which 
in terms of a constructive educative process leads to 
growth and development. Such a growth takes place in 
a continuous process since it passes from the stages of 
doxa (i.e., eikasia and pistis) and ultimately leads to 
the stages of episteme (i.e., dianoia and noesis). There 
exists an organic connection between stages of doxa and 
episteme. There, a continuity of experience links the suc¬ 
cessive stages of development in a dialectically con¬ 
structive way. This continuity represents the experience 
of each stage and development into a new stage. In other 
words, each stage should not be conceived of as an isolated 
phase of growth. The experience acquired at every stage 
contributes to thorough expansion and growth necessary 
for the next stage. 
Periagoge illustrates a knowledge-affair. It purveys 
an interaction between the self and its world. This inter¬ 
action undermines the imposition of knowledge from above and 
from outside. It is fundamentally based upon personal ex¬ 
perience . 
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——Fresh Glimpse at the Theory of Anamnasis 
Socrates declares that "searching and learning are al¬ 
together recollection."67 This statement has been subjected 
to diverse interpretations and elaborations for a long period 
of time. Many of the interpreters have taken it as an indis- 
pensible postulate for Plato’s theory of psyche, a consequence 
of the theory of eidos (Forms), and a way of describing teach¬ 
ing as an intellectual midwifery process. Some students of 
Plato have interpreted the theory of recollection in a strict¬ 
ly logical and rational way. Others have taken it as a mythi¬ 
cal and metaphoric approach to reality. 
We intend to get to the core of Plato’s understanding 
of the theory of recollection by way of a functional frame¬ 
work in order to be able to establish the relationship bet¬ 
ween the process of actual experience and education. We want 
to see if Plato did see any functional relationship between 
learning and experience. Moreover, our purpose of studying 
Plato's theory of recollection is partly an attempt to find 
the interactional and continuous character of learning. This 
study is concerned with the important issue that learning ex¬ 
perience is a constructive temporal process, viz: it involves 
growth and development from within. Construction and inter¬ 
action exemplify the objective and internal conditions. Here 
f "Platonic isomorphism" is in order. Any again my theory o 
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learning experience, thus, indicates a dynamic interplay bet¬ 
ween mind and external reality. 
Klein takes recollection to be a process of dianoetic 
eikasia. He utilizes the kinds of knowledge associated with 
the Divided Line in the Republic. The process of dianoetic 
eikasia signifies an educational activity that is comparable 
to eikasia on the lower sensory part of the Divided Line. 
"Just as sensory eikasia is a recognition of the images of 
sensibles as images, dianoetic eikasia is the recognition of 
sensibles and their images, as well as the properties of each, 
as images of purely intelligible objects."66 The process in¬ 
volves the attempt to know in a progressive way. It is not 
limited to the recovery of an insight once gained and then 
lost. It is not the repetition of what is past.69 It is a 
construction of experience that aims at the culmination of the 
hierarchy of learning which is embodied in episteme. 
Reminiscence, thus, is not to be taken as a recall of a 
past vision. It is not a passive process of reception and ac¬ 
quisition. It rather illustrates the dynamic activity of us¬ 
ing an "intelligible criterion by which to unify and stabilize 
sense precept ions."70 Learning experience is the construction 
of a unifying system of ideas which represent an arduously in¬ 
ternal process. It leads to the awareness of one's ignorance. 
It indicates a reverse process of asking questions of oneself 
and judging one's views in- the light of dianoetic eikasia, 
which takes into account previous experience of eikasia in a 
67 
dianoetic way. This process accounts for the continuity of 
epistemic experience. A judgment about particular sense per¬ 
ceptions in a unifying process is reached by means of dia¬ 
noetic eikasia. Thus, the plurality of sense perceptions is 
gathered and unified in an intelligible manner. The whole 
dialogue of Meno purports the notion that learning is a con¬ 
structive process from within. Learning is not, then, re¬ 
calling in a literal sense. It is a realization. It purveys 
the notion that what we see in the realm of the sensible and 
plural should be constructed in an intelligible and cognitive 
way in order to overcome the disordered plurality of changing 
particulars. 
Recollection involves the review of past experience in 
an intelligible mode. In other words, it entails thinking 
back. Here comes the temporal dimension of the theory of re¬ 
collection. It requires contemplation on the past. We need 
to ascertain how acquaintance with the past may be translated 
into a potent means for dealing with the future. Thus, the 
theory of recollection implies the significance of the tempor¬ 
al dimension in learning. As a result of this continuity of 
experience we do not lose our touch with the past; and, there¬ 
by, we can capture the past in a critical way in order to apply 
such a fruitful past to future problems. If human knowledge 
is conceived of possessing the character of ergon, then the 
construction of an intelligible idea of past experience within 
the framework of present possibilities is a must. 
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It was previously mentioned that dialectical method 
aim at eliciting and extorting knowledge. This view of Plato 
is well expressed in his opening discussion of Phaedo (73a-b): 
When people are questioned, if you put the questions 
well, they answer correctly of themselves about every¬ 
thing; and yet if they had not within them some know¬ 
ledge and right reason, they could not do this. And 
that this is so is shown most clearly if you take them 
to mathematical diagrams or anything of that sort. 
Careful examination of the above passage of Phaedo mani¬ 
fests my argument of the constructionist epistemology of Plato 
which relies heavily on the interactional process of question¬ 
ing by the educator and constructive response by the learner. 
Recollection is a process which involves the dialectic in the 
sense of weaving together of logoi in order to attain the ulti¬ 
mate goal of a synoptic view of reality. Thus, such a synoptic 
view presupposes the previous stages of doxa and episteme. The 
noetic ascent postulates dianoetic eikasia (Rep. 511 b-c). If 
human understanding is described in terms of recollection, it 
is because such an understanding requires gathering and collec¬ 
ting many into one. Such a notion of anamnesis is described in 
the following passage of Phaedrus (249 b-c): 
For a human being must understand according to eidos what 
is said, going from many perceptions to a one gathered 
together by reckoning. This is a recollection of those 
things which our soul beheld when it journeyed with god 
and looking down upon the things which now we suppose 
to be, gazed up to being as such. 
Plato here, refers to the experience of particulars 
gathered and identified as perceptions (aithesis). In order to 
have an intelligible grasp of particulars, the learner has to 
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construct a mental image of such diverse phenomena. Such a 
gathering and unifying process may be called eidos. We may 
notice the organic relationship between eidos and logos in 
the sense of gathering. However, it should be borne in mind 
that the Latin word recollectus, clearly illustrates such a 
connotation of anamnesis. Since it is derived from the past 
participle of Recoiligere, (Re, "again," Col, the assimilated 
form of com, "with," and legere, "to gather,").7^ In other 
words, recollectus exemplifies a process of gathering as a 
learning activity of what is diverse and making it into a 
unified whole. As John Sallis rightly states the Meno illus¬ 
trates the process of constructing an organic relationship be¬ 
tween parts and coming up with an intelligible whole. Meno 
especially divulges the fact that the "appropriate comportment 
of man" necessitates the mediation of parts with whole.72 The 
whole-part relationship is a valid Platonic controversy which 
has been subjected to diverse interpretations by various stu¬ 
dents of Plato. The accurate appreciation of the theory of 
eidos also compels one to examine this relationship. The al¬ 
legory of the cave is also an attempt to develop the insight 
that knowledge of particulars is gained through their engage¬ 
ment with an idea-through their reference to a unity of parti¬ 
culars. The universal appears and is disclosed in and through 
these particulars. According to Plato, multiplicity and parti¬ 
cularity should be worked out and arranged into a unity. Sen¬ 
sible phenomena are not accessible to comprehension unless they 
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are organized (logoi) in such a way that a unified whole is 
attained. The knowledge process is an attempt to establish 
an intelligible link between parts, particulars, appearances 
and wholes.Wholes represent unity and integrity. From an 
educational point of view one important characteristic of the 
doctrine of recollection is a struggle to combine and arrange 
all the parts, elements or individuals into an effective 
whole. Unity is gained by an appreciation of the interde¬ 
pendence of parts or individuals. This unity will represent 
a beautiful harmony wrested from dissonance. Learning in the 
sense of recollection should make it possible to climb the 
hierarchy of ideas and reach the apex of this hierarchy, to 
agathon, which is the ultimate unity in which full disclosure, 
aletheia, is grounded. The connection between things bear 
upon the problem of whole and parts. The involvement of the 
problem of whole and parts is explained by Plato in Meno when 
Socrates gets Meno to agree prior to the second definition of 
shape, the interconnection between parts and whole. He re¬ 
alizes that if a person (like Meno) is oblivious to the whole 
he will be unable to set forth an appropriate definition 
(Meno 75 d-e). The paradox faced by Meno lies in his ignor¬ 
ance of the continuity of the knowledge process. Meno seems 
to hold that knowledge is a discontinous process. He imagines 
that knowledge is comprised of discrete and individual items. 
He fails to realize that knowledge is an unremitting, connect¬ 
ed and sequential process. Socrates, on the contrary, makes 
every endeavor to prove that knowledge is not a process of 
collection of discrete parts. But it is a coordinate attempt 
to find out the logoi of the parts in a dynamic and evolution 
ary process (Meno 79 e-81 a). For Plato, recollection is an 
active enterprise which aims at the preponderance of know¬ 
ledge over ignorance (Meno 81 e). 
The educational process of recollection as an experience 
which leads to the recognition of different aspects of ignor¬ 
ance (anepistemosyne). One kind of ignorance, however, is 
overwhelming and formidable. It typifies the state of think¬ 
ing that one knows something while not knowing it. This kind 
of ignorance is referred to as amathia. This word represents 
a state of unlearning (Sophist 229 b-c). Socrates hints in 
Meno that the state of double ignorance should be overcome. 
Meno is typically characterized as a person who is not aware 
of his ignorance (Meno 71 c-d). Since Meno is described as 
self-ignorant he is unable to raise valid questions. 
From an educational point of view learning in terms of 
recollection should lead to self-awareness. The dianoetic 
eikasia involves the development of the learner in a succes¬ 
sive process commencing from a state where the beginner thinks 
that he knows, while he is ignorant. If a person is said to 
be ignorant, it is usually not his ignorance that is being 
highlighted; rather it is his failure to learn. They next 
stage is characterized by the fact that we do not know, but 
we are aware of our ignorance. We do not know and we know that 
we do not know. This is .a constructive stage, since one has 
and the arrogance resulting from 
overcome his self-ignorance 
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such an unconscious state. The final experience is self- 
consciousness of one’s knowledge. In fact, Plato divides ig¬ 
norance into two halves, self-conscious ignorance and uncon¬ 
scious ignorance. For Plato consciousness of not knowing in¬ 
dicates a point in a constructive process of knowledge. 
Plato has elaborated one of the most important education¬ 
al theories which is recently spoken of as self-concept. Many 
modern educational psychologists have emphasized the signifi¬ 
cance of self-concept is learning and social adjustment. 
They maintain that self-concept plays a fundamental role in 
the specific realm of learning and teaching. Plato has anti¬ 
cipated the theory that self is a construct, not an organic 
thing like the brain or the heart. One important aspect of 
learning as recollection, involves the construction of the 
self from the interactional process of the interplay between 
the individual and his world.74 The eristic claim objected 
to by Socrates is clarified in the following: 
Do you realize that what you are bringing up is the 
trick argument that a man can not try to discover either 
what he knows or what he does not know? He would not seek 
what he knows, for since he knows it there is no need of 
the inquiry, nor what he does not know, for in that case 
he does not even know what he is to look for (Meno 80 e). 
Here we have encountered a situation where knowing does 
in some way anticipate itself. That is, in order to seek for 
what we do not know, we must already know it; otherwise, we 
could not know that we need to seek, could not know how, wheie 
and what to seek for. On the other hand, if we do have know¬ 
ledge before inquiry, such an act would be totally unnecessary 
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Socrates' rebuttal in this case is the Doctrine of Recollec¬ 
tion. He hints that the above statement is a mere sophistry. 
He resorts to the technique of discovery, learning and pro¬ 
blem solving in order to lead the boy into the learning of the 
Pythagorean theorem. The learning style adopted by Socrates 
hints at a self-inquiry which is a constructive process. In 
the course of recollection cognition takes place in the form 
of recognition. We can only learn what learning is in our 
own process of recognition of ideas in the sense of processes 
of knowing. 
One important issue which is indicated in both Me no and 
Phaedo is the theory of the immortality of the soul. Cebes 
points out that the argument from reoollection bears witness - 
to the fact that souls have discarnate existence. The proof 
adduced to corroborate this claim is that if you question stu¬ 
dents cunningly you can elicit the right answer and that this 
is clearly seen in geometry. The theory of prenatal knowledge 
in the light of universals, raised by Plato in the fifth book 
of the Republic, and noted by Crombie illustrates the fact 
that "there are precise analysable universals, and there are 
physical instances which must not be confounded with them.”75 
In other words, facts should not be confused with ideas. Ideas 
must not be confounded with their instances (Meno, 74b-7-8). 
The Republic indicates that what the instances do is to pro¬ 
vide us with the doxa of their universals. From an educatioi- 
al point of view, the doctrine of recollection aims at idea 
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formation in the process of an analysis and synthesis of 
facts. Education is the constant reorganization of facts in 
accordance with mental background with presupposes past exper¬ 
iences. This past experience, in fact, is comprised of the 
dynamic interplay of nature and nurture. Here, I understand 
nature as representing the prenatal determination thereof 
(Phaedo 75—76—77). The immortality of the soul, from an epis¬ 
temological view-point, adumbrates a prenatal stage of episte- 
mic inheritance which is conveyed to the successive generations. 
The organism (subject) represents a unified whole which has a 
relation with the past as far as its dynamis is concerned and 
has to relate to the present in order to be able to survive 
and evolve. This aspect of man's existence betokens the 
apriori dimension of knowledge. Plato anticipates Kant's at¬ 
tempt to reconcile deductive processes and sense perception. 
Kant once asked himself how science is possible. On the one 
hand, there are deductive processes and on the other, there 
is the experience we get through our senses. He faced a di¬ 
lemma regarding the above two things. He saw it necessary to 
reconcile the two. He contemplated an organic concoction. 
He realised that the subject is not only the source of de¬ 
ductive necessity in reasoning, but that the same is true of 
the categories of space, time, causality etc. He found that 
synthetic knowledge and judment entail apriori. He hinted 
that logical structures like syllogisms, are analytical in 
the sense that the conclusion is contained in advance in the 
premises and only has to be extracted fiom them. Such 
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structures, he held, are apriori due to the fact that they are 
necessary mental constructs without direct reference to the 
external factors. Kant's theory implied that mathematical 
truths are both synthetic and apriori. In a judgment like 
+ 3 = 21, there is a synthesis as 21 which has properties 
that are not present in 18 and 3. By adding these a new and 
specific totality has been constructed. This proposition is 
apriori, since it is not based on experience, but is produced 
as a result of the operation of the categories of the mind. 
Kant held that apriori presupposes not only universality and 
necessity, but also their priority to experience. This pri¬ 
ority is a logical one.7® 
Plato maintains that necessary truths, logical and ma¬ 
thematical constructs, have to be extracted by means of learn¬ 
ing in the form of recollection. Socrates attempts to help 
the boy to ’recollect geometrical relations in a gradual pro¬ 
cess. The theory of apriori synthetic is elucidated by So¬ 
crates in Meno when the expression "being reminded of" is us¬ 
ed. In the language of Meno we have learned that 7 + 5 = 12 
at all times, but we do not fully remember this until we 
have been reminded of it. Being reminded of in this context 
should be identified with learning. Teaching logical and ma¬ 
thematical truth involves the process of reminding the student 
of such categories. Meno and Socrates both agree that the 
slave boy did not learn geometry in the form of expository 
teaching. He learned apriori synthetic judgments through a 
Thus, the recollection 
method of discovery (82 b-85-b) 
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doctrine implies "that there must be concepts and propositions 
given innately to the human mind if the learning of such sub¬ 
jects as geometry under normal conditions is to be accounted 
for by the most plausible hypothesis available."77 For Plato 
the gap between ignorance and knowledge may be filled by means 
of learning in the form of inquiry. The soul is able to re¬ 
member things in their connections (Meno-81-82). The myth of 
recollection, in the view of Plato, is intended to motivate 
inquiry. The slave-boy exchange exemplifies the situaton of 
a person who is exposed to the discovery of knowledge in an 
open ended fashion. The exchange between Socrates and Meno 
provides grounds for engaging in discovery without preformali¬ 
zation of the reasoning process. For Plato, knowledge should 
be learned by means of discovery which is opposed to the for¬ 
malised methods. Inquiry and discovery methods are, according 
to Plato, appropriate modes of learning even in case of apriori 
knowledge. Learning mathematical and logical sciences involv¬ 
es reflective thinking and method. Meno is a significant ex¬ 
ample of the appreciation of the close connection of psycho¬ 
logical and logical processes. He seems to realize the evolu¬ 
tionary character of mind's logicality. In other words, Plato 
reveals a special sensitivity towards the problem of adult 
logic. He seems to distinguish between an adult's logic and 
that of a child. The mind of the child should not be forced 
to conform to an external subject matter, in the words of 
Dewey.78 The stages of the logical development of the child 
should be taken into consideration when a curriculum is de- 
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designed. This fact is indicated in Plato's conception of the 
successive stages of doxa and episteme. 
According to Plato definitions, explanations and inter¬ 
pretations are important components of teaching and education. 
A great deal of school learning, in fact, takes place in the 
course of defining words and sentences. Socrates expressly 
asserts in Phaedrus (237 c) that: 
My boy, if anyone means to deliberate successfully about 
anything, there is one thing he must do at the outset. 
He must know what he is deliberating about; otherwise he 
is bound to go utterly astray. Now most people fail to 
realize that hey don't know what this or that really is; 
consequently when they start discussing something, they 
dispense with any agreed definition, assuming that they 
know the thing.^9 
What Plato implies here is the importance of definitions 
in classroom discussion. If the teacher is able to handle de¬ 
finitions in a professional way many futile discussions may be 
avoided. The techniques of logic skillfully used by Socrates 
in various dialogues such as Meno, Laws, and statesman attests 
to this fact. Thus, logical process in educational activities 
is carefully followed in a meaningfully didactic and critical 
way. Plato seems to distinguish between the internal and ne¬ 
cessary connection inherent in the actual process of thinking 
and its intellectual product. The dialogue of Meno clearly 
reveals Plato's consideration of the logical development of 
the child. Logical development of the child takes place when 
learning is carried out in the sense of recollection. Child's 
capability at early stages of development consists of a series 
of discontinuous judgments which determine one another extnn- 
sically but not intrinsically. In other words, the primordial 
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approach of the learner to logical problems seems to consist 
of unconscious judgments. Such judgments are normally sup¬ 
ported by unrelated or unqualified instances (Meno 72-b). 
The role of the teacher is to help the student to construct 
knowledge in the process of reflection of his own coordinat¬ 
ing activity which yields an expanded internal structure, ac¬ 
cording to Piaget.81 Such an expanded internal structure pro¬ 
vides the child with the means to gather (logos) and unify 
particular instances given to him and to come up with a uni¬ 
fied whole. When Meno attempts at defining "virtue," he, pri¬ 
marily, identifies what a man's virtue is, and what a woman's 
virtue is, and then says that each kind of person has his or 
her own virtue. Meno's proposed definition fails since it 
does not define the term virtue; instead he offers several 
other definitions, definitions which are substitution instances 
of the formula the "virtue of X is Y." He does not appreciate 
that all of these entail some common meaning for the term 
"virtue" itself. Ultimately, Socrates leads Meno to see what 
is involved and to proffer a second definition. Men's second 
definition does not have the same inadequacies as the first. 
Socrates' attempt to provide a proper definition of "figure" 
and his reference to the doctrine of recollection shows his 
didactic dexterity and erudition in the construction of know¬ 
ledge in the learner in a genetic and developmental fashion. 
Plato seems to reject both rationalism and empiricism. 
On the one hand, he does not reject sensory perception as 
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important source of knowledge as rationalists (such as 
Descarte) do. On the other hand, he does not subscribe 
to the claim that knowledge must rely primarily on sense 
perception which comes form outside the individual through 
the senses. Plato's position seems to be a type of construc¬ 
tivism. Constructivism refers to the fact that knowledge is 
built by an active learner from the inside rather than out¬ 
side. This view is in opposition both to the empiricist and 
rationalist view. If the aviary model of the Theaetetus 
(196-9) and the theory of recollection in Meno and Phaedo 
are carefully studied, no doubt will be entertained as to 
the interiority and construction of knowledge. 
If an educator, like Socrates, pays attention to the 
internal character of knowledge and learning he does not con¬ 
sider the pupil to be analogous to an empty glass. His class¬ 
room will not be arranged into neat rows like rows of empty 
glasses to be filled and passed from one grade level to the 
next. This pouring of knowledge implies that the teacher is 
like a giant master that his high command of all the erudi¬ 
tion and wisdom of the past and chooses out of her or his re¬ 
pertoire what to teach, with what organization of subject mat¬ 
ter and in what succession and sequence (Rep. 518c). 
Thus, Plato's theory of learning provides deep undei- 
standing of the knowledge process and general guidance for the 
educational enterprise. The only criticism which may be level 
led against Plato is his underestimation of social and cultur¬ 
ally-based forms of knowledge, although there could be infer- 
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ed some indications and circumstantial evidence in connect¬ 
ion with this form of knowledge in his Republic. 
glato's Conception of Moral Development-Compared with Kohl¬ 
berg's Study of Morality ~- 
It may be mentioned that careful analysis of Plato's 
dialogues, especially the Republic, Meno, and Symposium re¬ 
veals clear indications that Plato anticipated Kohlberg's 
conception of moral stages of development. In order to de¬ 
monstrate the latter, claim, a tentative comparison is made 
between Plato's notion of the development of dikaiosyne 
(justice) and eros, and Kohlberg's moral scheme of develop¬ 
ment. Plato sets forths a series of arguments in which 
dikaiosyne (justice) and eros are studied within a hierar¬ 
chical framework of development. 
First Level of Moral Judgment-Preconventional morality. 
In the dialogue with Polemarchus, in response to Simonides' 
statement that dikaiosyne is "to render to each his due," or 
"what befits him" there seems to be a series of arguments 
which contain sequential character (Republic, 331 E- 334B). 
In the first stage an attempt is made to define dikaiosyne 
(justice) as a techne (art) which involves doing good to 
friends and evil to enemies. In modern terms if dikaiosyne 
(justice) is described as doing good to friends and harming 
enermies, and the just man is the one who seeks to benefit 
friends and harm enemies, then it is not far-fetched to sug¬ 
gest that this kind of moral argument falls within the scope 
of the pre-conventional level of moral development. The 
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person who approves of this kind of moral argument seems to 
see behavior as being good if it exhibits a sense of objective 
responsibility. This characterization indicates an egocentric 
deference to concrete reciprocity. Within the framework of 
this stage of morality, right action (dikaiosyne) is seen as 
an orientation to objective exchange and reciprocity. 
When Socrates asks what Protagors' aim of education is, 
the Sophist responds that the aim of education is embodied 
in social rewards (Protag 318E-319A). Thus, according to 
Protagoras, appropriate education secures external rewards, 
power, wealth, prudence and influence. Isn't this defini¬ 
tion of the aid of education what Kohlberg characterizes as 
the preconventional level of moral development (i.e., reward- 
punishment orientation and egoistic morality-reciprocity 
and objective exchange)? 
From a cognitive point of view this level of moral 
development corresponds to the stage of doxa which con¬ 
stitutes the most naive form of knowing (eikasia). This 
level of knowing transpires in the world of concrete 
imaginations. As it was indicated earlier, Plato identified 
this stage in his allegory of the cave as shadows of reality. 
On the other hand, the same scheme of moral argument 
is delineated in the Symposium in the sense that at the pre- 
conventional level of moral development as egocentric, he- 
donistic model is provided in the image of a lover that loves 
only beautiful things (Sym£. 201 a). Egocentrism is best 
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illustrated when it is said that men love the good to be 
their own forever (Symp. 206 a). Hence, eros is for the good 
to be one's own forever. The lover of good things loves that 
the good things be his (Symp. 204 e). He who gets good 
things will be happy, since the happy are happy by acquisi¬ 
tion of good things (205 a). 
Plato seems to anticipate Kohlberg's characterization 
of the premoral (pre-conventional) level of morality as that 
of interpreting good or bad, right or wrong in terms of he¬ 
donistic and acquisitive consequences. Thus, when Phaedrus 
describes eros as a desire for physical beauty, his arguments 
illustrate the first stage of moral development according to 
Kohlberg. 
Second level of moral judgment. At the second level 
of moral judgment, Plato describes justice as the capacity 
to perform good roles and to maintain the conventional order. 
At this level, Plato suggests, the expectations of one's 
family, group or community is considered as valuable in its 
own right. In Book One of the Republic, Plato describes 
morality at the conventional level as the capacity to be 
just in engagements, dealings, associations and partnerships 
(Rep. 333 b). At this level the attitude is one of respect¬ 
ing social and group contracts and obligations. 
In the Symposium, Pausanias elaborates the social and 
contractual implications of eros. He is deeply concerned 
with the prevailing morality in the Athenian society. The 
approach of Pausanias involves the same ramifications that 
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are described in the characterization of dikaiosyne (justice) 
in Book One of the Republic (333 b). For him actions and 
omissions, if taken out of their social context, may be 
labelled neither good nor bad. The morality of every action 
is determined by society (Symp. 180 c- 185 c). 
Pausanias represents a conventional type approach to 
morality. He poses an orientation of interpersonal relations 
of mutuality while Phaedrus takes on a hedonistic and ego¬ 
centric image of morality. In Piagetian language, Pausanias' 
account of morality is less egocentric and involves decentra- 
tion and socialization. His moral judgment indicates signs 
of respecting social duty, concern with social rules and an 
appreciation of the utility of social institutions and norms. 
Eryximachus views morality in a more sophisticated way. 
His speech aims at the solution of tangible problems of the 
present. Such an approach to problems seems to ignore the 
hypothetical dimension of the problem solving relating to 
the future. He appeals to logic to resolve problems involving 
concrete objects. In short, Eryximachus paves the way for a 
more sophisticated and complex conception of eros (Symp. 
85 c- 188e). 
Moreover, the convention level of moral judgment is 
more clearly discussed in the Protagoras. Protagoras seems 
to suggest that society's norms and institutions are planted 
in the child's mind and are manifested in his behavior in the 
process of his early education. In this dialogue learning 
and instruction of moral judgment and actions are likened to 
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learning the Greek language (327 e- 328 a). It is indicated 
that since a person can learn a native language, he is, like¬ 
wise, able to learn his society's laws and orders. Here 
learning arete is compared to learning a techne. Since a 
skill or craft is not acquired by instinctive ability (physis) 
or mere chance (tyche) , morality is, likewise, not attained 
spontaneously. Education, thus, seems necessary to foster 
social morality in the child. Protagoras does not account 
for the dynamics of fostering socialization and moral judg¬ 
ment aiming at the maintenance of social institutions and 
norms. Nevertheless, he alludes to environmental and edu¬ 
cational influences on moral development. 
Post conventional level of moral judgment. Plato in 
discussion of dikaiosyne (justice) explains that "It is not 
the function (ergon) of heat to chill, but of its opposite. 
It is not the function of dryness to moisten, but its oppo¬ 
site. It is not the function of the good to harm, but of 
its opposite. Yes, it is not the function of the just (i.e. , 
good) man to harm anyone, but of its opposite." (Rep. 335 d) . 
Plato seems, at this level, to suggest that it is not true 
that the just man should harm anyone. Here, the highest 
techne (skill) as a form of arete is described as a function 
which aims at positive morality. He adds that "The physician 
(in the strict sense) seeks the well-being of the patient, 
not his own. The pilot seeks the well-being of the sailor, 
not his own." (Rep. 341 b- 342 e). 
Plato, at this level, seems to describe a morally 
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principled orientation toward actions or commitments. He 
attempts to define moral value (arete) and principles to be 
residing "in conformity to shared or sharable standards, 
rights, or duties." He attempts to characterize the prin¬ 
cipled thinker and actor as a capable agent who is able to 
evaluate principles of dikaiosyne (justice), the moral 
validity of concrete social rules and norms. At this level 
the virtue of the soul is described as justice and its de¬ 
fect as injustice. Plato seems to indicate that, at this 
level of moral judgment values and principles have validity 
and application "apart from the authority of the groups or 
persons believing in these principles and apart from the in¬ 
dividual's own identification with these groups. 
In the Symposium Diotima provides a holistic account 
of knowledge and reality. He describes eros as yearning for 
completeness and consummation. Eros, is identified by Dio¬ 
tima as something between god and man, something between 
beautiful and ugly, good and evil, mortal and immortal, know¬ 
ledge and ignorance. Eros is identified as a daimon. He is 
the son of abundance (Poros) and poverty (Penia). He is 
aware of his destitution. Thus, he desires for what he lacks 
he attempts to encounter his deficiency and improve it. He 
has knowledge of his ignorance. Therfore, he seeks after 
knowledge. The main objective of Diotima is wholeness, which 
involves all that is good and beautiful (Symp. 201 e- 207). 
Diotima aims at a pragmatic and utilitarian relationship be¬ 
tween herself and the world around her. Her tone is utili- 
tarian and attempts to define eros within the framework 
86 
of inadequacy and deficiency. She characterizes eros as a 
generic term. This generic term aims at satisfaction of 
the inadequacy existing in the personality of the individual. 
At 210 of Symposium, Diotima suggests that, 
Next he must grasp that the beauties of the body are 
as nothing to the beauties of the soul, so whatever 
he meets with spiritual loveliness, even in the husk 
of an unlively body, he will find it beautiful enough 
to fall in love with and to cherish-and beautiful 
enough to quicken in his heart a longing for such dis¬ 
course as tends toward the building of a noble nature. 
And from this he will be led to contemplate the beauty 
of laws and institutions... . (Symp. 210 c). 
In this passage an attempt is made to dwell upon.legal 
and social implications of love and morality. The signifi¬ 
cance and utility of social context is the overtone of this 
passage. The reference to the beauty of laws and social and 
political institutions seems to correspond to what is argued 
by Kohlberg in his stage five of moral judgments. Here, the 
standards that are critically examined and agreed on by the 
society as a whole determine what is right. 
The argument of Diotima about immortality implies a 
concern for the continued existence of man as preserved and 
guaranteed by socially acceptable and utilitarian standards. 
The aim of eros at this stage is to acclimatize the indivi¬ 
dual to the good and beautiful social cosmos. In the latter 
arguments of Diotima, there seems to be a tendency to higher 
stage. In other words, Diotima attempts to bridge the gap 
between the pragmatic social contract orientation and the 
existential, idealistic realm of the universal-ethical pnn- 
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ciples orientation. 
In short, Socrates attempts to develop a kind of scala 
amoris which proceeds from an egocentric-hedonistic stage of 
eros to a universal, ethical orientation of episteme, sophro- 
syne, dikaiosyne and phronesis. At the end of the Symposium 
there is a tentative schematization of the steps of noetic 
and moral development as follows( 210 a- 211 b): (1) first 
one must love a particular beautiful physical body and en¬ 
counter beautiful logoi therein; (2) one must understand that 
beauty in one physical entity is to be compared and appreci¬ 
ated in other bodies; (3) one must attribute a higher value 
to the beauty of the psychies, and bring forth logoi in them; 
(4) one must see the beauty in compliance with and respect 
for laws and see that their beauty is akin; (5) one sees the 
beauty of different social aspects of knowledge (i.e., eros); 
(6) one must turn and contemplate the great universal and 
ethical value (pelagos) of the beautiful and set forth beau¬ 
tiful logoi therein, until he envisions a certain sort of 
knowledge that is of the beautiful. 
At 211 c of the Symposium it is expressly stated that: 
Starting from individual beauties, the quest for the 
universal beauty must find him ever mounting the hea¬ 
venly ladder, stepping from rung to rung-that is from 
one to two, and from two to every lovely body, from 
bodily beauty to the beauty of institutions, from in¬ 
stitutions to learning, and from learning in general to 
the special love that pertains to nothing but the beau¬ 
tiful itself-until at last he comes to know what beauty 
is (Symp. 211- c). 
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CHAPTER III 
ARISTOTLE 
Many essentialists and some progressive educationalists 
have claimed that Aristotle is the founding father of essen- 
tialism and its more extreme form perennialism. They say 
that Aristotle defines man as a rational animal. Mankind has 
an intellect designed for acquiring knowledge. Man's exclus¬ 
ive essence is intellectual. Thus, it follows that education 
is mainly intended to develop his intellect. For instance, 
Hutchins in following this trend, states that: 
Every man has a function as a man. The function of a 
citizen or a subject may vary from society to society, 
and the system of training, or adaptation, or instruc¬ 
tion, or meeting immediate needs may vary with it. But 
the function of man as man is the same in every age and 
every society, since it results from his nature as man. 
The aim of an educational system is the same in every 
age and in every society where such a system can exist; 
it is to improve man as man.l 
He adds that: 
Education deals with the development of the intellectual 
powers of man. Their moral and spiritual powers are the 
sphere of the family and the church.2 
Hutchins, as a follower of "essentialist" Aristotle, pri¬ 
marily bases his thesis upon the premise that the chief func¬ 
tion and essence of man is to think- a premise, we shall hold 
is inappropriately attributed to Aristotle. So the school 
system is created to help the student expand his capacity to 
think. Therefore, certain intellectual subjects take prece¬ 
dence over other less rational ones. As it was already 
mentioned, this position is adhered to by certain other es- 
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sentialists such as, Mortimer Adler and Admiral Hyman Rickover. 
They agree that certain intellectual subjects directly help to 
develop man's intellectual potentials.^ Thus, they claim 
that since the basic goals of education are changeless and 
universal, a hierarchy of subjects should be taken into con¬ 
sideration in the development of a rational curriculum. 
They allege that if a person is aware of the essence of 
something his knowledge is not of an unknown ephemeral kind. 
If the essence is truly known, then to explain away later con¬ 
tradictions in changing phenomena should not be a difficult 
task. In this way schools are considered as institutions set 
up to transmit absolute knowledge. The curriculum, thus, is 
based upon the unchanging body of knowledge which has an 
apriori quality. The principal duty of a teacher, on the 
basis of the above assumption, is comprised of the transmis¬ 
sion of this knowledge to students. 
The essentialist movement, therefore, distinguishes between 
an essential anda non-essential in school curricula. The 
essential accords with the criteria of intellect, while the 
non-essential holds a lesser degree of compliance with the 
dicta of intellect. Quine says that essentialism may be de¬ 
fined as "the doctrine that some attributes of a thing may be 
essential to the thing and others accidental."4 If we accept 
this definition as a fairly true characterization of essential¬ 
ism, then we may divide the items of a curriculum into es 
sential and accidental. The essentials are to be seriously 
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instructed prior to any accidental subject matter. Essential 
subjects constitute the realm of necessity while accidents 
constitute a category of subjects which are contingent and un¬ 
necessary in character. If essence is understood to be a sub¬ 
stantial reality, then, phenomena such as color, weight and 
operation, according to the essentialists, are considered as 
accidents. They are dependent upon the substances. In short, 
essence represents the quiddity of a thing, "that by which it 
is immediately intelligible and on which human mind can focus- 
because it presents an immobile aspect, the stable form of 
what it really and fully is, viz, a thing".^ 
This chapter purports to consider what Aristotle has 
to say on these and a few other topics and present some rea¬ 
sons that might be given for establishing that there is no 
acute essentialist commitment in Aristotle's writing accord¬ 
ing to recent semantico-lingjlstic-scholarship. In order to 
appreciate the non-essentialist outlook of Aristotle, the 
study of his general philosophical idea would seem in order. 
Thus, the core of esssntialism, i.e., essence seems indispen- 
sible. 
Essence: 
As it was mentioned earlier, essence, as related in 
the Latin term ens, is what is, what exists. "In this sense, 
it designates a concrete, singular reality in the act of ex¬ 
istence."6 In fact, essence is an idea promulgated by Latin 
— -■> ^-»' which are rendered 
scholars, There are several Greek terms 
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essence in Latin translations. For example: 
To Ti est = "what." 
To t_i eri einai = what makes a thing what it is. 
Ousia — substance, existence, essence. 
—usia is one of most complicated Greek philosophi¬ 
cal terms which has been used by Aristotle when he speaks 
about change. In words of John Herman Randall, ousia is 
used by Aristotle to "extend his analysis of what is in¬ 
volved in the outcome or full functioning of "natural" pro¬ 
cesses . " 
Thus, ousia may be anything that is what it is due to 
change (kinesis) . It may be the energein, full functioning. 
For Aristotle to be, involves becoming and change (Ti^ est), 
since the process of functioning, from dynamis to energeia, 
constitutes the quality of being. The characteristic of 
any thing is distinguished if it is considered in its genetic 
process of coming into being, change, and interaction in the 
world of natural processes. So ousia, in general, is what 
can change. Such a change normally leads to a fuller energeia 
functioning. Thus, ousia is what is at the end of any process 
distinct from what it was at the beginning. There is a sub¬ 
stantial change involved. 
In the discussion, Categories, Aristotle has defined 
ousia as the subject of discourse. Being, to on_, has been 
described in many ways, some of which appear in the Categories 
The most important definition of being is To ti estin, what 
it is, that which responds to the question of "what it is" by 
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revealing the ousta of the thing, i.e., by definition (horos) 
through genos and diaphora.7 So ti estin, in the sense of 
ousia, is defined in the Categories as the subject of com¬ 
munication and discourse. The question "what is it?" in the 
Aristotelian sense, inquires about the characteristic func¬ 
tion of a thing. When it is asked "What is this?" and it is 
answered that "this is a car" the predicate of this proposi¬ 
tion encompasses the car as a vehicle for transportation. The 
direction of Aristotle's question is toward the particular 
being as such. He wanted to inquire about what a thing is in 
sofar as it is o_n hei on. ^ Aristotle's question addresses 
the "whatness" of a particular thing in a functional sense. 
In general, the ousia of a thing may be expressed in a 
unified formula (logos) when it is defined (horismos). This 
definition should be knowable and communicable. In other 
words, it shald be expounded in a comprehensible structure. 
The main problem with essentialists is that they take this 
comprehensible structure to be prior to the concrete reality 
of the thing. They hold that the intelligible form of a thing 
possesses the unique reality. For instance, intellect is 
possessed uniquely by man as a distinctive characteristic, 
and it is that which makes him qualitatively distinct from 
everything else in the universe.^ They normally confuse the 
difference between ousia as a term applied to a class and ousia 
in the sense of energeia. They think that Aristotle has not 
resolved the problem of ousia as the subject of discouise and 
ousia as energeia.1° In one sense, the function of a thing 
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may be understood by means of saying what it is, i.e., dis¬ 
course. But we should differentiate between such discourse 
and the thing defined by way of discourse. This distinction 
should always be made between the discursive character of a 
thing and its concrete reality. In other words, the charac¬ 
ter of a thing may be expressed in words, but its existence 
may not be stated in words. 
In the treatise Categories, Aristotle makes a dis¬ 
tinction between a "first ousia" and a " second ousia.H 
From these derive "the concept of the universal" whereby 
essentialists (e.g. scholasticists and rationalists) deter¬ 
mine the quiddity of a being. They have limited themselves 
to this aspect of ousia. Concrete, individual things are 
instances of the "primary ousia". Universals, genera and 
species are instances of the secondary ousia. For Aristotle, 
what is called ousia primarily refers to the individual 
thing (Categories 2a 11). He maintains that individuals are 
ousia in the strictest sense, for they are the subjects of all 
other things, and all other things are either predicated on 
them or are in them (Categories 2b 15;37). 
Essentialists (e.g. scholasticists and rationalists, 
etc.) usually take ousia in the second sense. Latin essentia, 
and quidditas are used to denote ousia in this sense. They 
identify basic and essential subject matters with the second 
notion of ousia. Intellectual and universal fall within the 
scope of the secondary ousia. Secondary ousia precedes 
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primary ousia. Secondary ousia is considered by them as the 
most noble element in man and its power is derived from the 
intellectual soul. On the other hand, scholastic scholars 
have rendered the dynamic notion of hypokeimenon, by the 
rigid terms of subicere and substare; and under the influence 
of Cartesian thinking, "subject" and "substance" came to be 
understood in the rigid sense of res. So the functional es¬ 
sence of everything was increasingly reified.^ The character 
of everything, including man, came to be understood in this 
rigidly passive mode. The essentialists, as the successors 
of this essential movement, have heavily relied on this high¬ 
ly inadequate and distorted rendition of hypokeimenon and ig¬ 
nored the functional character of this notion. Thus, they 
take subicere as a representation of ousia in the secondary 
rational sense. Since the second ousia of man, in their view, 
is rationality and his physical entity is an accidental phe¬ 
nomenon, accidents play no part in the being of essence. 
Therefore, essential subjects which are constant and relate 
to the ultimate rationality should constitute the core content 
of every curriculum. 
They seem to believe that ousia in the primary sense 
which involves particular things should not take precedence 
over ousia in the secondary sense. Hence, by virtue of this 
understanding, if you know the essence of something, youi 
knowledge is not of an unstable and changing kind. If the 
essence is truly known, contradictory appearances should be 
103 
easily explained away. The content of the curriculum, hence, 
should constitute the unchanging and universal essences. 
Since the ousia of man is above that of animals, they claim, 
he can use his distinctive nature (i.e., rationality) to 
acquire knowledge. In order that a student may exercise his 
reasoning faculties, facts are needed. For this purpose, the 
mastery of a large assortment of factual materials will in¬ 
evitably be needed. Memorization of the essential facts, 
then, will be necessary. Thus, an appeal to the highly ab¬ 
stract and verbal seems indispensible. 
As it was mentioned earlier, the word, subject, in¬ 
volves a passive process of reception on the part of the 
learner and an active process of exposition on the part of the 
teacher. Subject is composed of sub, meaning under, and 
jectum, meaning to fall. Subject semantically represents an 
authoritatively active process of teaching and an obediently 
passive process of learning. The Latin notion of subject in 
the above sense does not correspond with the Greek hypokeimen- 
on, which is, in the words of Heidegger a highly dynamic power. 
According to Aristotle, hypokeimenon, is the sub- 
of genesis So hypokeimenon is a principle which 
should be appreciated in the context of material change. So 
it is not merely a logical concept but, "together with eidos, 
a genuine co-principle of being (Phys. 1, 190 b), what is, 
from a different point of view, matter (hy1e) and, like matter, 
is known not directly but, analogically (Physics. 191 a). 
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Thus’ hypokeimenon possesses a dynamic nature while, subject 
indicates a rigid and reified notion. It is not difficult 
to declare that the notion of subject is foreign to the 
Aristotelian outlook. 
For Aristotle, therefore, the content of the curricu¬ 
lum is not a completed and essential subject. If curriculum 
is described in terms of hypokeimenon it involves kinesis 
(change). John Herman Randall rightly states that what is 
involved in ousia is change, that is, the outcome of a pro¬ 
cess. "Things always change to something else. "^-5 
Kinesis: process (kinesis) is defined as the entele- 
cheia of a dynamis (potentiality). It occurs as a metabole, 
i.e., a change in the category of quality, quantity or place 
(Physics, V, 226 a). The cause of kinesis may be said to be 
physis. (Phys, 11, 192 b). In other words, Kinesis may be 
defined as the fulfillment (entelecheia) of a capability 
(dynamis). So in the Aristotelian outlook kinesis represents 
the broadest scope of movement and change. 
For Aristotle the world consists in a great theater of 
processes. Everyting in the world possesses a power (dynamis) 
to operate (energeia). The operation of such power is known 
as actualization. Any change or reduction of one thing into 
another consists of the passage of one opposite to another in 
the hypokeimenon. In the Aristotelian world view, only motions 
bring about events. The notion of dynamis is closely related 
to that of hyle (matter), which brings with it a correlative 
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term morphe (shape, form or eidos). Matter and form are re¬ 
lative terms in the sense that a thing which has some degree 
of form may serve as the matter upon which a new form is im¬ 
posed. This process of change may continue for several stages. 
Form is inseparable from the matter.16 
With respect to the notion of kinesis four different 
kinds of questions may be asked. In response to the above 
four questions four different kinds of answers may be pro¬ 
vided. These answers may be called aitia, the factors re¬ 
sponsible for a process. These four factors constituting a 
process have been known as "four causes." But, only one of 
these factors may be named as cause, i.e., efficient cause 
(kinoun). A fairly good translation for ait ion is responsi¬ 
bility. Since, ait ion is a judicial term meaning culpability, 
Aristotle has adopted this notion to study processes. The 
four factors contributing to the operation of a process are: 
1- Formal factor (Ti esti?) 
2- Material factor (ex hou?) 
3- Efficient cause (hypo tinos?) 
4- Fulfilling factor (hou heneka?) 
In the third chapter of Physics II Aristotle attempts 
to enumerate and classify the four kinds of answers and ex¬ 
planations responsible for the opesition of a process. Many 
unjustified criticisms of Aristotle have focused on his notion 
of causes. And recent scholarship has put an end to such 
criticisms by rendering aition as responsible factors or ex¬ 
planations. Aristotle declares that a full understanding of 
any process requires a grasp of all the four factors. 
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The fulfilling factor seems to serve as a rather fair 
translation of the Greek telos. For Aristotle telos repre¬ 
sents a much broader notion that purpose fo finality. Telos 
includes not only human ends, but also all natural ends and 
outcomes in the processes. In chapter 8 of Physics, Aristotle 
begins by stating a non-teleological view of natural history 
and states a series of arguments against that view. The first 
argument indicates that nature exhibits greater regularity, 
whereas chance (tyche) reveals an absence of regularity. So 
what happens naturally can not be a matter of chance and must 
possess an end for something. Thus, events do not merely take 
place, they have ends and consequences. Nature as well as 
human happenings have consequences and ends. Such ends are 
consciously intended in human care, and in natural processes 
such outcomes should be discovered in order that man may be 
able to appreciate the function of such processes. A very 
helpful example is offered in the case of an egg growing into 
a chicken. 
Ousia is further conceived by Aristotle as the movement 
that contains within itself its fulfillment (tele) in such a 
way that dynamis always leads to a renewed actualization 
(energeia). We realize that ousia may not be understood un¬ 
less its relationship with dynamis, ergon (function), energeia, 
(the state of being in activity, en meaning within, ergeia, 
meaning at work, functioning) is appreciated. 
Energeia is derived from ergon (function). Function is 
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that which a thing is naturally suited to do, i.e., the making 
or doing for which a thing has a capacity and ability. Since 
function is conceived by Aristotle as the end, energeia is 
obviously related to entelecheia. being in a state of fulfil¬ 
lment. Entelecheia derives from eri, meaning inside, tel, 
meaning fulfillment, and echeia, meaning possession. Thus, 
entelechy is related to the notion of ergon, and ergon is the 
function of capacity (dynamis) and therefore its fulfillment 
(telos). So, the state of functioning tends towards the state 
of fulfillment, especially since Aristotle has indicated that 
energeia differs from kinesis in that the latter is incomplete 
(ateles), while the former is not. Therefore, at the state of 
entelecheia, dynamis of a thing causes its transformation to 
something other than what it is.I"7 
In short, there are two types of activity. One kind leads 
to a process of change, resulting in a further product: the 
functioning of the dynamis, to construct a house results not 
only in the building, but also in the house, and the house as 
an ousia is the consequence of the process of building. The 
second kind of activity, as Randall comments, represents a 
functioning which is self contained and includes its own end. 
For instance, seeing is the end of the power of seeing. Such 
an activity is a self sustained consummation, entelechy. In 
the first type of activity, the product is a consequence be¬ 
yond the functioning itself. In the second type of activity 
both objective and activity are in the actor: hearing is in 
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the hearer, thinking is in the thinker,living is in the man 
or animal.I® 
So ousia is energeia in the sense of being the conse¬ 
quence of a motion or process, the fulfillment of the dynamis 
of motion. On the other hand, ousia, in the sense of consum¬ 
mation is pure activity. Here we observe that in view of 
Aristotle the ousia of anything is identified in its activity. 
In the realm of natural processes, the psyche, life, is re¬ 
garded as the entelechy of a living being, the overall acti¬ 
vity for the sake of which it can exist. Ousia involves the 
power to act and function. The dynamic conception of being 
may be appreciated in terms of ousia. Being as an activity 
(energeia) has its end in itself. For Aristotle being is a 
dynamic notion which provides the power to act. Being is not 
a power, it is functioning (energeia). 
Body-Mind Problem 
The word psyche, in Greek, is a general notion which ap¬ 
plies to all those powers which plants and animals possess, 
but the lifeless elements do not. Psyche is, therefore, of 
wider application than life (zoon), which is the power of 
self maintenance common to the plant and the animal. Aris¬ 
totle has divided the world into animate and inanimate things. 
An animate (empsycha) thing's functioning is different from 
that of inanimate things. The fundamental difference between 
animate and inanimate things is understood by Aristotle in 
their behaving and acting, rather than in their structure.19 
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Aristotle has written the treatise De Anima. to deal with the 
—-Sla of llvlng things. Randall says that Aristotle has used 
the term psyche to signify the process of living and knowing. 
Psyche in the view of Aristotle is considered the arche of 
living and knowing. Thus, the term psyche represents the com¬ 
plex power which all living things exhibit. It is a distinc¬ 
tive power which distinguishes the physis of natural things. 
So the physis of living things is identified in their living 
and knowing aspect.20 
Therefore, psyche for Aris.totle, represents the living 
dimension of a large class of natural things. Psyche is, 
thus, a functional notion. It is not an ousia with separate 
identity. It is the eidos of the living beings. It is the 
dynamis of the body of function in an appropriate way. Psyche 
provides the dynamis of the living body to perform (ergon) its 
specific function (energeia). Psyche is not a separate en¬ 
tity added to the body. Its relation to the body is compar¬ 
able to the power of seeing to the eyes, hearing to the ears 
and so on. So it may be said in the same way that seeing is 
the entelechy of the eyes, hearing the entelechy of the ears. 
Hence the psyche is the entelechy of the living organism.21 
Aristotle maintains that living beings do not all have 
the same kind of life (psyche) . Plant life is simply growing, 
taking in nutrition, and producing seeds to new plants. Plant 
life is limited to vegetation. The psyche of animals possesses 
sense perception, desire (orexis) and movement. Men, in addi- 
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11011 to the above operation (energeia) possess the dynamis 
to know (nous). 
As a biologist, Aristotle held life as a continuum from 
the simplest to the most complex of living beings. It is a 
gross misrepresentation to say that he holds psyche to be a 
supernatural indwelling ousia. Aristotle pays due attention 
to the physical dimension of psychological activities. He 
repudiates the dualism of body and soul. He does not con¬ 
sider psyche as a prisoner in the body of "a ghost in a 
machine," but a special kind of organic unity. The psyche as 
the arche of kinesis is an operational dimension of living 
organism. A complete ousia is an individual being (a tode ti) 
and on such individual is the living thing (soma empsychon) 
composed of a material (hyle) and a formal (eidos) principle.22 
Aristotle criticises the notion of souls as being in bodies, 
without considering the fact that any activity of the soul 
need appropriate physical organs.23 He attacks those scholars 
who think that the soul is an independent entity which under¬ 
goes changes and does things. He adds that it is the person 
or animal that undergoes changes and does things. ^ 
The interaction of living organisms with the external 
world is clearly taken into account by Aristotle. Since he 
appreciates the functioning of the living organism in an ex¬ 
ternal context, he holds that life is the dynamis of living and 
knowing, the capability of the organism to respond to the en- 
He understands the activities vironment in a selective manner. 
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and functions of an organism in terms of its external object, 
that toward which such functions are directed (ta antikeimena). 
For instance, seeing is determined in terms of visible objects, 
thinking is appreciated in terms of what is thought and so on. 
For Aristotle, the functions of an organism are consequential 
responses provided to interact with "specific external force." 
All of an animal's organs work together to help him to survive 
in a dangerous world, to react to its environment, seeking out 
the food that preserves it and avoiding what harms it. 
"An animal must have sense perception, and there can be 
no animal without this faculty, if nature does nothing 
pointless. For everything that exists by nature is 
for something. Now any body capable of walking would, 
if it lacked perception, be destroyed and fail to at¬ 
tain its end, which is its natural function. For how 
could it feed itself? It follows that no living organ¬ 
ism is able to move but unable to perceive."25 
The above passage clearly indicates the importance of 
sense perception in the survival of an animal. Such sense 
perception establishes an organic relationship between the 
organism and the environment. 
Aisthesis (sense perception) is understood by Aristotle 
as the reception of a sensible eidos without its matter (hyle). 
The notion of the dynamis is understood in terms of its passage 
to the stage of functioning (energeia), and such functioning 
ends' as an actuality in the thing moved (vision in the eye, 
thought in the mind, and so on). Sense-perception, thus, may 
be described as an alteration (alloiosis)in that it indicates 
the passage from dynamis, to energeia of one of the sense fa¬ 
culties. The function of aisthesis is, therefore, to receive 
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form of sensibles without the matter, and so be subject to 
consequence (pathes) of appetite (orexis), pleasure (hedone), 
pain. Aristotle seems to hold that perceiving something 
is being aware of it, awareness is a non-physical event that 
occurs at the end of a chain of physical and physiological pro¬ 
cesses, in the words of J.L. Akrill.27 Aristotle’s theory of 
sense perception is thoroughly biological. It establishes a 
close link with desire and movement. It does hardly emphasize 
the private acts of awareness. 
the 
the 
and 
Knowing Process 
Aristotle hardly seems to subscribe to rationalism (i. 
e., essentialism) as far as knowledge is concerned. Knowing 
may not be divorced from sense perception. The knowing pro¬ 
cess is not an independent activity. It is an activity which 
depends on the lengthy sequence of sensible processes. 
Aristotle identifies knowing with the power of to kritikon. 
To Kritikon, has been translated as the power of discernment, 
discrimination and selective response.28 He relates the power 
of selective response to the object of the desire to know. The 
knowing process takes place on two interconnected dimensions, 
that of sensing which represents the capacity of animals and 
that of intuitive and reasoning (nous) which characterises 
men only. 
Human nature, for Aristotle, constitutes a composite 
structure involving the interaction of reason, emotion, pei- 
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ception and action in an empsychon. There is an organic re¬ 
lationship between nous and other dimension of human life. 
N°us is a power in man that provides him with the ability to 
think deductively. But, this power is not the focus of 
Aristotle's attention as many essentialists claim. He deals 
with the notion of nous as a special function of human organ¬ 
ism in direct relation with other dimensions of knowledge. 
Nous, is an energeia which is represented in the form of 
noesis. (Meta. 1072 b). Since Aristotle maintains that all 
knowing depends on sense perception or observation he has 
shown that even nous which is an abstract process can not 
grasp the knowledge of a universal without the mediation of 
particular physical events. Thus, for Aristotle nous can not 
function without "images," i.e., a physical representation. 
Knowledge of anything derives from sense experience. Know¬ 
ledge results from the observation of the external reality and 
reflection upon what can be observed. Understanding and learn¬ 
ing generally depend upon sense experience. So sensations 
bring into nous, the intelligible structure of the universe. 
Senses furnish a kind of image for the intellection of the 
nous. What mediates between sensation and nous is experience. 
Experience causes the nous to apprehend what is in the realm 
of the intelligible. This nous is not independent from the 
body as many essentialist (e.g., rationalists) seem to allege. 
Aristotle considers that the question whether the psyche is 
separate from the body be as foolish as the question whether 
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impression is separate from the wax. But, in case of nous, 
he states that we can know things as they are. Nous is merely 
a capacity in man to think. It helps man to rise beyond the 
individual varieties and establish universal truths. In order 
to understand particular events we must see them as part of 
some general pattern. This is what Aristotle means when he 
uses nous as intuitive mind. 
The essentialists try to focus merely on this aspect of 
the Aristotelian epistemology to demonstrate their claim that 
reason (nous) is the ulitmate means for man to achieve know¬ 
ledge. They seem to ignore the total picture provided by 
Aristotle when he deals with the problem of knowledge. They 
reduce the Aristotelian epistemology to the mere rational 
apprehension of truth, without recourse to sense data or ex¬ 
perience. They interpret Aristotle in a crass rationalistic 
fashion without any reference to his works. They depict 
Aristotle as a staunch advocate of "universalism." They seem 
to believe in the universality of man and his reason. 
Mortimer Adler is a contemporary disciple of Aristotle in 
a scholastic sense. In the postscript to The Time Of Our Lives, 
he wrote, "when I first thought of writing this book, I con¬ 
ceived it as little more than a re-writing of the Nicomachean 
Ethics of Aristotle... ."29 He tries to associate the goal of 
education with the function of the nous only. First he alleges 
that "with respect to education, as with respect to every othei 
matter which the philosopher considers, there can be only one 
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set of true principles and concl usions "30 He states that the 
aim of education is the same for all men and at all times and 
everywhere the ends of education are ’’absolute and universal 
principles."31 what he claims about the aims and ends of 
education are flagrantly un-Aristotelian or at best an inade¬ 
quate and distorted reading of Aristotle. Since he seems to 
underestimate the Aristotelian theory of phronesis in educa¬ 
tion, he defines man as a rational animal, in the sense that 
man has the power of abstraction. Ideas are, in his view, the 
products of abstraction. He holds that "because the intellect 
is man's highest power, the operations which flow from its 
good habituation are the highest form of human activity."32 
Knowledge, for him, results from the operation of intellect. 
He says that "in the case of every human power, other than the 
intellect itself, the natural tendency of the power is toward 
that actualization of itself which conforms to reason. This 
follows from.the subordination of all human powers, in their 
exercised arts, to reason itself."33 
It may be realised that AdLer's view of Aristotle repre¬ 
sents an inadequate and deficient picture of what Aristotle has 
bequeathed for later generations. He seems to ignore Aristotle s 
notion of aithesis as the fundamental source of knowledge. 
For Adler education should basically aim at secondary ousia, 
i.e., universals, rather than the first ousia, particulais. 
He as well as some other essentialists seem to disregard 
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Aristotle's notion of phronesis as a crucial basis for his 
epistemology. Aristotle sees the practical application of 
knowledge as the most important component of his educational 
theory. He has devoted a whole chapter of his Ethics to 
the applicability of knowledge. That is why he has challenged 
the conception of the good as an abstract universal. Aristotle 
asks how could a knowledge of the universal and essential 
structure of goodness itself help a physician to heal his 
patients. A physician never studies health in abstract uni¬ 
versal terms. He studies the health of man, or even the health 
of an individual. Knowledge, thus, from an educational point 
of view, aims at application. 
Learning for Aristotle is a form of phronesis, phronesis 
is a form of knowledge that serves to mediate between the uni¬ 
versal and the particular. In other words, phronesis involves 
a "peculiar interlacing of being and knowledge , determination 
through one's own becoming."^4 Phronesis provides a type of 
"ethical-know-how" in which both universal and particular are 
co-determined. 
Aristotle maintains that moral knowledge is not episteme, 
scientific knowledge. Episteme is knowledge of what is univer¬ 
sal. It is characterised by what exists of necessity. It re¬ 
resents the insight and deduction about stable, essential and 
universal aspects of being. Mathematics typifies this mode 
of knowing and truth. In short, episteme is a knowledge of 
what is permanent. This form of knowledge can be taught with 
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slight impact on the practical dimension of reality. The 
telos of this form of knowledge lies in its own pursuit, 
while the telos of phronesis is realized in action. 
Phronesis is a form of knowledge and learning which is 
appropriate to praxis. Phronesis , thus, has a direct practi¬ 
cal implication, while episteme is learned for its own fulfil¬ 
lment. Episteme does not directly aim at an existential situ¬ 
ation. Phronesis is closely tied to praxis. Episteme re¬ 
quires demonstration for the sake of learning and instruction, 
while phronesis requires no formal demonstration. Phronesis 
involves careful deliberation and choice. (Ethics, 114a. 25, 
30, 35). Episteme as knowledge can be taught and learned, 
but even Pericles can not teach his sons to be worthy people. 
The Uiversality of episteme is not the universality of man's 
knowledge of the good.. For Aristotle the best education is 
the one which fosters phronesis. 
Aristotle distinguishes between techne (technical know¬ 
how) and phronesis (ethical know-how). Gadamer has elaborated 
this distinction. He states that techne is learned and can be 
forgotten; we can lose a skill. (N.E. 1140b 30). But ethical 
know-how can not be forgotten. There is a different conceptu¬ 
al relation between means and ends in techne and phronesis. 
The end of phronesis is not a particular product. It is rather 
"complete ethical rectitude of a life time."35 Phronesis, un¬ 
like episteme, does not stand in isolation from the moral be¬ 
ing of man, but belongs to it. Moral knowledge has no deter- 
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minate end. It involves right living in general, whereas 
technical know-how (techne) is particular and serves 
particular ends. The proper education which fosters phronesis 
helps the student to deliberate with himself about the object 
of this knowledge. Thus, he is in a position to deliberate 
about what is right in a concrete situation. 
Both phronesis and techne represent dynamic forms of 
knowledge. Phronesis includes both reflection on perspective 
and its implementation in relation to a given situation, while 
techne is a practical knowledge of making things. Phronesis 
is the capacity to think well about living well (eudaimonia). 
Man of phronesis is good at summing up a situation .weighing 
various elements and proposing alternative moral ends. Phrone¬ 
sis is epictatic. It is not only the ability to provide ap¬ 
propriate advice from the sidelines (1143 a 8-10), but it also 
is the application of this advice. 
Aristotle says that "ethical know-how" must be combined 
with moral arete. This enables a man to determine and per¬ 
form what is right and moral on each particular occasion. In 
other words, ethical know-how and moral arete are but two di¬ 
mensions of the same ideal moral person; one can not exist 
without the other. other. Phronesis is the energeia of the delibera 
tive faculty. 
the re fore, 
y. Deliberation seeks to change what is changeable, 
it is not logical to deliberate about what is 
eternal and permanent. Phronesis deals with the contingencies 
at the level of praxis. The arete of deliberative faculty is 
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called phronesis. While the arete of contemplative faculty 
is sophia. 
Practical reason has two distinct functions: technical 
competence and moral wisdom. The two should not be confused. 
Technical competence or techne has as its objective the pro¬ 
duction of a particular material thing, an end outside itself. 
Moral wisdom (phronesis), on the other hand, has as its ob¬ 
jective the determination of appropriate means for achieving 
moral ends. 
Aristotle explicitly states that "we deliberate not about 
ends but about means. A doctor does not deliberate whether 
he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor 
a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does 
anyone else deliberate about his end. They assume the end and 
consider how and by what means it is to be attained." (N.E. 
1112bll-20). 
He clearly states that wish relates to the end and cho¬ 
ice to the means. We wish to have a happy life, but we shall 
choose the means to such end. We wish to be healthy but, we 
choose to act in compliance with the standards of health and 
safety. (N.E. 1111b 25-26). In fact, choice ensues upon de¬ 
liberation and wish is a form of appetite. He further indic¬ 
ates that phronesis and moral arete determine the complete per¬ 
formance of man's functions: virtue ensures the rightness of 
the end we aim at: phronesis ensures the rightness of the 
choose to gain that end. So phronesis is concerned 
means we 
; 
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with choice of the appropriate means to the moral end. 
Furthermore, techne deals with production (poeisis), 
wh*le phronesis is concerned with action (praxis). Techne 
represents a productive characteristic under the auspices of 
true reason (N.E. 1140a, 15, 20). Techne is creating, build¬ 
ing in the sense of a deliberate producing, as Heidegger in¬ 
dicates. Techne is the knowledge how to create, build and 
produce beyond what is given. Techne has the force to bring 
forth the hidden bring out into the open. Both techne and 
poeisis create a disclosure. They lead forward and bring to 
light what is hidden. Thus, the essence of techne is aletheia 
(unconcealment). 
Techne involves a productive skill. It is exercised to 
act upon and alter what can be other than it is. Such techne 
is developed through experience. Techne as a form of know¬ 
ledge encompassing expertise and competence, has its limits in 
providing the criteria to judge a person morally. Technical 
know-how does not tell us in a comprehensive way what kind of 
person is the agent of techne. Man's ultimate goals condition 
all his other less fundamental aims. Appreciation of ethos 
(character) concerns the ultimate goals a person seeks and 
his impetus for doing so. Phronesis should not be subsumed 
under techne-as a special kind of productive expertise since 
in moral problems it is not enough for a man to know how to 
perform certain actions or produce certain things. While in 
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matters of skill, an expert may not necessarily involve 
himself with the moral outcome of his production. A person 
may show his expert competence in either a morally acceptable 
or unacceptable way. Immoral action does not constitute 
phronesis, while production or making of a certain thing 
(techne) may or may not involve a moral goal. The best in¬ 
stance of the latter circumstance may be illustrated by the 
production of thermonuclear weapons for the immoral purpose of 
eradicating the human race.(N.E. 1140b 36-39). This last ex¬ 
ample may clairfy Aristotle's notion when he says that ethical 
know-how involves deliberation in a moral sense. It is not 
teachable in the sense that techne can be taught. It is a 
comprehensive ethical knowledge and insight which is gained as 
a result of proper education. 
Technical know-how is concerned with a product (ergon) 
which is neither necessary nor natural, while ethical know¬ 
how is concerned with man and his conduct , as an intellectual 
arete. Techne is directed exclusively to the product. Aristotle 
clearly states that: 
"Things which admit of being other than they include... 
both things made and things done. Production (poiesis) 
is different from action (praxis)-for that point we can 
rely even on our less technical discussions. Hence, the 
characteristic of acting rationally is different from the 
characteristic of producing rationally. It also follows 
that one does not include the other, for action is not 
production nor production action. Now, building is a 
"technical know-how" or applied science, and it is es¬ 
sentially a characteristic or trained ability of ration¬ 
ally producing." (N.E. VI, 3-1140a 5). 
Thus, ethical know-how (phronesis) is immanent as far as 
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its aim is concerned, while the aim of technical know-how is 
dependent upon a particular product. In ethical know-how 
motives are of first significance; in technical know-how 
(techne) motives are not of primary importance, because it 
is the ergon (product) that comes first. Mistakes in techni¬ 
cal know-how reflect upon the product; mistakes in ethical 
know-how are prejudice and may even be destructive to human 
beings. Mistakes in ethical know-how can harm the ethos of 
man. So a man of phronesis possesses ethical sagacity and 
prudence. He has the ability to reach sound conclusions in 
his deliberations about what is good for him and the society. 
Phronesis, in short, falls within the scope of action (praxis), 
while techne is concerned with production (poeisis). Ethical 
know-how is a virtue; it is not an art. 
Therefore, the education which aims at fostering 
phronesis is concerned not only with the personal affairs of 
an individual, but also with the affairs of the family 
(oikonomike) and of the state (politike). So education, 
according to Aristotle, involves the personal and social 
development of the child. For him phronesis as a virtue has 
a significant socia.1 dimension. Political wisdom and know¬ 
ledge is an important aspect of phronesis, since it involves 
the ability to make judgments about practical problems in 
human life. This is another practical dimension of Aristotle s 
education which cultivates' the understanding (synesis) of the 
practical problem of conduct. Thus, it educates the child to 
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be able to judge other's actions correctly and learn from what 
they do or say (N.E. 1143a 5, 10, 15). 
A healthy education, according to Aristotle, fosters 
good sense (gnome) in the child. As a result of developing 
such a good sense the child will be able to judge rightly what 
is equitable. Such a sense of equity enables him to be con¬ 
siderate or to show cojisicfe rat ion for others (N.E. 1143a 20, 25). 
It could be cautiously said that Aristotle anticipates 
the sixth stage of Kohlberg's moral development paradigm. At 
this stage the child is able to define what is right. He does 
not act from fear, approval, or law, but from his own inter¬ 
nalized standards of morality. Phronesis, in other words, in¬ 
volves a universal ethical orientation which leads to self 
chosen ethical principles based upon abstract concepts (e.g., 
respect for the dignity and freedom of each human being). I 
believe that phronesis may be clearly understood if we apply 
Kohlberg's pardigm of moral development to the notion of 
Aristotle's ethical know-how. It should be emphasized that 
phronesis is a sequential process rather than an incidental 
event in human life. Thus, it involves deliberation and moral 
action. In modern parlance phronesis reflects a signficant 
dimension of hidden curriculum. It may be said that Aristotle 
seems to oppose the theory of value clarification or the 
value transmission approach. 
On the basis of the theory of phronesis, Aristotle hints 
at the fact that there is an orderly and logical pattern in the 
development of a child's moral judgment and action Children 
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evolve new and higher standards of morality as they become 
intellectually prepared through interaction with the environ¬ 
ment (N.E. 1141a 35, 4, 10, 15, 20, 25). 
The relationship of phronesis to praxis is not compar¬ 
able to the relationship of a law to the case. Phronesis, 
does not possess the universality and unchangeable rigor of 
the law. Phronesis, is a kind of self-knowledge. It is a 
knowledge of what is right in specific human situations. That 
is why it is said that it serves as a mediation between the 
universal and the particular. Aristotle, thus, indicates the 
importance of experience in the process of knowledge, truth 
and finally education.36 Phronesis provides the kind of know¬ 
ledge which enables phronismos to engage in praxis successful¬ 
ly. Phronesis, then is a deliberating capacity which provides 
self-knowledge and appreciation to apply to specific situations. 
Therefore, human actions, when followed upon a deliberate cho¬ 
ice (proairesis) , may be judged moral or immoral (N.E. 1. 13b). 
If education is effective, according to Aristotle, it 
should furnish a dialectical link between learning (subtilitas 
intelligendi) and practice (praxis). For him action is the 
exercise of the capacity of an agent, individual, to affect 
other agents or things, to move them, alter them, use them, 
and if possible influence them. The peculiar characteristic 
of an action is its episteme aspect. That is to say if a per¬ 
son does not know what he is about, we normally do not con 
sider him agent of his action. An agent, theiefore, acts only 
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when he knowingly, and upon deliberation, intervenes the world. 
The morality of an action is normally determined in accord¬ 
ance with the circumstances of pre-meditation and thoughtful 
deliberation. 
Action involves the apprehension of the meaning of life 
for the sake of guidance and moral behavior. Action has not 
only a personal impact but also a social dimension. Since 
ethical conduct is not conceiveable outside the scope of the 
society, numan excellence, which leads to eudaimonia, is not 
confined to theoretical knowledge (theoria), as many essenti- 
alists allege. Life of theoria should be complemented and sup¬ 
plemented by the attainment of other goods. 
Essentialists usually ignore the notion of phronesis 
and replace it with mere theoria. They attempt to divorce 
theoretical episteme from the full range of human life and 
action. Human ergon, for them is limited to the theoretical 
faculty. They hold that human excellence is fully vested in 
theoria, while Aristotle has emphasised that human ergon in¬ 
cludes, but is not limited to theoria. 
For Aristotle arete involves the process of human de¬ 
velopment and growth. The foundation of such arete is not 
to be regarded as merely resulting from the cultivation of 
theoria. In fact, human eudaimonia consists in the fosteiing 
of all faculties including theoretical ability. That is why 
he has elaborated his argument of praxis, poie^is, and ergon 
to such a large extent. The area of praxis for him consists 
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in all our transactions and 
beings with other men as we 
them. 
affairs as social and political 
act on them, with them or for 
Arete and Education 
In the view of Aristotle, the definition of happiness 
involves the definition of arete. Arete implies the proper 
function (ergon) of a person in a particular field. In other 
words, the means of attaining eudaimonia is excellence in the 
discharging of one’s functions. In the previous pages we 
saw that Plato, in Meno, raised the question of arete in terms 
of an educational scheme. This dialogue covered the discus¬ 
sion of the question of the teachability of arete. The dilem¬ 
ma remains unanswered. Aristotle takes up the subject and 
discusses it from both educational and epistemological points 
of view. He elaborates the concept of arete in terms of hap¬ 
piness and intellectual and moral wisdom. He declares that 
the highest stage of man's eudaimonia is the exercise of moral 
and intellectual virtues. Arete is divided into two inter¬ 
related realms of moral and intellectual. Intellectual 
arete involves the theoretical faculty while moral arete 
falls within the scope of hexis (habit), diathesis (disposi¬ 
tion), dynamis, (active and passive capacity), pathos (affec¬ 
tive dimension) and the form of things (morphe). By these 
qualities Aristotle represents the genus of moral are^e. 
Moral virtue or arete is concerned with the delineation 
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of the mean (meson) between actions and emotions. This 
standard is formulated to exclude the extremes of excess or 
defect. Theoretical arete is concerned with the function of 
substantive knowledge. Aristotle believes in the plausibility 
of theoretical arete and says that it can be taught. He says 
that this activity is insightful (theoria). Theoria falls 
under the purview of philosophy. It is the activity of nous, 
insightful apprehension which is the sublime human faculty. 
Theoria involves permanent and everlasting phenomena. It is 
a pleasant action for human beings. It is self-sufficient. 
It should be loved for its own sake not as a means to other 
ends. The educational implications of this dichotomy are 
clear. It may be construed that theoria is the subject of 
substantive knowledge or knowledge that, while praxis comes 
within the realm of knowledge-how. Knowledge-how is improv¬ 
ed by practice. Aristotle clearly says that "we become just 
by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave 
by doing brave acts." ^7 So moral arete is acquired by vir¬ 
tue of the exercise of the excellent act. 
He has in mind three subjective factors of excellent 
acts, namely: intention, choice and habitual disposition 
which serve as the preconditions for the excellent acts. Pro 
per actions result from knowledge, deliberation and habitual 
attitude. Knowledge about morality does not necessitate 
moral action. The other fundamental elements should join in 
order that an excellent product or act emanate. 
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It is noted that, for Aristotle, arete constitutes a 
sequence of stages involving both cognitive and affective di¬ 
mensions. Aristotle's conception of arete in the domains of 
both intellectual and moral avenues challenges intellectual- 
ism as a close-ended preoccupation with abstract reasoning 
and pure rationality precluding the comprehension of emotion¬ 
al and affective dimensions of the process of education. 
Aristotle's reference to the theory of akrasia indicates that 
he has in mind the developmental stages of human growth and 
education. In other words, he opens the way for the admis¬ 
sion of moral weakness and incontinense. In the modern sense, 
he has broadened his view of human development to include a 
thorough appreciation of the human situation. In this way he 
has challenged the Socratic view of the impossibility of do¬ 
ing evil knowingly and willingly. He maintains that the moral¬ 
ly strong man is the person who conforms to his deliberation 
and reflection. In other words, he consents to his own logical 
conclusions, while a morally weak person transgresses the con¬ 
clusions of his reflections. For he is prone to act according 
to his passions, even though he knows that what he does is 
evil. A self indulgent person can not be considered temperate. 
Temperation involves continence, and incontinence involves in- 
tempe ranee. 
It is noted that Aristotle takes into account the multi¬ 
various dimensions of the ’motivational resources of the stu- 
Psychological reactions and impluses are not ignored dent . 
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in the Aristotelian scheme of education. He realizes that 
the feelings of the student should be exposed to proper 
training. He acknowledges the fact that the young person tends 
to follow his instinctive passions. Therefore, there should 
be reasonable guidance of his passions in the right direction 
(N.E. I, III, 1095a 2-18). The student of Aristotle is urged 
to consider and evaluate his life as a whole in order to 
reach a conclusion involving his eudaimonia and to try to ap¬ 
preciate noble and just actions and virtues in order that they 
may be habituated in the process of time and ultimately form 
his second nature. Moral virtue is a disposition for inde¬ 
pendent and decided behavior. So the composition of action 
(praxis) and emotion (pathos) constitutes the pivot of 
Aristotle's conception of virtue and thereby education. 
The tendency of arete is not only toward action but it 
also entails emotions. The student of Aristotle is a person 
of, among other things, active and passive dispositions. So 
dispositions are exposed to anger, pleasure, desire, pain and 
horror. The human development is the process of interaction 
between action and being acted upon. Human beings, in the 
course of experience, are both subject and object of activity 
in general. What Aristotle means by good character is a well 
balanced person who not only performs excellent actions but 
also has good feelings. Education, thus, aims at both ex¬ 
cellent actions and healthy and productive feelings. So the 
best curriculum, for Aristotle, is the one which allows for 
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the cultivation and the fostering of skills and crafts of 
excellent performance as well as wholesome emotional po¬ 
tentialities. Aristotle envisions the development of a per¬ 
sonality which is not only well-trained in terms of action, 
but also in terms of affections as well. The peculiarity of 
human activity revolves around the notions of action and 
passion. 
Aristotle at 1147 a 22-22 deals with the students in 
general. For him, those students "who have learned a subject 
for the first time connect together the propositions in an 
orderly way, but do not yet know them; for the propositions 
need to become second nature to them and that takes time." 
Here we notice a significant allusion to the attention paid 
to the moral development in a sequence of stages. In other 
words, the student should learn by doing (habituation). 
Learning also involves enjoyment and pleasure. The student 
should learn to enjoy doing what is excellent. Pleasure in 
the acquisition of knowledge requires the appreciation of 
noble joy. The genesis of pleasure in education and know¬ 
ledge requires the training of the child to enjoy leaining in 
order that he takes pleasure in doing it. 
The disposition to enjoy learning and doing excellent 
functions is influenced, to some extent, by the environment. 
He seems to realize the interaction of the individual with the 
environment in child growth. This is another indication 
which repudiates the allegation of essentialism ascribed to 
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to him (N.E. 117964 31). Aristotle confers great signifi¬ 
cance upon the ciiltural and moral background of the student. 
The learner, according to Aristotle, is the one who already 
loves noble action and enjoys learning by doing. He is a 
person who has already been taught what is noble (N.E. 1099a 
13-15). The interesting conjuction of social association and 
context and personal endeavor and practice anticipate the 
Deweyan conception of learning by doing. Thus, his stress on 
habit (hexis) and disposition to choose the proper mean in 
actions and emotions gains prominence. Aristotle reserves a 
method of direct instruction for the cultivation of intellec¬ 
tual excellence, while he explicitly states that moral virtues 
(arete) could hardly be subject to instruction. They are ac¬ 
quired, rather, through practice and habituation. 
He alludes to three possible ways of acquiring moral 
excellence; viz: by nature, by instruction and by habitual 
practice. He does not totally exclude natural inclinations 
and instruction in moral excellence (N.E. 11792, 20). But 
he casts doubts on the effectiveness of instruction in all 
cases. He justifies his position by stating that a student 
who is guided by emotions does rarely yield to argument and 
instruction. A person who already loves "what is noble and 
feels disgust at what is base" may be instructed to do ex¬ 
cellent acts. 
In short, Aristotle may be said to be one of the foie- 
runners of the theory of developmental psychology and educa¬ 
tion in that he conceives of happiness not being limited 
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to the acquisition of rational knowledge. Rather, harmonious 
growth involves all human faculties, affective as well as 
cognitive. Happiness, for him, is a human achievement, and 
animals can not be called happy, because they do not have 
understanding or free choice in the acquisition of happiness 
as in the case of the final goal of man. 
We observe that the educational system proposed by 
Aristotle seems almost a reformulation of Plato's paradigm 
(in the Republic) for the training of the guardians (Rep. 
374d-404, 521-541). Aristotle distinguishes three essential 
elements constituting proper education: nature, nurture 
and instruction. 
A child's natural disposition concerns the pleasures to 
which he is attracted and the pains to which he is highly 
sensitive. We do not by nature develop into good or bad 
people; we must learn how to live well. Dynamis (capacity) 
to be good or bad is a neutral potentiality. The dynamis of 
man may be moulded through nurture and instruction (N.E. 2.1. 
1103a 24 and 2.5.1106910). 
Nurture primarily involves physical and emotional train¬ 
ing. It mainly depends on practice; learning how to act pro¬ 
perly can only be carried out by doing (praxis), by habituation 
(ethismos). 
"It is clear that in education 
before theory, and the body be 
(Pol.8.3.1338b5-6). 
practice must be used 
trained before the mind 
f T 
Aristotle attempts to suggest that a pe rson's actions have 
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not only an outer direction but also an inner bearing on the 
formation and development of his character. Practice serves 
to take on personal characteristic (hexis) appropriate to 
those kinds of activities. 
Another thing which is in the focus of Aristotle's dis¬ 
cussion is the factor of experience. He seems to contend 
that emotional dispositions are considered as traits of moral 
character when a person acts from his own choice and not mere¬ 
ly as a computer programmed by someone else. Only through 
right experience we become good persons. Practical excel¬ 
lence requires the process of experience. This experience 
provides a basis for our development into good and moral peo¬ 
ple. Thus, the goal of nurture is not simply moral excellence 
itself but growth in the direction of moral excellence. 
Instruction, which is a later stage in the education of 
the child, involves the cultivation of "the power of forming 
right judgments, and of taking delight in good dispositions 
and noble actions." (PoK 8.5.1340a 17-18). It was pre¬ 
viously mentioned that phronesis is a comprehensive excel¬ 
lence and its development requires not only instruction, but 
it also presupposes the right kinds of experience The experi¬ 
ence of being truly enamoured of what is noble." Hence, it 
is impossible to convince a person of the propriety of an 
action or practical principle by mere argumentation and de¬ 
monstration. Instruction, therefore, involves not only formal 
teaching, but also a solid nurture in order that emotional 
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traits may be transformed into an intelligent disposition 
of moral character (N.E., Book 9. 1179b8; 1.3.1094b282). 
Careful examination of the educational theory of 
Aristotle clearly suggests that he does not concede to what 
essentialist and particularly perennialists read into his 
thought. Aristotle explicitly states that "thought alone 
moves nothing; only thought which is directed to some end 
and concerned with action can do so." (N.E. 6.2.1139a 36-37) 
Therefore, if Aristotle is alleged to hold that the aim of 
education is to develop the faculty of thinking, it will bla¬ 
tantly challenge the clarity of his text. From Aristotle's 
point of view, education aims at action and practice and not 
simply thinking. The telic end of education is embodied in 
good action. Since man is a constant center of activity he 
wants to know reality and to change it to what he desires it 
to be. 
Education, thus, involves human practice, directed at the 
use of his power to affect and alter, to dominate and control 
things. Good is also defined primarily in terms of functional 
and practical ends. Practical good is both an activity and 
a characteristic (N.E. 7.12.1152b33; 2.3.1104bl3). To claim 
that Aristotle confines his educatinal goal simply to the 
development of intellect seems aprocryphal vis a vis the text 
itself. If we claim that Aristotle is a process philosopher 
we are not very far from the truth. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EDUCATIONAL THOUGHTS OF RUMI 
Introduction 
Before studying the philosophy and education of 
Jalaludin Mohammad Rumi (1207, 1273), as a part of our 
project, a short summary of his intellectual development is 
in order. 
Rumi was born in Balkh in present-day Afghanistan. 
His father was a reputable scholar and juristconsult. As 
a Sufi and scholar his father, Baha Walad, was well-versed 
in both traditional sciences related to Shariat (canonical 
law) and the Sufi sciences related to the tarigah, the 
practical Sufi dimension of knowledge. In the former 
capacity he taught uninitiated Muslim students in their 
social and everyday affairs and in the latter he inspired 
a select group of pupils on the way to self-education and 
spiritual exercise. 
Upon the invasion of the Mongols (616/1219) he left 
the city with his family and many of his followers to make 
a pilgrimage to Mecca first, then to find a safe place to 
settle. After the trip to Mecca he set out for Konya 
(Iconium in present day Turkey), where he was welcomed by 
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the Seljuk king and his sage vizier, Muin al-Din Parwanah 
(SPL.2). 
Rumi, the son of this reputable scholar, began study¬ 
ing the traditional sciences in the fashion of his family 
and forebearers at an early age. He studied Arabic grammar 
and syntax, the Quran, prosody, jurisprudence, hadith (the 
collections of sayings and practices of the Prophet), 
history, logic, philosophy, astronomy, and mathematical 
sciences. By the time his father died (628/1231), Rumi 
was a well-known and respected scholar in the above 
disciplines. At the age of twenty four he was assigned the 
duties and responsibilities of his father as an educator 
and juristconsult. 
Rumi began, then, his Sufi training with a student 
and disciple:: of his father, Borhan al-Din Tirmidhi in 
1232 (629), who was an acknowledged master of Sufi knowledge 
and practice. Until the death of his Sufi teacher and 
guide, Rumi practiced the spiritual path under his super¬ 
vision and guidance. 
In the year 1244 (642) Rumi met the enigmatic and 
charismatic figure Shams al-Din of Tabriz (a province in 
north-west Persia). This Socratic figure transformed the 
life of Rumi in a drastic way. Thus, he realized that 
beyond pedantic intellectualism of academia, there is a 
vast world of experience which can enrich and broaden one’s 
knowledge and insight. 
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In contact and communication with his old master, 
Shams, he gave up the ivory tower intellectualism in which 
he had already been involved and started an odyssey of 
personal experience. He realized certain stations of 
experience to which he had not already gained access. 
To Rumi's profound dismay Shams left him after a 
period of one or two years of constant communion and com¬ 
panionship. The grief of the disappearance of Shams 
provided Rumi with great inspiration to create his master¬ 
piece, Divane-Shams, containing 40,000 verses replete with 
didactic themes about life, self-realization, cosmic self, 
and ishq (love). 
Some scholars compare the life and love of Rumi for 
Shams to that of Plato for Socrates. Both Socrates and 
Shams drank the wine of martyrdom on the charge of defend¬ 
ing their righteous causes. Both of them died without 
leaving any traces of scholarship in writing. Both of 
them inspired their students to create great works (T S. 
p. 24). 
After the disappearnace and murder of Shams, Rumi 
quit his preaching for the general public. He turned his 
whole attention to the education of Sufi trainees. Shams 
for Rumi had two levels of meaningfulness, one as love 
incarnate and the other in terms of the literal meaning of 
the name, i.e., the sun of truth. Rumi began to versify 
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his personal experience with Shams as an archetype of self- 
actualization and realization of the Truth. He inevitably 
used his inspiring master's Norn de plume. From this time 
until his death (1273) he continued writing poetry inspired 
by the illuminations of experience and vision. 
Rumi's Divan Shamsi-Tabrizi, containing some 40,000 
verses, spans a period of thirty years—from the time Shams 
arrived in Konya to the time Rumi died. 
The Mathnavi ("couplets"), another important work of 
Rumi, contains six books of poetry comprising 24,915 verses. 
This work has become an educational resource for Muslim 
students. The Mathnavi was composed as a result of educa¬ 
tional dialogues between Rumi and his pupils. The Mathnavi 
is a collection of Paideia comparable to the Greek educa¬ 
tional notion. Its tales, anecdotes, apothegms, and 
aphorisms are derived from a great variety of sources 
ranging from Greek, Persian, Turkish, Arabic, and Hindu 
cultural themes to the Quran, and hadith literature running 
the whole gamut of Islamic wisdom, with a particular accent 
on practical dimensions of experience. 
The Mathnavi intends to cultivate and foster the life 
of man. It implies the learning and the practice of a 
liberal arts perspective. Rumi tries to ascertain how 
philosophy, history, jurisprudence, and literature con- 
tribute to the education of man as a virtuous and moral 
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being. In fact, the Mathnavi is a work which contributes 
to a liberal education (paideia) in the fullest sense of the 
word. 
The Mathnavi implies that education should not be con¬ 
fined to the development of reason only. The goal of 
education according to the Mathnavi is not the imparting of 
cognitive repertories. Knowledge in the Mathnavi is a 
correlate of action. In other words, for Rumi knowledge is 
for the sake of action (M V, 2424). Knowledge, for Rumi, 
should abound in an incentive toward moral deeds in the 
sense that the noble images shown in the great writings of 
scholars and in divine decrees command our respect and 
stimulate our emulation. The knowledge of man should be 
conceived of in dispositional and practical terms. Rumi's 
recourse to a great variety of sources reveals his insight 
into the educational significance of the cultural wisdom of 
paideia and its concerns for fostering moral conduct and 
virtuous action. 
Rumi has provided moral perspective by alluding to 
aphorisms, tales, anecdotes, and apothegms bequeathed by 
preceding generations in order to make it possible for the 
student to see the practical and functional relevance of 
the disciplines he studies. He has successfully 
strengthened the continuity between thought (knowledge) and 
action . 
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For Rumi, the Mathnavi, in short, advocates the con¬ 
tinuity of the process as well as the results of educational 
effort. The education advocated by Rumi in the Mathnavi is 
a life-long process and endeavor. It is not merely a 
process of preparing the student for the future. Rumi, 
thus, does not consider intellectual studies as fundamental 
and primary in preparing the student for the future. 
In the following pages the issue of Rumi's anti- 
essentialism will be extensively dealt with. It is 
sufficient here to state that Rumi uses tales and stories 
to provide a basis for moral education. The materials 
which Rumi uses in the Mathnavi are intended to raise moral 
dilemmas for students to resolve. He appreciates how such 
tales and stories become a source of moral education. He 
intends to reconcile theory and practice within the pur¬ 
view of an educational process. In the Mathnavi, he pays 
due attention to what stimulates the student to respond to 
practical situations. Thus, he provides a basis for the 
effective resolution of problems (MI, 35-45). 
In the Mathnavi a child is given the opportunity 
"to experience conflict or discrepancy between one's own 
actions and evaluations and the actions and evaluations of 
others."1 Rumi, by invoking a historical fiction or tale, 
engages the child in a moral dilemma and tries to involve 
him in the milieu delineated in the story. The child 
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confronts new questions about why the people in a certain 
story act in such and such a fashion. With the guidance 
and help of the teacher the student is led to recognize the 
motivations of the characters and relate them to specific 
actions. Thus, he is given the opportunity to examine his 
own self in relation to the characters represented in the 
story. 
Encounters among the characters of the stories of the 
Mathnavi often raise issues of justice, truth, and 
righteousness. Students who are attaining the stage of 
"fairness" as a result of a sense of reciprocity try to 
make meaningful relationships with the main character who 
seeks after truth and justice. 
The follow-up discussions of the issues involved in 
the tales of the Mathnavi in the classroom help the stu- 
ents to understand and appreciate the moral behind the 
story in question and pave the way for a process of self- 
examination and moral identification with justice and 
righteousness. Thus, stage advance is encouraged. Rumi 
anticipates Kohlberg's view that morality is not an ex¬ 
ternal order imposed on basically selfish and violent 
impulses. It is rather the immanent ordering of the 
relations of persons who have "an innate desire to establish 
social bonds with each other."3 Rumi believes in the "map" 
Such a map of moral and educational 
of the stages. 
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development was originated and elaborated by other Sufi 
teachers. The "path," or tariqat explicated by the author 
°f "Kitab Luma" is perhaps the oldest comprehensive treatise 
on Sufi education. It consists of seven stages, and, as 
Reynold A. Nicholson has pointed out "each stage is the 
result of the stages immediately preceeding it."^ These 
stages involve the educational and ethical development of 
the pupil. The education is not complete until the student 
has passed through all the "stages." Every stage of 
development is interrelated. The latter stages comprehend 
and include former stages of development. Nicholson 
rightly states that "the Sufi 'path' is not finished until 
he has traversed all the 'stages,' making him perfect in 
5 
every one of them before advancing to the next..." 
In the view of Rumi the development of the person is 
a continual process of growth (T R p.29). Rumi has inter¬ 
twined methods of psychology with those of philosophy in 
the Mathnavi. He uses psychology to study the process of 
human consciousness and behavior and applies philosophy to 
judge and analyze such a process. In fact, the Mathnavi 
is a work which combines both psychology and philosophy. 
He seems to appreciate the interconnection of psychology 
and philosophy for the study of man, nature, and reality. 
He does not impose an impervious fence between philosophy 
and psychology. He realizes that psychology can help the 
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educator to proceed with teaching in a structurally 
sequential manner. He seems to see the difference between 
the actual dimensions of human existence and the formal 
mode of logic and philosophy. He can see that formal logic 
and rational philosophy judge and analyze products and 
conclusions rather than actual human experiences. He 
realizes the importance of the psychological stages of 
development and, hence, the capacity of a person to ex¬ 
perience and learn levels of reality. Thus, he places 
himself in opposition to theories that treat the mind as a 
tabula rasa, or blank table that absorbs information with¬ 
out the process of ideation (S P L p. 12). 
I have elaborated so extensively on the methods and 
the content of the Mathnavi because Rumi has worked out his 
fundamental ideas of philosophy and psychology of education 
in this work in a salient fashion, and I have utilized 
this source extensively. So I believe that the above pre¬ 
liminary study of the various ramifications of this work 
is not so far-fetched. Therefore, I am basing my study 
primarily on the Mathnavi. 
However, it should be added that the Mathnavi is a 
work of poetry containing a great variety of metaphors, 
allegories, and other figures of speech. Although I 
appreciate my limitations in dealing with a work of this 
nature, I can see many advantages in Rumi's style. I will 
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show in the course of my examination of Rumi how a 
sequential and analytical approach to reality and education 
can, after all, only take place within a broader context and 
background of meaningfulness. Sequences and stages, in 
Rumi's view, can be recognized as such only in relation to 
a previously tacit acknowledgment of the whole. I will try 
to show that knowledge is to be regarded as a dimension 
between the tacit and explicit axies. In words of Michael 
Polanyi the realms of ’’focal" and "subsidiary awareness" 
are to be carefully appreciated in order to get a compre- 
hensive view of reality. If I succeed in proving that 
"gestalt awareness" or "lateral thinking" is another facet 
of the human process of knowing, then the claim that a 
metaphorical view of reality is another important and 
reliable dimension of being and knowing seems not to be a 
. . 7 
far-flung position. 
Process Philosophy of Rumi 
It should be pointed out that Rumi's philosophy is 
Islamic in background, and his interest in philosophical 
cosmology, ontology, epistemology, and axiology reflect 
dimensions comparable to those of Whitehead, Beidyaev, 
Hartshorne, Hegel, and William James. He seems to hold that 
Reality is ultimately inexpressible purely in terms of 
reason and science. This is not to deny the importance of 
these latter. Rumi may not be said to be a mystic in a 
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conventional sense; i.e., he does not renounce the use of 
reason and the materials of science. He is no more and no 
less a mystic than Bradley, Whitehead, or Hegel, since he, 
like them, finds some facets of this universe expressible 
only in the language of metaphor and poetry: 
"The intellect is luminous and seeks the good. How 
can the dark ego vanquish it?" (M III, 2557-58). 
"If the braying of your ass-ego were to diminish, the 
call of your intellect would be your Messiah." 
(D 34042). 
"Intellect is a man's wings and feathers." (M VI, 
4075-77) . 
Rumi, like these western thinkers finds Reality in 
some respects surd, neither expressible in rational numbers 
nor capable of being explained away. Rumi argues that the 
most tangible center of knowledge and consciousness may be 
said to be the experience denominated by such words: as 
self, power, and environment. For Rumi self is not a soul 
substance. It is a process of developing wholeness and, 
hence, moves toward greater freedom. Development consists 
of integrating new material in one's consciousness; this 
includes the acquisition of knowledge of the world and of 
oneself. Thus, it seems that self is the individuation 
through the interaction of the self with the eternal 
reality. Moreover, individuation consists of becoming a 
single, homogeneous being. Such individuation represents 
an ongoing process of growth and development. Thus, the 
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ego undergoes tremendous changes. The essence of self is 
creative movement and action. Thus, Rumi seems to 
characterize self not as a thing but an act. 
Rumi maintains that individuality is not a general 
idea. Individual is not something aloof, discrete, in¬ 
sulated. It is a concrete manifestation of the inter- 
grative dance of organism and environment. Body is not a 
thing residing in empty space, but rather a complex system 
of interrelated events or acts. Thus, he does not advocate 
body-mind-duality. He seems to think that body and mind 
are one in action and experience. Self is a comprehensive 
system which contains ego, mind, intellect, will and body. 
Every moment and we are renewed, though we are 
ignorant of this renewing for every and aye. 
Life like a stream of water, is renewed and renewed. 
Though it wears the appearance of continuity in form. 
That seeming continuity arising from its swift 
renewal. 
As when a single spark of fire is whirled round 
swiftly. 
If a single spark be whirled round swiftly, it seems 
to the eye a continuous line of fire. 
This apparent extension, owing to quick motion, 
demonstrates the rapidity with which it is moved. 
(TR p. 24) . 
In the above poem Rumi refers to the individuality of 
the individual as the outcome of continual renewal and 
change. He indicates that this seeming continuity emanates 
from swift change and renewal. 
In Rumi's view self is a complexly individuated, un¬ 
fathomable psychic field of experience. It is ultimately 
a generative noetic ground of manifestations, a unity of 
psychical and physical dimensions of reality. Continual 
change in ousia constitutes different forms of human ex¬ 
perience and activity. 
For Rumi, as for Whitehead, the philosophy of nature 
is associated with the philosophy of organism. Philosophy 
of nature consists in study of a process of panpsychic 
evolution. He, like Charles Hartshorne, holds that all 
units of matter are living. Rumi does not advocate the 
concept of dead static matter in cosmology. He seems to 
anticipate the application of what is known as the cell 
theory of reality in modern biological science, to all 
reality and phenomena. He seems to maintain that all 
microscopic and macroscopic things in the universe possess 
living and sentient characteristics. He anticipates 
Hartshorne's view that the "lack of an explicit organ does 
g 
not spell the lack of function." The ascription of 
sentience to the simplest physical entities-electrons and 
other atomic particles-provides a basis for Rumi to con¬ 
struct his theory of reality, meaning and truth. Rumi 
states that: 
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Air, earth, and fire are God's servant. 
To us they seem lifeless, but to God living. 
When you strike steel on flint fire leaps forth: 
(TR. p. 15). 
You see a movement, you know there is life. (M II 
3253-55, 58). 
When a mineral turns its face toward the plant king- 
dome, life grows up from the tree of its good fortune. 
Every plant that turns toward the spirit drinks from 
the fountain of life, like khidr. (M VI,126-128). 
According to Rumi the universe presents itself to our 
attention as a process of becoming which is the becoming of 
actual entities. For him any event seems to involve the 
notion of beginning, ongoing, and consummation. The simplest 
instance is any act of perception. We may say that from the 
top of this building we see a castle over there and across 
the valley a planet in the sky. In terms of the convention¬ 
al scheme of simple spatiality, we may regard ourselves 
wholly "here" and the "castle" as wholly "there." But if 
we abandon the notion of conventional "spatiality," then, 
the things grasped in a realized unity here and now are 
not simply the castle and the planet; they are the castle 
and the planet from the perspective of the space and time 
of our here and now. And there are innumerable other pei- 
spectives from which other aspects of castle and planet are 
grasped and with which they are united in similar ways. 
What, indeed, is "the" castle or "the" planet except an 
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endless variety of standpoints (i.e., if they are con¬ 
scious of their own standpoints) from which, and in which, 
they are perceived? And what is the "here and now" from 
which we are perceiving? What, in fact, we are conscious 
of is merely the relation of our "here and now" events to 
the coincidental happenings throughout the rest of the 
universe. Hence, an event is the interpenetration of all 
the infinitely varying aspects of the universe from some 
particular standpoint. Rumi's reference to reality as 
"constant and swift renewals" indicates that the universe 
is not a static entity. It is a "creative process" in 
the words of Whitehead. Rumi attempts to replace a 
rationalistically static conception of universe with a 
dynamic interpretation portraying the universe as a contin¬ 
uous process of creative activity in which each actual 
entity exercises a measure of choice and in turn makes its 
own contribution to the totality which is called universe. 
In "every moment the world is renewed, and we are unaware 
of its being renewed, whilst it remains (the same in 
appearance). Life is ever arriving anew, like the stream, 
though in the body it has the semblance of continuity." 
(M.I., 1145). 
From Rumi's point of view, transition and growth are 
two aspects of the same reality. Rumi has based his theory 
of "substantial change" on the Muslim Sufi tradition. Sufi 
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scholars state that any entity, including a human being, 
constantly undergoes change, growth, transition, and re¬ 
newal. Indeed, they hold that change and transition take 
place in the category of ousia (substance). They seem to 
believe that to be anything in the world of natural 
processes, means to be something that comes into being 
and passes away. In this sense, anything that is, any 
ousia, is anything that is what it is as a result of a 
process, a kinesis, the full functioning (energeia) of 
dynamis. Thus, energeia and kinesis are characteristics of 
any ousia♦ Change (metabole), in the broadest sense, and 
process are a fundamental fact of our experiental world, 
the world we perceive. Things, hence, are always changing 
into something else. Materials are always taking on new 
forms.^ 
On the contrary, Islamic peripatetic philosophers, 
such as Ibn Sina contend that change and transition occur 
merely to accidents. They argue that transition or move¬ 
ment takes place to pave the way for the actualization of 
what is potential (i.e., an essentialist argument). They 
maintain that kinesis (harakat) occurs in the four 
categories of quantity, quality, place and position. They 
claim that change or movement in the ousia, is, ontologically 
speaking, impossible. What they name as jawhar is the 
exact equivalent of the Latin Substantia. It does not 
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correspond semantically to the Greek, Qusia, which is a 
dynamic notion representing change and growth.^ 
Rumi seems to portray a kind of organic philosophy in 
which an evolutionary process of genesis and growth is 
delineated. Thus, he seems to hold that the first appear¬ 
ance of a given quality at a certain stage in evolution is 
not a pure "emergence" (though it may have an emergent 
aspect) of the quality, unrelated to the previous state of 
nature, but is intelligible in the same fashion as the 
appearance of a new organ. Rumi would not subscribe to 
Newton's theory, which makes no provision for the evolution 
of matter, which has been a basis for a modern concept of 
the universe. Rumi states that: 
I died as mineral and beame a plant, I died as plant 
and rose to animal, I died as animal and I was man, 
why should I fear? When was I less by dying? 
(M IV, 2881). 
First he appeared in the class of inanimate things, 
Next he passed therefrom into that of plants, 
Remembering naught of his inanimate state so 
different; 
And when he passed from the vegetative to the animal 
state he had no rememberance of his state as a plant, 
Except the inclination he felt to the world of plants 
Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers. 
Like the inclination of infants toward their mothers. 
(TR, p. 216). 
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Rumi s vision of reality is based, on the awareness of 
the essential interrelation and interdependence of all 
phenomena physical,biological, psychological, social, and 
cultural. He emphasizes that every organism—from the 
smallest bacterium through the wide range of plants and 
animals to humans—is an integrated whole and thus, a 
living system. All natural phenomena are wholes whose 
specific structures arise from the interaction and inter¬ 
dependence of their parts. Such wholes involve a process of 
transaction—the simultaneous and mutually interdependent 
12 
interaction between multiple components. 
These wholes are dynamic in nature. Their forms are 
not rigid structures, but are flexible, yet stable mani¬ 
festations of underlying processes. For Rumi form is 
associated with creativity and process, interrelation with 
interaction, and opposites are unified through oscillation. 
"Things become clear through their opposites." (SPL. 28). 
Hence hidden things become manifest through opposites 
Opposites are made manifest through opposites 
So you have come to know light through light s 
opposite. (M VI, 104). 
Rumi seems to hold that the emergence of organic 
patterns is fundamentally different from the consecutive 
stacking of building blocks, or the manufacturing of a 
machine product in precisely programmed steps. He asserts 
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that life is equilibrium, integration, and "peace among 
opposites." (MI, 1293-94). 
In short, Rumi agrees with some modern physicists who 
argue that consciousness may be an essential aspect of 
universe, and that we may be blocked from further under¬ 
standing of natural phenomena if we insist on excluding it. 
The new discoveries of bootstrap approach in physical 
sciences has opened up the possibility of including the 
study of human consciousness in future theories of matter. 
The problem of human consciousness has already attracted 
13 
the attention of physicists in the area of quantum theory. 
This theory of matter and reality, agrees, to a great 
extent, with Whitehead's philosophy of organism. Charles 
Hartshorne has elaborated his theory of panpsychism on the 
basis of Whitehead's theory of organism. 
In conclusion, Rumi has developed a theory of reality 
which defies any dualistic, rationalistic, and essentialist 
approach to the existing phenomena. His theory of reality 
is closely and organically associated with his theory of 
consciousness.^ Both reality and consciousness present 
themselves to us in a process, not in a substance oriented 
fashion. Rumi anticipated Whitehead's statement that every 
entity in the universe, of whatever sort, contributes data 
to every other entity.15 Whitehead refers to this process 
of organic integration and interdependent event as the 
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interfusion of actual entities. Whitehead states that 
the universe is anlayzable into societies of societies. The 
society arises as a result of intimate sort of relationship 
characterized by "organic order." A group of actual 
entities constitutes a society. For instance, an army is a 
society of regiments, regiments are societies of men, men 
are societies of cells, and cells are societies of protons. 
By society he implies organism. Such an organism dynami¬ 
cally participates in and interacts with other organisms 
and actual entities. However, what distinguishes human 
societies from the society of cells is the possibility of 
experience and self-consciousness about organization present 
in the former. While man shares basic vital functions with 
other living beings, he differs from them because he re¬ 
tains his past experience. With animals an experience 
vanishes as it happens. Thus, each action is not related 
to aconstellation of past experiences. Man lives in an 
environment where each event reverberates what has gone 
before. In other words,each occurance is a reminiscence 
of other things. The event of participation, interaction, 
and transaction constitutes a continual process. Rumi s 
organic theory of reality, to a certain extent, represents 
the same notion as the one developed by Whitehead in the 
light of his theory of "actual entities" and "societies. 
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It should be pointed out that this real world of 
processive passage is similar to those of Plato and 
Aristotle. The Greek word bios, from which we take 
"biology," is usually translated into the narrowly English 
word "life." But its range is much larger. Plato un- 
hesitantly speaks of the psyche (life) of what we should 
ordinarily call "living things." But he also speaks of the 
psyche of the polis (city, state, e.g., Athens) in the 
Republic and also of a world psyche in the Timaeus. Plato 
points out that a living man lives within the living social 
polis, and ultimately in the cosmos, the world alive. 
Psyche is associated with movement and consciousness. Plato 
in Timaeus (42 a-d) and Laws (X, 896e-897b) associates 
psyche with the principle of motion (kinesis). He holds 
that the reason for the immortality of the psyche is the 
fact that it is always in motion. Thus, psyche is a vital 
principle, natural force, a spark of a cosmic moving 
principle, a source of magnetism in the view of classical 
Greeks. 
Aristotle attempts to define psyche as a harmonia. 
Harmonia is a Pythagorean theory which is used to define 
psyche as a harmony of opposites. It is a musical concept 
which is utilized to explain the constitutive principle of 
all musical intervals. Harmonia theory has been used by 
Plato and Aristotle to describe the cosmic dance of the 
integral components of the universe. It is closely 
associated with the notion of holon. 
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Holon has been variously translated into English as 
whole, organism and universe. Plato seems to maintain that 
holon is something more than the total (pan) of its parts. 
He applies holon to the parts of the kosmos (Laws, 903c, 
904b). Thus, Plato seems to recognize the processive 
passage of any event. The whole of nature according to 
Plato and Aristotle is alive and dynamic. Aristotle de¬ 
fines nature (physis) as the principle (arche) and cause 
(aitai) of motion. (Physics, 11, 192b). 
Rumi and Whitehead advocate a panpsychist view of 
nature as Plato and Aristotle do. For both Rumi and 
Whitehead it then appears that man's acute alienation., or 
separateness from nature is not normal, but pathological. 
Whitehead states that "there is no absolute gap between 
"living" and non-living." This principle of life and 
vitality provides another evidence to support the argument 
that neither Plato and Aristotle nor Rumi subscribe to the 
positions taken by essentialists (in general and perennial- 
ists in particulars) regarding the conception of essence- 
substance ontology. 
In the following pages an attempt will be made to 
study the relation of body and mind in a more elaborate 
way within the scope of Rumi's outlook, with a reference 
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to modern position in science and philosophy. Recent re¬ 
search and analysis of brain functions help us understand 
the organic interaction of mind with external reality, the 
brain's division of labor and the synthetic functions of 
corpus callusom. 
Rumi1s Conception of Relativity, Truth and Knowledge 
Rumi seems to claim that although man has the ability 
to know the truth, this ability is not unconditioned, 
because the relativity of the disposition, situation, and 
point of view of the one who knows is determining his in¬ 
sight and conviction. Thus, he abandons the principle of 
contradict ion and universal validity of truth. Something is 
relative in so far as it is referred to another or is the 
bearer of a relation. Rumi indicates that things are not 
understandable without reference to something else (e.g., 
father, son) . Truth has validity on a conditional basis. 
Changeability in experiential knowledge results from 
variation of time and place. For Rumi the principle of 
relativity is applicable to many experiential processes, 
actions, i.e., becoming. Theman's perception is relative to 
human sense and reason. 
Whitehead states that both metaphysics and epistemology 
have been hampered by the conception of substance ontology 
as a primary mode of analysis. "Substance" is used by 
medieval scholastic philosophers in contrast to "accident." 
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Substance has an intrinsic quality for them, while 
"accident" is a dependent entity. So, substance has in¬ 
dependence and is not a relative notion, while accident is 
a relative and dependent notion. For them intellect and 
reason fall within the scope of substance while sense per¬ 
ception is in the category of accidents. Truth, if based 
on reason and intellect, has an intrinsically independent 
value. They define truth as a similarity or agreement 
between spirit and existence. Adequate knowledge is based 
upon logical truth. The norm of truth is the logical 
criterion that makes it possible to distinguish a true 
judgement from a false one. 
Rumi does not deny the validity of formal truth (i.e., 
logical and mathematical), but he believes that formal or 
substantial truth is not the only facet of knowledge. He 
hints that experiential truth is a highly significant facet 
of knowledge. For him truth has an educible and elicita 
tional character. It should be obtained in the process of 
inquiry and exploration. The acquisition of truth involves 
action and participation. 
Rumi's principle of relativity is applicable to any 
physical action or state relative to antecedent states of 
the world. 
To know things is to know them in relation; to know 
a part is to know how it connects with the whole 
It is the 
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total vision that we call full knowledge. Rumi uses the 
analogy of the elephant in a dark room to portray this 
holistic position: 
Some Hindoos were exhibiting an elephant in a dark 
room, and many people collected to see it. But as 
the place was too dark to permit them to see the 
elephant, they all felt it with their hands, to gain 
an idea of what it was like. One felt its trunk, 
and declared that the beast resembled a water-pipe; 
another felt its ear, and said it must be a large 
fan; another its leg, and thought it must be a 
pillar; another felt its back, and declared the 
beast must be like a great throne. According to the 
part which each felt, he gave a different description 
of the animal. (T R p. 122/M 111,1260-1270). 
The elephant resembles the object of inquiry and the 
people gathered in the dark room are inquirers and problem 
solvers, in modern educational jargon. If the elephant is 
taken to a bright place, all of the above inquiries will 
realize that they were holding different parts of the same 
whole. Rumi in this story takes a holistic approach towards 
the acquisition of knowledge with the significance of 
relativity prevailing in the situation. Relative notion of 
truth indicates the notion of relatedness of experiential 
phenomena. 
Meaning appears from connectedness and context. With¬ 
out context and relatedness, nothing makes sense. Try to 
imagine letters without words, words without sentences, and 
sentences without language. Learning includes learning to 
see relations and connectedness. Anthropologist Edward 
"because they consistently teach us not to 
Hall said once. 
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make connect ion... there should be a few people at least 
whose task is synthesis—pulling things together. And that 
is impossible without a deep sense of context." Context 
reflects the web of relevance. Context is rather easy to 
learn if it has been given a context or framework. 
Context and interconnectedness provide the basis for 
the appreciation of the whole. Rumi cites this story to 
indicate that linear, analytical approach to reality does 
not represent the whole truth of the fact. The power of 
seeing wholes (i.e., synthesis) is required for detecting 
meaning. The elephant metaphor builds a bridge between 
analysis and synthesis (i.e., right hemisphere and left 
hemisphere functions). Rumi attempts to seek integration. 
Integration involves experience in the sense of human 
interaction with the world in an organic and transactive 
form. Whitehead's use of the theory of organism also 
supports the idea that between and among actual entities 
there is a synthetic and organic relationship. This 
approach to reality which is opposed to the mechanical 
approach constitutes the basis for Whitehead's conception 
of relativity. (PR, 228). 
Rumi attempts to bridge the gap between the two 
worlds of right brain and left brain functioning. He 
advocates togetherness of analysis and synthesis as a solid 
basis for knowledge and awareness. He is concerned to 
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elucidate the relations among various types of entities, 
rather than undertaking to reduce them to one another. He 
makes every effort to challenge the "nothing but" approach. 
For him human perception is relative to human sense and 
human reason. Any physical action or state is also relative 
to antecedent states of the world. This "nothing but" 
approach arises from substance oriented ontology. Rumi 
attacks the substance-quality conception of reality. No 
matter which way we go into the precise inquiries of 
physical science or the direct deliveries of experience, we 
find not things (substances), but events and processes as 
the primary ingredients. The basic fact in experience is 
our consc ious-her e-perce iving-t hose-char act er-over-t her e- 
now. The hyphens exemplify the original togetherness of 
the mentality, the spatiality, the temporality, and the 
distinguishing characteristics. Any experience, thus, 
involves a complex web of dynamic events. Rumi illustrates 
his point of reference to such things as poison and water. 
He states: 
In the whole of Time there is no poison or candy 
that is not a foot for one and a shackle for another. 
For one it is a foot, for another the foot's chain. 
For one it is poison, for another candy. 
The snake's poison is life for the snake, but death 
in relation to man. 
Creatures of water see the ocean as garden. 
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Creatures of earth see it as death and torment. 
(M IV, 65-69). 
Nothing God has created is in vain, whether wrath 
or forebearance, sincere counsel or guile. 
None of these is absolutely good, none absolutely 
evil. 
The benefit and harm of each depends upon the 
situation. For this reason knowledge is necessary 
and useful. (M IV, 2597-9). 
Rumi seems to declare that there are relational 
elements between "percipient" at a certain moment in the 
words of Whitehead. "If a physical theory T claims that 
an attribute or relation of a physical event or object is 
the same in every reference system in which it is specified, 
then such T can be said to be "invariant" or "absolute" in 
virtue of thus being independent of the reference system. 
By the same token, attributes or relations of an event or 
thing are called "covariant" or relative in "T" if T 
asserts that they do not obtain alike with respect to all 
physical reference systems but depend upon the particular 
system. 
Rumi apparently attempts to prove that the relation 
of a physical event is not the same in every reference 
system. For instance, the effect of poison to the reference 
system snake differs from its relation to a human being. 
Poison does not represent an absolute and invariant entity 
in every situation and in'relation to every thing. Poison 
is dangerous in relation to a human being. It is not 
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dangerous in relation to the snake or some other living 
beings. The sea is life giving in relation to the sea 
creatures and deadly in relation to some other land crea¬ 
tures. Thus, concrete existence is relational in view of 
Rumi. Things exist and function by reason of their rela¬ 
tions to other things. Concrete existence, moreover, is 
space-time structures; time and place are essential to an 
event. 
Rumi pictures the world as made up of entities and 
events having volume and duration and having to each other 
whole-part relations. He aims at finding invariants in a 
world whose appearance is admitted by and framed by the 
condition of motion of the observer with respect to the 
observed. For Rumi behind relativity is relatedness and 
continuity. In a conception of the universe involving 
process, change, and development, to be implies to be 
something, existing implies limitation. On the other hand, 
to be an entity means to be acting and participating. 
Whitehead uses "actual entities" to indicate that actual 
involves activity and entity involves potentiality. Thus, 
relativity is a notion which relies both on potentiality 
and actuality.^ Rumi anticipates such an appioach to 
reality, since he bases his philosophical outlook upon 
processive passage of reality. He states. 
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Some one is one person’s father and another’s son; 
the roof is below Zayd and above Amr. 
The relation of below and above derives from these 
two persons. In itself the roof is one thing only. 
(M III, 1151-55). 
Rumi intends to say that the truth of knowledge is 
relative and tentative. Truth in a temporal sense is 
"seasonable" for Rumi. He contends that our sense per¬ 
ceptions do not provide us with absolute truth. His theory 
of relativity supports my claim that Rumi does not sub¬ 
scribe to an essentialist conception of truth and knowledge. 
For Rumi truth involves a dynamic process of action and 
commitment. Truth is to be derived from experience and that 
the refined form of experience is knowledge. Truth mainly 
relies upon action. Truth as the object of knowledge is a 
relative notion. 
Therefore, Rumi does not advocate the notion of 
truth in terms of the "adequation of intellect with the 
external reality" (i.e., correspondence theory) as the only 
means of a comprehensive and integrated approach to reality. 
For Rumi truth is not simply obtained by means of the 
correspondence of knowledge and its object or the foimal 
coincidence of our representation and its content, Iruth 
for him occurs as a process. It is a process in which the 
opposition between reality and concept, or between 
objectivity and concept, or between content and concept is 
sublated to unity: 
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"So you have come to know light through light's 
opposite: Opposites display opposites within the 
breast.” (M VI, 104). 
"Form comes out of formlessness." (M I, 1130). 
So the locus of manifestation for a thing is its 
opposite, and each opposite aids its opposite. 
If you write upon a black page, your script will be 
hidden, since both are the color of tar. (D3761-62). 
Rumi indicates that truth should not always be 
equated with correctness (i.e., orthoses, adequaetion, 
homoiosis) . Truth is a participatory process which requires 
the participant to make every endeavor to bring forth that 
which is hidden, forgotten or concealed. Thus, truth is 
a situation-directed notion, in view of Rumi, requiring a 
flexible mind sensitive to the flux of things. Truth con¬ 
stitutes what is wrested from hidden-ness. The attempt 
to elicit the truth from concealment represents a constant 
process of activity, and commitment. Thus, truth for Rumi 
has an educible and elicitational character: 
"God says: I was a hidden treasure, I wanted to be 
known. In other words, I created the whole of the 
universe, and the goal in all of it is to make Myself 
manifest." (F, 176-177/184). 
The universe was created for the sake of manifestation, 
in order that treasure of wisdom might not remain 
hidden. 
He said, "I was a Hidden Treasure" Listen! Do not 
lose touch with your own nature, make yourself 
manifest. (M IV, 3028-29). 
"Although the thief remains silent in 
magistrate makes him confess." (M IV 
denial, the 
1014-16). 
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Thus, if truth has a hidden (concealed) character it 
requires constant activity to extort it from its source of 
concealment. Struggle to attain truth represents a personal 
event in view of Rumi. We see that Rumi's conception of 
truth is another version of Platonic aletheia (unconceal¬ 
ment ). 
From an educational point of view, Rumi can be said 
to describe the aim of education as the attempt to develop 
the student's ability to think reflectively and act in 
accordance with his thought. The relationship between 
thought and action constitutes a dynamic process of inter¬ 
action. What is involved, in short, is a dialogue between 
the personal and private world of the individual and the 
facts which exist external to him. It is precisely this 
interaction between self and non-self that characterizes 
Rumi's educational procedure. For Rumi there is no gap 
between what is "inherently" intellectual and what is 
practical. Therefore, it is possible to appreciate the 
intellectual significance and objective worth of a wide 
range of subjects. The intimate relation of intellectual 
and practical dimensions of knowledge and learning make it 
possible for the student to experience reality in relation 
to his capacity to understand and become aware, and hence, 
to grow. He asserts that: 
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Just so everyone in matters of doctrine gives a 
different description of the hidden subject. A 
philosopher expounds it in one way, and a critic at 
once refutes his propositions. 
A third censures both of them; a fourth spends his 
life in traducing the others. 
This truth and that truth cannot be all true, 
And yet all of them are not entirely astray in error. 
(R R, p. 98). 
Careful analysis of the above poem shows that Rumi 
is very critical of all attempts to claim completeness, 
truth, and finality for knowledge. After all, Rumi 
acknowledges, that we are finite creatures. In the words 
of Whitehead, "it is obvious that all of the interconnected 
actual entities of an actual world cannot be fully pre- 
19 
hended by any actual entity." 
Whitehead's works provide us with impressive 
illustrations of the fruitful results which have been 
achieved by careful analysis of apparently fantastic specu¬ 
lative deviations from Euclidian geometry produced during 
the late nineteenth century, and that such speculative 
deviations turned out to be of great value in expressing 
20 
modern scientific knowledge. 
This statement of Whitehead illuminates Rumi's 
contention that "everyone (i.e., scholar, philosopher, and 
research worker) mentions indications of the load, Ihis 
truth and that truth cannot be all true. And yet all of 
them are not entirely astray in error." (TR, p. 98). 
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This latter statement of Rumi reveals his relativist 
conception of truth and knowledge. In short, Rumi does 
not subscribe to the Latin notion of veritas. He is more 
inclined to advocate the conception of aletheia. 
Tacit Dimension 
Michael Polanyi states that in any given cognitive 
situation there are certain elements that the knower is 
aware of, since he or she gives them due attention. Such 
awareness is called "focal." In the same context there are 
also factors of which the person is aware even though he or 
she is not directing attention to them. This is termed 
"subsidiary" awareness. For instance, when someone reads 
my paper, he or she is primarily mindful of the meaning 
and not the words, nouns, verbs, adverbs, and adjectives 
used in my statements. However, he or she is subsidiarily 
aware of the parts of speech I use in my sentences, for 
whenever I make a grammatical or spelling error he or she 
immediately notices it. This example may be generalized 
to include many physical, psychological and social questions. 
Polanyi has outlined the two poles of knowing in the 
following way: 
When we use a hammer to drive in a nail, we attend to 
both nail and hammer, but in a different way. We 
watch the effects of our strokes on the nail and tiy 
to wield the hammer so as to hit the nail most 
effectively. When we bring down the hammer we do no 
feel that its handle has struck our palm, but that 
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Its head has struck the nail... I have a subsidiary 
awareness of the feeling in the palm of my hand 
which is merged into my focal awareness of my driving 
in the nail.22 
Polanyi says that when we are relying on our awareness 
of someting (A) for attending to something else (BO, we are 
but subsidiarily aware of (A). The thing (B) to which we 
are thus focally attending, is then the meaning of (A). 
The focal object (B) is always identifiable, while things 
like (A) of which we are subsidiarily aware may be un¬ 
identifiable. The two kinds of awareness are mutually 
exclusive. When we switch our attention to something of 
which we have hitherto been subsidiarily aware, it loses 
its previous meaning. Such is the definition of tacit 
knowledge in the view of Polanyi. 
The epistemological conclusion to be taken from the 
distinction made between "focal" and "subsidiary" awareness 
is that the knowing process takes place as a result of the 
reciprocal and interdependent functioning of focal and 
subsidiary awareness. Thus, knowledge cannot be confined 
to the realm of focal awareness. In other words, tacit 
knowledge is a place "to stand" to attend from in 
order to be able to attend to anything at all. 
Polanyi adds that tacit knowing is more fundamental 
than explicit knowing. "We can know more that we can tell 
and we can tell nothing without relying on our awareness 
be able to tell."24 Polanyi argues that 
of things we may 
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the tacit dimension is not only a justifiable form of 
• knowledge, it is "logically prior" to explicit or focal 
awareness. In any cognitive context the knower tacitly 
depends on a great many factors in order to know anything 
explicitly. He, further, shows that what is known tacitly 
in one situation may well be known explicitly in a quite 
different context. What Plato and Aristotle called 
phronesis entails streams of tacit knowledge, since it is a 
knowing in the concrete situation. Phronesis is distinct 
from discursive rationality. It is the capacity to know 
how to act in a particular (variable) situation. Techne 
(technical competence) has also a certain tacit dimension 
in it, since it involves both focal as well as subsidiary 
awareness. Polanyi's example of hammering a nail and his 
discussion of the development of skills indicate the 
relevance of the notion of the tacit dimension in both 
techne and phronesis.^ 
In his famous work, Personal Knowledge, Polanyi 
discusses physical and perceptible skills as illustrations 
of his notion of tacit and subsidiary knowledge. All of 
us, he argues, swim, play tennis, walk and the like without 
being able to articulate this knowledge verbally. We ai e 
able to recognize the face of an old friend in a crowd of 
many thousands without being able to verbalize the way we 
do i t. 
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Tacit knowledge has a physical dimension which relates 
to the role of the body. As Polanyi has shown in his 
various works, bodily activity has a cognitive aspect. 
Sometimes our bodies function as instruments of attaining 
knowledge. Such knowledge is often of a tacit nature. 
Motor knowledge, for example, can only be obtained by means 
of "indwelling" in the words of Polanyi. He states that 
things which we can articulate, we know by observing them; 
those that we are unable to articulate we know by means of 
n r* 
dwelling in them. 
In dealing with the notion of indwelling and partici¬ 
pation he cites Heidegger's being-in-the-world. Heidegger's 
analysis of Dasien as being-in-the-world indicates that 
dwelling (wohnen) is not other than thoughtfully living in 
this wonderful world and undergoing an experience of this 
unfathomable presencing in everything we do, think, and say. 
In this way we give the body the gift of comprehension. 
Thus, we "move in," "inhabit" and live and feel at home in 
this world. We do not feel expatriated to the exile of 
27 
mathematical rationality. The world is familiar to us. 
Polanyi, in pursnance of Heidegger's idea adds that all 
understanding is based on our dwelling in the particulars 
of that which we comprehend'.' Since, knowledge has some 
tacit dimension in it, therefore, "indwelling" seems to 
constitute an important aspect of every cognitive phenomenon. 
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Any knowing process requires an empathic indwelling. If 
we take the material world in a non-mechanistic form, as a 
complex web of relationships, interconnections or correla¬ 
tions in a net-work of dynamic events, we do not consider 
events as isolated phenomena and separate entities. We 
realize that, as Fritjof Capra, a theoretical high-energy 
physicist of Berkeley, has pointed out, all entities and 
events constitute patterns of inseparable cosmic process. 
The patterns of activity are thus correlative and inter¬ 
actional. Hence, Capra says that "when we get to subatomic 
particles, we find that they are actually not made of any 
material substance, they have a certain mass, but this 
mass is a form of energy. Energy is always associated with 
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processes, with activity. It is a measure of activity." 
Thus, he claims that "when we observe the particles that 
make up atoms, we never see a substance; what we observe 
are continually changing dynamic patterns a perpetual 
^ . ,,30 
dance of energies. 
If we submit to the significance of the holistic and 
ecological interrelationship of events and the dynamic 
nature of reality, we can appreciate the notion of inte¬ 
gration. So we realize the meaningfulness of organization 
rather than solely concentrating on building blocks and 
basic substances. Thus, we can conceive of reality as an 
integrated whole with a dynamic nature. All natural events 
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and phenomena are wholes which arise from the interactions 
and interconnections of their parts. It is obvious that 
the nature of the whole is quite different from the mere 
sum of its parts. The best illustration of the notion of 
the whole is to be found in human organisms. Each organ is 
made up of tissues and each tissue is made up of cells. 
But the function of each tissue is interconnected with the 
function of the whole system. 
A holistic view of reality paves the way to under¬ 
stand the interdependence of all phenomena and the dynamic 
nature of living organisms. Arthur Koestler has coined the 
word holon for those systems which entail the relationshp 
between the whole and its parts. He maintains that each 
holon has two opposite tendencies: an integrative tendency 
to function as part of the larger whole, and a self- 
assertive tendency to preserve its individual autonomy.^ 
In a biological or social system each holon must assert its 
individual characteristic in order to maintain the system s 
stratified order but it must also submit to the demands of 
the whole in order to make the system viable. These 
tendencies serve as opposites but in fact they constitute 
a complementary system. 
The above theory is opposed to the methanistic world¬ 
view of Descarte (and other essentialists) who based their 
whole theory of reality on the dichotomy of matter and mind 
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In Descarte's view the material universe was a machine 
which followed the dictates of mechanical laws. For him 
everything could be explained in terms of the mechanistic 
movements of its part. Descarte extended this approach 
even to living organisms. He considered plants, animals 
and human beings as machines. He maintained that human 
beings were inhabited by a rational soul. He made a sharp 
distinction between body and mind. In his famous work, 
the Meditations he reduced all categories of reality into 
the duality of body and mind. He said that "Descarte can 
be of his own existance as a thinking thing while still in 
doubt that he has a body-hence, he and his body (if he has 
one) must be really distinct one from another." He adds 
that "he clearly conceives that it is actually possible 
that he should exist as a mind or thinking thing without 
32 
existing as a body — thus, mind and body are distinct. 
In his view the body is a part of the mechanical nature; 
the mind, a pure thinking substance. Since the body is a 
mechanical system, the soul is not (as in the opinion of 
the ancients) the principle of life: live bodies differ 
from dead ones as stopped watches differ from working 
ones.33 This Cartesian method which is essentialistic in 
nature has led to the fragmentation characteristic of both 
of our general thinking and the major academic disciplines 
It has contributed to the widespread tendency to reduce 
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reduce everything to be terms of the above basic dichotomy. 
Thus, in science this method, as Fritjob Capra states, has 
taken all aspects of complex phenomena to be understandable 
by means of reducing them to their constituent party with¬ 
out studying them in their interactive and integrational 
relationships. This essentialism has not only affected 
science but also other major disciplines such as the social 
sciences, i.e., philosophy, psychology, and education. 
Heidegger says that such a world view has led to a pre¬ 
vailing "subjectivism'1 which advocates the superiority of 
rationality and the soul over all other aspects of reality. 
As the self-certain subject man is now the "fundamentum 
inconcussum Veritatis" an autonomous law giver who legislates 
truth and prescribes to the world in what manner and on 
what conditions it can be an object of human cognition. He, 
further, adds that this rationalistic (i.e., 
essentialistic) approach to the world and reality no longer 
permits things to show themselves for what they are, but, 
prescribing the manner in which they can appear, violates 
their pristine innocence. This essentialistic method of 
approach is an attack on the world, staged by rationalism, 
34 
the center of the universe and the arbiter of all truth. 
Descartes separates mental and physical dimensions 
of the human being in order to define an area in which 
everything is completely explained by a reductionist, 
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mechanistic physical science. He apparently opposes the 
fact that human beings have several mental faculties, such 
as sense, memory, imagination, and intelligence. He 
advocates a kind of monistic reductionism. He does not 
allow for any connection between the mind's basic capacity 
for ratiocination and anything that could occur in the 
brain or other parts of the body. In other words, mental 
events do not seem to be identical with physical events. 
The brain can be of no use to pure understanding -- as 
opposed to the faculty of imagination and sense, which are 
more dependent on body. By the same token, he denies the 
fundamentality and importance of physical reality (res 
extensa) at the expense of rationality (res cogitan). He 
conceives of mind apart from body. From an epistemological 
point of view, he conceives of understanding taking place 
with no reference to a physical and tangible dimension. 
For him mind is the machine which produces knowledge: thus, 
the essential truths of mankind are not regarded to be 
dependent upon senses for their verification. Attainment 
of knowledge and truth is through the exercise of reason. 
In the West the conceptual framework created by 
Descarte was completed successfully by Newton, who worked 
out a systematic mathematical formulation of the mechanistic 
view of nature. Since then, the mechanistic Newtonian 
model of the universe has prevailed in scientific thought 
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and research. The social sciences and the humanities could 
not remain immune to such a mechanistic outlook either. 
They followed suit and fragmented everything in order to 
study it. Since then the body came to be regarding as a 
machine that could be analyzed in terms of its parts; 
disease was seen as a malfunction of biological mechanisms 
that were studied from the view point of cellular and 
molecular biology. The physician's role has, since then 
been described as the correction of the malfunctioning 
of a specific mechanism by means of physical or chemical 
manipulation. 
Alfred North Whitehead holds Descarte responsible 
for this disastrous separation of body and mind in western 
thought. The inference that we can take from Cartesian 
thought for our educational purposes is that Man is defined 
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and described in terms of his rationality. 
Thus, he paved the way for a more rigorous mental and 
intellectual discipline in education. His doctrine of 
manifest truth came to be false. Although he tried to 
challenge the authority of Aristotle and claimed that man 
had no need of authorities, "since he could perceive the 
truth for himself, he did not succeed in freeing himself 
from the authority of intellect. Man's trained intellect 
,36 
became the authority for truth. 
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With regard to his methodic doubt for the discovery 
of truth to justify his mathematical conception of universe, 
he begged for authoritarian criteria as to whether the 
authority were Aristotle or intellectual intuition. His 
mechanistically dualistic view caused a breach between man's 
thought and exernal reality. He over-emphasized the 
quantity of nature and reality and undermined their quality. 
For Descarte, reason should be elevated to the 
highest mode of knowing, therefore, education is to aim at 
the growth and development of reason only. Thus, the dis¬ 
ciplines which entail abstractions and apriori data are to 
constitute the core of any curriculum. The aim of education 
should not violate universal rational truths. Such an 
educational endeavor does not leave any room for the 
isomorphism and interaction of mind and body. The develop¬ 
ment of the mind is to be regarded as the paramount aim of 
every solid discipline. 
Since man's realm is defined within the purview of 
res cogitans, which is in sharp contrast to the of res 
extensa, he may not be regarded as being able to dwell and 
participate in the world. He is entangled in the acute 
dichotomy of subject and object. He is the subject and 
his subject oriented ivory tower prevents him from parti¬ 
cipating in and interacting with the the res extensa as 
an existential context. 
In fact, Descarte has decontextualized human cogni¬ 
tion. This catastrophic displacement and fragmentation 
exiled man to the temple of rationality. It may be claimed 
that the founding father of modern perennialism (and its 
moderate form, essentialism) is frankly Descarte. 
With a Cartesian method of education one cannot dwell 
in the truths of facts. The object of knowledge is defined 
as a doubtful hostile force to be captured in a rational 
way. Hence, there remains no empathy in the form of an 
integrative process. 
Dwelling in an educational sense seems to agree with 
the notion of Platonic recollection (anamnasis). It is a 
home coming, in the words of Heidegger. Hence, taking 
refuge in the den of rationality and reason imprisons man 
in a claustrophobic confinement. If we think that the 
external world is present only to the intellect and in an 
essentially mathematical form, then we have to close the 
door to the process of experience, since experience may 
sometimes defy mathematical reasoning. Thus, in addition 
to the dualism of mind and body we encounter a dualism 
between the world of phenomenal experience and the world of 
intellect ion. 
In-dwelling and participation-in-being is a safeguard 
which protects man against the oppressive incursion of 
mathematical rationality. 
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What is the outcome of the Cartesian method? The 
Cartesian method of inquiry surely involves not only the 
duality of subject and object but also the duality of mind- 
matter, theory-action, experience-nature, means, ends, 
individual—society—schoo1 and home. Dewey’s words provide 
the best illustrations of such dichotomies. Heidegger avers 
that various forms of dualism are the outcome of an initial 
diremption of an original united consciousness which was 
fragmented and dichotomised in a western context. The 
Cartesian notion of knowledge and education is spectatorial. 
It has little relationship to practice and participation. 
Dewey rightly states that "the brood and nest of dualisms" 
which appeared in the seventeenth century was due to the 
"initial split between the enduring object of contemplation 
and the malleable objects of artisans." He adds that: 
When objects are isolated from the experience through 
which they are reached and in which they function, 
experience itself becomes reduced to the mere process 
of experiencing, and experiencing is therefore 
treated as if it were also complete in itself... Since 
the seventeenth century this conception of experience 
as the equivalent of subjective private experience 
set over against nature, which consists wholly of 
physical objects, has wrought havoc in philosophy.37 
Dewey says that the distinction between objective facts and 
subjective emotions, problems and doubts are other products 
of the "habit of isolating man and experience from nature." 
If we concede to the notion of discontinuity between the 
two worlds of noumenon and phenomenon, mind and mattei , 
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theory and practice, man and nature, we will have no other 
choice but to be passive spectators of reality without 
being able to participate and dwell in it and feel rooted 
in and related to it. Knowing and the known hence, will be 
two different processes which occupy two distinctively 
strange arenas. To treat the world as a view and man as a 
subiectum, knowing subject and observing subject, leads 
man to feel estranged in a world of experience. 
The essentialist (perennialist) intends to take his 
disciples to the distinctive realm of rational knowledge 
which is beyond the abode of daily experience. Thus, his 
disciples, are to worship what is eternal, permanent and 
unchanging and scorn and belittle what is contingent and 
changing. The changing affairs of daily life are to be 
assigned to low class artisans and craftsmen and matters of 
universality and rationality are to be appreciated, taught, 
and worshipped. 
On the contrary, learning by way of dwelling and 
participating in a process involves a pupil centered 
method. Learning in the sense of participation and dwelling 
is based upon practice and doing. Therefore, the main 
concern of education will not be limited to focal and 
explicit awareness. The curriculum will be experience- 
centered rather than book-centered. The teacher's role 
will be more like that of a moderator or interlocutor in 
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a minstrel show. The student will be an actor and the 
teacher will be the coordinator of various acts. 
The object of learning, thus, will be the grasp of 
a comprehensive entity rather than merely particulars with 
no close relation to the whole. It has been proved that 
whenever we concentrate our attention on "the particulars 
of a comprehensive entity, our sense of its coherent 
existence is temporarily weakened; and every time we move 
in the opposite direction towards a fuller awareness of the 
whole, the particulars tend to become submerged in the 
whole." In other words, identifying particulars in many 
cases and describing the relation between them are to be 
regarded as two complementary efforts in the thinking of 
Michael Polanyi. Thus, in these two complementary endeavors 
a comprehensive entity is elucidated. What clinical 
practitioners usually call the peculiar indescribable 
appearance of a pathological condition as its faciejs, may 
be said to result from the two complementary processes of 
analyzing the particulars and integrating these particulars 
in a gestalt manner. 
Learning in the sense of the full-growth of the child 
should aim at both of the above processes; i.e., focal and 
subsidiary awareness. Learning should take place m the 
manner in which skill is -improved. Sportsmen, like 
tists like painters, pianists and 
swimmers and runners, ar 
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dancers normally learn their hobbies and skills by means 
of motion studies, followed by the "skillful incorporation 
of the isolated motions into a complete performance." The 
analysis of the component parts of a skill remains in¬ 
complete until they are fully integrated. The best example 
may be the learning of typing or the playing of the piano. 
In playing the piano or typing concentration on particulars 
weakens the performance. When we turn our attention away 
from particulars (i.e., isolated motions) and toward their 
39 joint purpose, we can achieve skillful performance. 
The isomorphic relationship between knowing and doing 
is indeed such that they are rarely achieved in isolation; 
knowing and doing are two interconnected processes. With¬ 
out doing, knowing, in most cases, is not to be acquired. 
I call this mode of knowing, an epistemic dwelling process. 
For instance, medical diagnosis combines knowing and doing 
about equally. "To percuss a lung is as much a muscular 
feat as a delicate discrimination of the sounds thus 
, . . , , ,,40 
elicited. 
In conclusion, it should be said that the knowledge 
acquired in the form of dwelling and participation involves 
an active-passive reciprocity. On the active side, it 
entails the engagement of the learner in the effort, and 
on the passive, it is a form of undergoing. We do some¬ 
thing to the thing and then it does something to us in 
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return. The combination of "focal awareness" and 
subsidiary awareness" leads to a meaningful transition 
which is interconnected with the return wave of consequences 
emanating from it. Thus, it is a dynamic process. If such 
a dynamic reciprocity and integration of mind and the 
external reality are consummated, knowledge and learning 
in the sense of dwelling are accomplished. On the contrary, 
education aiming at mere rationality and reasoning 
necessitates reservation, distance, isolation, and stand- 
offishness because it heavily relies on abstractions, 
deductive syllogisms, apriorism and the negligence of the 
realm of the posteriori. 
Split Brains and Tacit Dimension 
There is an increasing amount of data accumulating 
which advances and supports the theory that the human 
brain is structurally divided between the left and right 
hemispheres. The left hemisphere is described to control 
right handed behavior and such cognitive activities as 
language and discursive reasoning. It is analytic, linear, 
digital, symbolic, and discursive while the right hemis¬ 
phere functions in a holistic, synthetic, analogic, 
perceptural, and eidetic fashion. 
Although in the nineteenth century A. L. Wigan, a 
British physician in his famous work, the Duality of the 
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Mind (1844) studied the two hemispheres of the brain and 
concluded that "the two hemisphere of the brain are 
really...two distinct and entire organs... each as complete 
and as fully perfeet... for the purposes it is intended to 
perform, as are the two eyes,"41 his theory had minimal 
impact at that time. The most extensive psychological 
studies of split-brain patients carried out by Roger 
Sperry and his colleagues at the California Institute of 
Technology have aroused many scientists and psychologists 
to experiment and test the truth of the claims made by 
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these research workers. 
The hard core data have been provided by experimental 
psychologists under laboratory conditions concentrating on 
perception, with normal "subjects" whose hemispherical 
connections have been temporarily shut off or with brain 
damaged patients who for some reasons have had these 
connections split permanently. The data acquired, thus 
far, have been used by many scholars in different disci¬ 
plines. I seek to extrapolate them for the study of 
Rumi's thought. Before that, I will provide the arguments 
of different disciplines within the framework of the split- 
brain issue, then try to compare the hemisphericity 
(bicamerality) theory to the tacit dimension of Polanyi. 
Consequently, I will show, how essentialism advocates a left 
hemispheric bias toward reality. 
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The cerbral hemisphericity of the brain has been 
suggested as a fulcrum for the appreciation and discernment of 
different conceptual tendencies and orientations of 
psychologists, scientists and artists within western 
culture. 
It was pointed out that the left hemisphere is 
specialized for analytic thinking. It operates in a linear 
fashion and processes information sequentially. It is 
responsible for linguistic and mathematical performances. 
There is evidence of left brain superiority in tasks 
involving grammatically organized word sequences, mathe¬ 
matics, logic, time sequences, and motor coordination. The 
left hemispheric mode of thought is described as symbolic, 
abstract, linear, rational, focal, conceptual, proposi¬ 
tional, logical, digital, secondary process, active, and 
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analytic. 
The right hemisphere mode of thought is described as 
concrete, diffuse, perceptual, appositional, primary process, 
holistic, passive, analog, cyclical, metaphoric-intuitive. 
In other words, the right hemisphere operates in such 
areas that involve "imagery, certain visual and constructive 
activities such as drawing, copying, assembling block 
designs, perception, and manipulation of spatial relations 
and between objects or configurations, and the 
simultaneous grasping of fragments or particulars as a 
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meaningful whole." The right hemisphere is, thus, 
responsible for artistic endeavor, crafts, body image, 
recognition of faces, and orientation to space. 
The brain has a long fissure that divides the two 
cerebral hemispheres. This fissure does not completely 
separate the two hemispheres, for a thick bundle of nerve 
fibers known as the corpus callosum functions as a 
coordinating conduit between the two hemispheres. The two 
hemispheres are antagonistic and complementary in nature. 
Hence, each hemisphere represents a special mode of 
thought as was indicated above. The two modes suggest a 
unity and struggle of opposites. Thus, human consciousness 
involves a process of complementary opposite functions. It 
may be said that the human mind is the outcome of the 
interaction between the two hemispheres and the external 
reality. 
Paul Bakan, in the light of the findings of functional 
asymmetry of the hemispheres, surveys two streams of con¬ 
sciousness or a "river consisting of selections, combina¬ 
tions, or interactions of streams from the right to left 
hemispheres. He studies individual differences in terms 
of their reliance on one or the other hemisphere in overall 
psychological functioning, A bias toward greater dependence 
on one or the other hemisphere could greatly influence the 
quality of consciousness. He calls the bias toward the 
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use of one hemisphere, hemisphericity.45 The studies 
carried out by Cohen, Berent, and Silverman, Nebes (1974), 
and Witkin and Defazio (1973) examine the existence of two 
qualitatively different kinds of thought or consciousness, 
mediated by the two hemispheres. They show that the human 
brain consists of two cerebral hemispheres that mediate 
different cognitive and affective functions. They have 
proved that hemisphericity can be determined by observing 
the direction of an individual's conjugate lateral eye 
movement (CLEM) upon the initiation of reflection in 
response to a question. Right-eye movements are associated 
with "left hemisphericity" and "left-eye movements are 
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connected with "the right hemisphericity." Each of the 
two hemispherical parts includes biochemical, autonomous, 
hormonal, and subcortical functions. Lateral asymmetries 
in function have been shown at the level of the thalamus. 
It has been shown that parasympathetic and sympathetic 
systems are functionally associated with the right and left 
hemisphere systems respectively. Even hormonal systems 
related to orgasm and menstrual cycle may be related 
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differentially to the right and left hemisphere systems. 
If we compare the findings and discoveries on split 
brain issue with the notion of explicit and tacit knowledge 
developed by Michael Polanyi we can discern the close 
correlation between the functions of the left and right 
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brain, on the one hand, and explicit and tacit knowledge 
on the other, respectively. The left hemisphere mode of 
consciousness and explicit knowledge represent the aspect 
of cognitive experience in which conceptual-linear, 
logical, and inferential articulation dominate. The right 
hemisphere mode of consciousness and tacit knowledge 
signify a cognitive experience in which conceptual-linear, 
logical, and inferential articulation dominate. The right 
hemisphere mode of consciousness and tacit knowledge signify 
a cognitive experience in which relational, iconic, 
concrete, diffuse, appositional, analogue, simultaneous 
grasping of fragments and particulars as a meaningful 
whole, assembling blocks and somatic judgements are para¬ 
mount. In other words, explicit knowledge and focal 
awareness may be said to emanate from the functions of the 
left hemisphere of the brain while tacit knowing and 
subsidiary awareness seem to be functions of the right 
hemisphere. Tacit knowledge is acquired as a result of 
the interaction between apperception and the embodied 
grasping. Such a knowledge provides the context and frame¬ 
work within which the explicit, focal, and analytical 
knowing takes place. Hence, analytical and rational 
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thought can only happen within a broader context and 
framework of meaningfulness. Stages of linearity and 
analycity are meaningful only in relation to a broader 
whole. Thus, when Polanyi alleges that the functioning 
of the subsidiary or tacit knowledge is logically prior to 
the functioning of the explicit or focal knowledge, we can 
discern that the left hemisphere mode of thought needs a 
broader context of meaningfulness in order to take a com¬ 
prehensive form. In other words, the relational interac¬ 
tion of the tacit knowledge or subsidiary awareness with 
the explicit knowledge or focal awareness gives prominence 
to the functionally desirable role of somatic or embodied 
indwelling as the axis of learning. 
Essentialism and Tacit Dimension 
The essentialist emphasis on the intellect and in¬ 
tellectuality as the distinguishing characteristics of 
man at the expense of the somatic dimension leads to the 
belief that the source of all knowledge is the intellect and 
ratiocination. Thus, the intellect of the students becomes 
the greatest concern to the teacher. All activities 
worthy of the name education somehow must be associated 
with the intellectual and linear powers of the educand. 
The essentialist defines man in terms of the intellectual 
and ratiocinative faculty. Thus, logics, mathematics, and 
grammar come to form the core-content of an essentialist 
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curriculum. Since reason is the primary source of arriving 
at knowledge, it should be educated and fostered. In such 
a curriculum experience plays a negligible role since it is 
of a transient nature. 
The essentialists heavily rely on the coherence theory 
of truth. This theory defines truth as an orderly and 
systematic "web of closely intertwined relationships."49 
According to this theory truth consists in the agreement and 
harmony of propositions in a definite system. Any new pro¬ 
position is true if it can be introduced into the system 
without upsetting its internal non-contradictoriness. The 
coherence theory of truth is predicated on the idea that the 
world is one enormous rational system. "The real is 
rational and the rational is real." Truth here is a 
coherent interrelated system or body of propositions. A 
statement is true if it can be incorporated in an orderly 
and consistent way within that corpus of propositions. I 
believe this theory is a new elaboration of the medieval 
"Adequation Theory of Truth" (Adaequatio intellectus_et—rei) 
which describes truth as the discovery of the interrelation 
of facts by means of the intellect. According to this 
theory truth resides in the intellect. 
Perhaps the best way of understanding the coherence 
theory is to apply it to a subject matter which best 
exemplifies this notion, mathematics. In order to 
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construct a system of geometry, for instance, one must 
begin with certain undefined elements (term), such as line 
or point, whose basic properties are described by postulates 
(axioms-assumption). The parallel postulate is a good 
example in geometry. It asserts that through a point not 
on a line one and only one line parallel to the line can be 
drawn. 
Essentialists sometimes apply the coherence theory to 
all knowledge that can be acquired about the physical, 
social, and transempirical universe. Every problem must 
be viewed in terms of a rational-linear system. 
The other theory which is advocated by some moderate 
essentialists to describe the truth is known as the 
correspondence theory of truth. According to this theory 
truth is defined as the correspondence of ideas to reality. 
If an idea corresponds with its counterpart in the world 
of reality, it is a true idea. The facts are neither true 
nor false, but the beliefs are. Thus, truth consists in 
the agreement of our thought with reality. A belief is 
called "true" if it agrees with a fact. This is another 
dimension of the medieval theory of "adequation of thought 
to thing" (Adaequatio intellectus et rei). Medieval 
scholars used to describe "truth as the adequation of the 
immanence in the act of our thought with that which exists 
outside our thought.For essentialist educationists 
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knowledge is to be viewed as the correspondence or repre¬ 
sentation. Thus, correspondence serves as a fundamental 
criterion of testing ideas. Learning, for instance is 
measured by the degree of the exactitude and permanence 
with which such correspondence is affected.51 
Both correspondence and coherence theories of truth 
neglect action. Such conceptions of truth do not commit 
us to action. They foster reasoning and ratiocination in 
isolation from experiential reality. Truth in this sense 
has a passive and non-dynamic nature. It can not provide 
a solution to practical problems. In educational terms 
such a notion of truth conceives of students as being 
receptive to and spectators of the content of the world. 
The coherence or correspondence theory of truth does not 
allow the student to participate and dwell in knowledge and 
action. It does not permit the student to apply his freedom 
to a given situation. It excludes the tacit dimension in 
favor of focal awareness. It ignores the strategic role 
of bodily indwelling as the axis or "learning gate" of all 
knowledge. It does not conceive of all knowing as 
initially somatic in character. 
An integrative metaphoric mode of thought occurs when 
the somatic and psychic qualities of the person involved 
are projected into direct experience with objects, pro¬ 
cesses and conditions existing in the external world. A 
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balanced use of both sides of the brain seems to help the 
student to develop an integrated personality. Creativity 
and imagination are cherished and passivity and nonchalance 
are diminished. It may be said that effectiveness in the 
total growth of the child as the ultimate goal of education 
comes from the fully acknowledged commitment to both sides 
of the brain. Essentialist curriculum is contrived to 
focus unilaterally on the functions of the left hemisphere. 
Thus, it bridles metaphoric, creative, visual, spatial 
holistic, and integrational dimensions of the student's 
mind. Essentialist curriculum is exhibited in a rational 
dominated classroom. Such a curriculum leaves little room 
for the revelation of activity, experience, and creativity. 
It advocates a passive view of rationality. Reading, 
writing, arithmetic, and grammar are the core of the 
curriculum content since they hinge rationality and in¬ 
tellection on the mind. It is natural that conservatives 
believe that the inroads of vocationalism have destroyed 
the traditional notion of the school as an institution 
transmitting knowledge and developing the intellectual 
faculties of the pupils, since in their view truth, know¬ 
ledge and rationality are not developed in the course of 
action. Even moderate essentialists tend to regaid 
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"vocationalism as a substitute for general education." 
Since essentialists heavily depend on the mind and 
reasoning of the pupil and that learning methodology is 
divorced from the philosophy of activism, the learning 
dimension of education is primarily subservient to a 
systematic presentation of an organized body of knowledge. 
Problems and projects should be introduced only after the 
student has mastered the fundamentals of the subject matter 
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at hand. Drill and memorization serve as means of 
inculcating basic skills and facts needed to progress 
through any subject matter. Thus, the lecture method is 
the best way to present such materials. In an essentialist 
classroom, the teacher exerts great control and dominance 
in the teaching-learning process. Thus content supercedes 
method, since it constitutes tire essential substance of any 
teaching-learning process. Thus, method never infringes 
upon the sanctity of the content. 
As was pointed out earlier, if the education has as 
its exclusive objective the cultivation of the intellect by 
teaching teachable subjects (cultural heritage), then the 
unilinear focus should be on focal, explicit knowledge. 
In such a case the left hemisphere of the brain shall be 
dominant and the functions of the right hemisphere and 
metaphoric dimensions will be schizophrenically suppressed. 
The mutilation and paralysis of the right hemisphere 
of the brain by the excessive stress on the functions of 
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the l^ft hemisphere may debilitate sensory awareness, 
improvisation skills, decision making, creativity, parti¬ 
cipation in and concern for social issues. 
Thus, an essentialist approach to education may be 
said to be dualistic, isolationist, atomistic and passive. 
The result of such education seems to be left hemispheric, 
disjunctive, submissive, remiss, and perfunctory. 
Essentialism implicitly advocates a type of substance, 
noun oriented ontology and epistemology. It does not fully 
attend to even oriented approaches. Accordingly, it 
supports an acquiecent conception of learning. Passive 
mentation seems to take the place of active participation 
and shared responsibility. 
Another consequence of left-hemisphere dominated 
education, which is the outcome of essentialism, is the 
promulgation of the view that the intellectual elite be 
given special attention in the educational program. For 
instance, Arthur Bestor claims that there are intellectual 
classes and that only the gifted class should be afforded 
the benefits of higher education. The average student 
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should not be accommodated in the name of democracy. A 
left-hemisphere-oriented curriculum that singles out 
intellect as the sole focus of education tacitly sanctions 
a "world inhabited by lopsided, apathetic people and, in 
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so doing, a social, economic, and political order that will 
accommodate them, in words of Jane Roland Martin.”55 
Rumi and Tacit Dimension 
Before dealing with Rumi's conception of tacit dimen¬ 
sion, a summary of Islamic rationalism is in order. 
Islamic theology and philosophy are two traditions of 
learning developed by Muslim thinkers. On the one hand, 
these two interrelated disciplines were used by Muslim 
scholars to provide a rational clarification and defense 
of the principles of Islamic outlook, and on the other hand, 
they were utilized in the pursuit of the ancient (Greek and 
Hellenistic, or Greco-Roman) sciences (Falsafa). Theolo¬ 
gical thinkers usually took a intermediate position between 
the traditionalists who remained loyal to the literal 
exegesis of the primary sources of Islamic doctrines and who 
abhored reasoning, and those whose reasoning led them to 
abandon the Islamic community (ummah) altogether. The 
status of the believer remained a juridical question in 
practice, not a matter for theologians and philosophers 
to decide. 
It should be remembered that the translation of 
Greek learning was promoted by the early Abbasid caliphs 
(8th-9th century) in order to prevent the onslaught of 
Manichaenism and other subversive literature that were 
labelled as Zandaqah (heresy) at that time. Thus, almost 
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ancient sciences" in order to determine the legitimacy of 
inauthenticity of them. They mostly resorted to sweepingly 
indiscriminate condemnation of the ancient sciences. How¬ 
ever, the attempt to suppress philosophical dispositions 
did not thwart the vigorous cultivation of these sciences. 
Thus, the theological movement in Islam came to be strongly 
influenced by philosophy. Not only Mutazilite, but also the 
Anti-mutazilite Dialectic drew its arguments from the 
writings of the philosophers. In this way a vulgar re¬ 
futation of philosophy and other ancient sciences was 
replaced by thorough investigation and scholarly research. 
Al-Ghazzali (Latin, Algazel) was the first Islamic 
scholar who embarked upon a deep study of the "ancient 
sciences with critical approach and insight." He studied 
the arguments of Muslim rationists such as (Ibn Sina), 
Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi and others in a highly erudite fashion. 
He closely researched both philosophical and scientific 
works. In his work "The Purposes of the Philosophers" he 
summarized peripatetic (essentialist) philosophy so well 
that when this work was rendered into Latin, it was used 
in the West as an authority on peripatetic philosophy. 
The purpose of the philosophers served as the preparation 
for his severe criticism of rationalism (i,e., essentialism) 
in The Incoherence of the Philosophers. In this work he 
1aunched a philosophical attack against the Aristotelian 
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all of the known works of Greek philosopher from Plato to 
the Alexandrian exegetical commentators of the 6th century 
were translated into Arabic. All Aristotle's works (with 
the possible exception of Politics) were available in full 
translation. The works of Aristotelian commentators such 
as Alexander, Themistius, Ammonius, John Philoponus, 
Nicholaus of Damascus, Simplicius and others were rendered 
into Arabic. Plato's works such as Timaeus, Republic, and 
Laws were available in Arabic translation. Plato's many 
other works were available in the form of paraphrases. 
Such paraphrases included the Sophist, Parmenides, Cryatylus, 
Euthydemus, Statesman, Timaeus, Republic and Laws. 
Moreover, the philosophical works of the Greek 
physician Galen (2nd century A.D.), and the Neoplatonic 
philosophers Plotinus (3rd century A.D.) and Proclus (5th 
cnetury) were available in full translation. 
Thus, Islamic philosophers proceeded to formulate 
their philosophical outlooks on the basis of their easy 
access to the profuse philosophic literature of the Greek. 
So the origin of philosophical interest in the Islamic 
world could be traced back to the translation movement of 
Greek texts and commentaries in the middle of the nineth 
century, 
From then on, the school curricula in the Islamic 
ate the study of the sciences of 
world came to incorpor 
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nature (including psychology and biology), mathematical 
sciences (including music and astronomy), metaphysics, 
logic, ethics and politics. Each of these disciplines had 
a large body of literature and material to be taught and 
learned by teachers and students. Muslim thinkers 
designated those branches of learning in the literature of 
Islam that found their way into the sphere of Muslim 
culture through direct influect and mediation of Greek and 
Hellenistic literature as ulum al-awail or ulum-al-qudama 
(Sciences of the Ancients). As it was mentioned earlier, 
strict orthodoxy always considered the faithful followers 
of ancient sciences as heterodox. Hence, the students of 
Greek sciences were forced to reconcile the themes of the 
ancient sciences with the prevailing dogmas and doctrines 
of orthodox authorities. For instance, some orthodox 
theologians declared that ’’those who abandon the science of 
Shafii and Malik and elevate the opinion of Empedocles 
to the level of law in Islam, should not be looked upon 
with trust." A harsh propaganda against the ancient 
sciences was whipped up indiscriminately. Many dogmatic 
traditionalists reacted negatively against the ancient 
sciences. In the course of time such propaganda was ex¬ 
pressed with increasing intensity. The very term 
"philosophy” terrified many narrow-minded traditionalists. 
In other words, they did not investigate the tenets of the 
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rationalism of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. No systematic 
attempt, however, had been made before the time of al- 
Ghazzali to lead a philosophical evaluation of Islamic 
rationalism (i.e., essentialism). He realized that per¬ 
ipatetic rationalism cannot respond to all the vital 
questions of man. Thus, he levelled his criticisms against 
Islamic Neoplatonism in general and rationalism in particu¬ 
lar. When he died in 1111 (505) he left behind him a large 
compendium of philosophical criticism against rationalism 
that served to transform the intellectual life of Islamic 
philosophers and thinkers. In short, he is more than any 
other single individual one of the most notable philosophi- 
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cal figures of Islam. 
As a result of al-Ghazzali's criticism of rationalism 
(i.e., essentialism), and the popular acceptance of such a 
criticism, he came to be known as a revolutionary philoso¬ 
pher who could justifiably overcome the rationalist 
tradition of the school of Peripatetics. May be, that is 
why there was bestowed upon him the honorific title, 
Hujjat-ul-Isiam, Proof of Islam. 
Baha Walad, father of Rumi, grew up in academic 
circles where peripatetic rationalism was criticized in 
pursuance of Ghazzali s method. 
Baha Walad was attracted to the school of thought 
advocated by al-Ghazzali. By the time Rumi was a child his 
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father publicly criticised rationalism in a vitriolic 
fashion. He pressed for a fresh look at the vital ques¬ 
tions of philosophy. He tried to prove that Islamic 
scholastic rationalism was entangled in a philosophical 
decrepitude and quagmire. In fact, al-Ghazzali's magnum 
opus, The Revival of Religious Sciences, served as a basis 
for an Islamic renaissance in experiential philosophy and 
sciences. This text was the source to which Baha Walad 
made recourse to vitriolize the advocates of rationalism. 
al-Ghazzali introduced a "methodic doubt" in the fashion 
of Descarte, as Montgomery Watt states, but such a 
methodic doubt did not lead to the triumphant advent of 
dualistic rationalism. The purpose of al-Ghazzali in 
the introduction of the technique of methodic doubt was to 
caution thinkers against indulging in mere ratiocination. 
He attempted to prepare philosophers to appreciate the 
dynamic conception of reality and personal experience, 
which contained not only sense-perception but intellect and 
the mind as well. 
Thus, Rumi lived in an age that reacted against the 
reliability of the rationalist method of philosophy. The 
prevailing atmosphere of an anti-peripatetic approach to 
philosophy did have a great impact on Rumi's conception of 
reality (LWR, 41-42-55). - Hence, one can notice great 
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similaritiss between al—Ghazzali 's Revival of Religious 
Sciences and Rumi's The Mathnavi. 
Students of Rumi find striking resemblance between the 
life and thought of Rumi and those of al-Ghazzali. Both of 
them were educated in a dominant Sufi tradition. The 
syllabus of studies in the age of al-Ghazzali and Rumi was 
almost identical. Both of them started their careers with 
the teaching profession. Both of them utilized similar 
methods in teaching and education of their students. Both 
of them were great Sufis in their time. Therefore, both of 
them relied heavily on personal experience rather than 
intellect and ratiocination as a way of knowing and realizing 
the truth. (LWR, 75.77). 
Rumi advocates the importance of experience in gain¬ 
ing knowledge. He maintains that active experience is a 
significant medium of learning. Experience is struggle. 
Life is action and change in Rumi's thought. Experience 
has a dynamic notion, since life is never static. Change 
is everywhere though degrees of change vary greatly. Rumi 
states that: 
Experience shows that the spirit is nothing but 
awareness, whoever has greater awareness has a 
greater experience. (D 4655). 
Rumi says before he met Shams he spoke the language 
of the intellect. After.he met Shams he spoke the language 
of experience. He argues that prose is normally take 
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an instrument of ratiocination, of logical argument, while 
verse normally speaks of experience. (L W R. 176). For 
Rumi poetry is not a mark of derogation. He believes that 
a real philosopher is essentially a poet. Rumi rejects the 
claim that "poets do not tell us anything about the way 
things are in the world," and that "they reveal private 
moods...," "whereas scientists and philosophers are charged 
with preserving and extending knowledge of nature and man." 
Rumi, like German philosophers such as Schopenhauer, 
Nietzche, and most of the Lebensphilosophen attempts to 
preserve the dynamic alliance between philosophy and 
poetry. He seems to concur with Kant in the belief that 
"for an adequate account of the world philosophers should 
investigate the ideas and visions of art and artists." For 
instance, when we study Nietzche, Herder, Lesser and many 
other German philosophers, it is not easy to discover where 
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philosophy ends and poetry begins. 
Therefore, Rumi, like Heidegger, seems to believe 
that poetry "represents a movement away from the thin 
abstraction of" representational thinking... the 
stratospheric construction of" intellection and "towards 
the full concreteness, of actual life-experience." Heidegger 
emphatically states that rationalism impedes man in an 
appreciation of authentic.existence. It does not permit 
him to dwell in life; it rather paves the way for Gestell, 
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"forcible framing." Dwelling is one of the themes by 
which Heidegger attempts to establish the essential con¬ 
tinuity of being, building, and thinking. Rumi hints at the 
same tenet. He seems to agree with Heidegger that poetry 
has an indispensable function in human life. "It is the 
creative source of the humanness of the dwelling life of 
man." Indwelling does not involve the placing of man "as 
subject over against the world of objects. It is a leap 
0 0 
into the midst of this world of things." We attain 
"dwelling by means of building." This building has the 
former, dwelling, as its goal. Every building is not 
dwelling. "Bridges, hangars, stadiums, and power stations 
are buildings, but not dwellings." To dwell, in this way, 
means merely that we take shelter in them. Hence, 
dwelling and building are related to each other as ends and 
means. Thus, dwelling and building are two separate, 
r* 1 
but interrelated activities." "We do not dwell because 
we have built, but we build and have built because we 
dwell."62 
Heidegger avers that dwelling is related to building 
in the same way that techne is associated with handicraft. 
Thus, it may be said that all actions, despite the great 
variety of activities in which men can engage, are of two 
kinds, distinguished by the relation between actions and 
their ends. Some actions are such that their ends are 
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identifiable apart from what is done to achieve them. In 
these cases we can distinguish two elements: the means 
(Ta pros to telos), and the end (telos), the intended 
result or consummatory condition, which is not itself the 
action, but which is produced by the action. The action is 
of instrumental value only, chosen only "incidentally." 
Dwelling is, thus, the telos of building. Building is an 
activity that by nature serves as an instrumental condition 
for dwelling. It includes making or producing (poieses). 
For Rumi thinking and education belong to the notion 
of dwelling in the same sense as building, although in a 
different way. In the language of Aristotle education is 
the activity of techne, poieses, phronesis, and sophia. 
The latter notions are interrelated in Rumi. Techne in¬ 
cludes the realm of experience. It involves creativity, 
production, imagination, and originality. 
The educational notion of dwelling in Rumi may be 
understood when he says that knowing the meaning of "I am 
God” is knowledge in a rational and essentialist sense, but 
becoming "I am God" is authentic knowledge emanating from 
experience, "I am the Truth," "I am thou" or "I am God" 
is the famous saying of Mansur Hallaj (858 A.D.), a Persian 
Sufi. Consequently, Hallaj was ordered to be whipped, 
mutilated, decapitated, crucified, and cremated on the 
charge of apostacy and self-apotheosis. Rumi said 
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whatever involves observation and rational analysis is to 
be included in the field of the discursive sciences, and 
whatever involves indwelling, participation, and experience 
is the comprehensive mode of knowing (F, 228/235). 
For Rumi the analytic process is a step by step 
process in which two elements are compared at a time and 
this process is contrasted with a non-analytical, 
integrative process which uses simultaneous feedback feeling 
for the whole field of knowledge. Education is that which 
aims at a integrated form of learning about ourselves and 
the world. The art of biofeedback which is a new technique 
6 3 
of becoming aware was centuries ago anticipated by Rumi. 
Biofeedback is the training of the individual in the 
control of his own states of awareness with outer technical 
corroboration. It should be emphasized that biofeedback 
is a cognitive process. Rumi says: 
The great scholars of the age split hairs in all the 
sciences. They have gained total knowledge and 
complete mastery of things that have nothing to do 
with them. But that which is important and closer 
to him than anything else, namely his own self, this 
your great scholar does not know. (F, 17/30). 
In another place he declares: 
Wretched humanity! Not knowing his own self, man has 
come from a high estate and fallen into lowliness. 
He has sold himself cheaply; he was ^Un, yet he has 
sewn himself onto a tattered cloak, (M III, 1000 01) 
A basket full of bread sits 
beg for crusts from door to 
head, leave aside dizzyness! 
on your head, but you 
door. Attend to your own 
Up to your knees in the 
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stream's water, you are heedless of yourself and seek 
a drink from this person and that person. (M V. 
1073-75). 
Would that you could know yourself for a time! 
Would that you would see a sign of your own beautiful 
face! Then you would not sleep in water and clay like 
an animal: you would go to the house of joy of all 
lovely spirits. You would travel to your every far 
corner to make yourself manifest, for a Hidden 
Treasure has remained concealed within you. (D, 3003). 
Rumi's works are replete with the illustration of biofeed¬ 
back and self-concept ion. 
For him education in the sense of dwelling aims at 
the comprehensive and total growth of the educand. In 
order to illustrate his point he relates that a thirsty 
person (resembling the seeker of knowledge and truth) was 
standing on the bank of a stream, but was not able to reach 
it because of a high wall. Climbing to the top of the wall 
he threw a brick into the stream and heard a pleasant 
sound "like words spoken by a sweet and delicious friend: 
the sound of the water made him as though drunk with wine." 
Brick after brick he threw into the stream. When the water 
demanded, "what pleasure does this give you 0 man?" "The 
thirsty man replied the pleasure was two fold: He heard 
the sound of the water, a melody to the ear of a thirsty 
man, and secondly every brick torn from the wall brought 
him closer to the running water." (T R, 77). In a meta¬ 
phorical sense, the sound of the water exemplifies an 
analytic, left hemispheric, spectatorial mode of 
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consciousness and knowledge, while the destruction of the 
wall represents a struggle to attain truth. Such a 
struggle is not limited to mere observation. It 
necessitates a meaningful odyssey oriented towards the 
objective. It requires the engagement of the whole person 
in the task. If by "water" Rumi implies truth and know¬ 
ledge, then, satiation of thirst seems not to be limited 
to the observation of the current of the stream. Total 
commitment is needed to achieve gratification. Hence, 
knowledge is not simply the result of reason and ratio¬ 
cination. For him knowledge is intertwined with experience. 
Therefore, education in this sense is not to be con¬ 
fined to the nurture of the rational faculty. It should 
be pursued within the realm of practical experience. Rumi 
holds that experience is necessary in the acquisition of 
knowledge (i.e., water). The destruction of the wall as 
depicted in Rumi’s story represents the method of experience 
(i.e., the doings and undergoings of the thirsty man). The 
efforts of the thirsty man to destroy the wall illustrate 
his activity and his thirst represents his undergoing and 
suffering. The destruction of the wall leads to the 
satiation of the thirst in this experience. The wall is 
delineated as a problem to be solved by the thirsty man. 
Rumi seems to indicate in this story that all conduct is 
f the individual to restore some 
in some way an effort o 
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disrupted equilibrium. From this point of view, if the 
individual is upset, he will use whatever repertoire of 
behavior patterns he has available to restore the balance 
to meet a novel situation (i.e., the wall in this story). 
Learning is not simply what is laid down to be learned. It 
is a process of techne, experience, production, building, 
and dwelling. 
"A certain grammarian was a passenger on a boat. He 
turned to the boatman and said, "Have you ever studied 
grammar?" "No!" replied the boatman. The grammarian 
scoffed at him and said "Half of your life has gone for 
nothing." This caused the boatman to grieve, but he re¬ 
frained from saying a word. The wind suddenly cast the 
boat into a whirlpool; the boatman shouted to the 
grammarian. "Tell me, do you know how to swim?" "No,” 
said he. "0 grammarian," said the boatman, "your whole life 
is going for nothing because the boat is sinking in the 
whirlpool." (M, 2835). 
The two characters in this story represent two major 
modes of consciousness; and, therefore, two major schools 
of educational thought. The pedantic grammarian typifies 
the verbal, rational, linear, analytic mode of thought and 
consciousness. He advocated the education of left hem¬ 
isphere superiority-grammatically organized word sequences, 
mathematics, logic, and those branches of knowledge and 
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learning that are concerned with symbolic, abstract, focal, 
propositional, conceptual, digital, and analytic phenomena. 
The boatman represents the skill of swimming which involves 
physical movement in space. The boatman exemplifies the 
artist, the craftsman, the musician, the dancer, the 
producer, the builder, and therefore, the dweller. His 
linguistic ability is limited, but he has experience as a 
man of phronesis and techne. Perhaps he cannot articulate 
his techne in an eloquent way, but in the case of an 
emergency he can cope. On the contrary the grammarian is 
limited to rational, analytical and logical skills. He is 
unable to cope with a practical situation which involves 
a life and death struggle. He possesses a neat, fastidious, 
and rational mind, but lacks what is needed to cope with 
life situations. He is seen as arrogant, self conceited, 
lop-sided, and he is possessed of»subdued by hubris. He 
knows why, but he does not know how. His knowledge is 
divorced from experience. In modern terms, he represents 
spectatorial mode of knowing and learning. 
It should be borne in mind that Rumi realizes the 
importance of logical, analytical, and verbal modes of con¬ 
sciousness. What he intends to establish by the story is 
the healthy correlation between focal, rational, and linear 
awareness, and tacit, holistic, metaphorical, functional, 
and subsidiary awareness. Education for Rumi merely aims 
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at more than "vertical" thinking. It includes "lateral" 
thinking as well. "Lateral" thinking, as Edward de Bono 
describes it, is similar to insight, creativity, and humor; 
it is a deliberate process. Lateral thinking generates new 
ideas. It is concerned with "breaking out of the concept 
prison of old ideas" and looking at things in a new way.^ 
de Bono says that lateral and vertical thinking are 
complementary. However, he adds, too much attention has been 
focused on vertical thinking by various educational disci¬ 
plines . 
The grammarian in the story quoted by Rumi is pre¬ 
occupied with vertical thinking (i.e., deductive and 
inductive thinking). The education which merely stresses 
the development of concept patterns and does not embark 
upon the "restructuring of those patterns" (insight) fails 
to provoke new ones (creativity). Thus, experience is left 
out and the openness to new patterns is blocked. He, further, 
asserts that although patterns facilitate communication, 
there are disadvantages to pattern. One of the disadvantages 
is that patterns tend to become established and rigid. 
Thus, it is difficult to change them once they becomes es¬ 
tablished. de Bono adds that when patterns become establish¬ 
ed, information tends to be used only within that pattern. 
Thus, the mind gets into a rut. 
making and cliche-using system. 
"The mind is a cliche- 
65 In fact, de Bono 
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maintains that the mind is a pattern-making system. The 
mind is continually creating and recognizing patterns. These 
patterns of information make way for memory. 
Patterns and assumptions can limit the contents of our 
consciousness. In order to illustrate this point I quote 
the following tale: 
A man, having looted a city, was trying to sell an 
exquisite rug, one of his spoils. "Who will give me 
100 pieces of gold for this rug?" he cried through¬ 
out the town. 
After the sale was completed, a comrade approached 
the seller, and asked, "Why did you not ask more for 
that priceless rug?" "Is there any number higher 
than 100?" asked the seller.66 
This tale represents the conception or rather the 
misconception of a person whose spectrum of awareness im¬ 
pedes him from going beyond the limit of 100. 100 serves 
here as the barrier to greater numbers. Patterns and 
assumptions can limit the contents of awareness and bar new 
and novel experience. It is taken for granted that any 
society holds in common certain assumptions about reality 
/> r-r 
as Robert Ornstein asserts. These patterns or assumptions 
"form a stock of present patterns that are the basis of 
communication." Sequential use of these assumptions and 
patterns is vertical thinking. Thinking within the range 
of 100 by the rug seller is vertical thinking. While a 
leap or change of patterns may be conducive to insight. 
I think that when Aristotle spoke of phronesis he had in 
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mind an insightful mode of thinking and knowledge. He 
defined phronesis "as a characteristic disposition (a hexis) 
to deliberate well in an unqualified sense, that is, so as 
to attain the best, ultimate, and most comprehensive ends 
open to man." (N.E. I, B. 1102 a 5-17, 23-25; 6. 2. 1139 
b 2-3). 
Vertical thinking which relies on assumptions and 
patterns is convergent. It is concerned with selecting the 
one right path to the correct answer. This mode of think¬ 
ing advocates coherence and correspondence conceptions of 
truth. It does not integrate experience in a meaningful 
way. It defies diversity and richness. The vertical mode 
of thinking seeks one path; it is not open to alternative 
approaches. In vertical thinking assumptions and patterns 
are sacrosanct. They must not be violated. Categories, 
labels, classification, are fixed and unchanging. The 
vertical mode of thinking may prevent the person from seek¬ 
ing alternatives in an impartial fashion. 
The vertical mode of thinking may lead to a dualistic 
attitude. If uni-dimensional education aims at the nurture 
of the vertical mode of thinking the risk of the dualistic 
and polarizational attitude in the student increases. 
Problem solving and discovery methods encourage the lateral 
modes of thinking, since in solving a particular problem 
there is a need to reorganize information into new 
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structures. Lateral thinking helps the student to avoid 
dualism and polarization. In short, lateral thinking is 
associated with right hemisphere consciousness. 
A useful technique of nurturing lateral thinking in 
the child is the generation of alternatives and dilemmas. 
"The most basic principle of lateral thinking is that any 
particular way of looking at things is only from among many 
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other possible ways." Other techniques in lateral think¬ 
ing include suspended judgments, the reversal method, 
brainstorming, analogies and randon stimulations. 
The assumptions and paradigms of essentialists is the 
authority of reason and intellect. They deemphasize and in 
some cases devalue the nonverbal, lateral, right brain 
modes of consciousness. They ignore such modes of thought 
and awareness, because they do not fit into their dominant 
paradigm. They tend to elevate the vertical mode of think¬ 
ing over that of the lateral, since the latter may thwart 
their shared paradigm of rationality. Rumi criticizes the 
rationalist philosophers for their staunch attachment to 
the sancified paradigm of reason and intellect. He de¬ 
clares: "the philosopher is in bondage to intellectual 
concepts." (M 111,2527-30) "Be well aware of the dis¬ 
crepancies among intellects, which extend in degiees fiom 
earth to heaven." (M V,459-461-463). "The philosopher's 
intellect turns toward fantasy. (M VI, 1894, 96-97). 
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Rumi considers the education aiming at transmission of 
knwoledge as "heresay and the lieutenant of vision." Such 
an education is not for him who is present, but him who is 
absent. For him authentic education and vision are identical. 
Vision involves seeing, perception, participation, and 
dwelling. It is an active experience. Education in the 
sense of the transmission of knowledge is tantamount to hear¬ 
say. It is a type of information or report about which the 
student has no direct access. It is a product imparted to 
the mind of students with no basis in his mind. It is 
poured into his mind in a forciable manner and as an in¬ 
vading phenomenon. Rumi says "whoever attains to vision 
has no more need for hearsay. To speak on the basis of 
hearsay in the presence of those who have eyes is wrong." 
(M VII, 204; M IV, 2066-72). If the way is paved for the 
student to observe the reality and experience it; his 
learning takes place in a meaningful way. But if knowledge 
is transmitted and imparted in the fashion a hearsay is 
reported, the data provided does not constitute a meaning¬ 
ful notion to be comprehended and learned. Rumi declares 
that "imitation and reasoning—all their wings and feather 
depend upon opinion... The leg of those who employ 
reasoning is wooden: A wooden leg is very unstable... 
The imitator gives impression to a hundred proofs, but he 
speaks from discursive reasoning, not direct vision. 
(M I, 2135-36-39-40; M V. 2470-71). 
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Rumi advocates the dynamic notion of truth and know¬ 
ledge. He alludes to education pursuing transmission of 
knowledge and culture by relating the following parable: 
Any one can paint a picture on a wall. It has a head, 
but no mind, an eye, but no sight, a hand, but no 
generosity, a drawn sword, but no cutting edge. In 
any prayer-niche you can find the painting of a lamp. 
But when night comes, it gives no light. They paint 
a tree on the wall, but if you shake it, no fruit 
will fall to the ground. 
Even so, that picture on the wall is not completely 
without benefit. Imagine that someone born in a 
prison and has never seen crowds of people and 
beautiful faces. And imagine that he sees paintings 
on the walls and doors of that prison—the form of 
beautiful women, kings and bridges, and luxurious 
trappings of sultans, thrones and crowns, banquets 
and party, musicians and dancers. (SPL, 139, 130). 
Rumi maintains that conclusions of reason and imita¬ 
tion do not constitute a sound and complete method of 
truth. For him truth is designated by the findings of 
direct experience. Obviously, he defines truth in terms of 
actions and functions, rather than substances and 
attributes. 
He attempts to demonstrate that the transmission of 
truth in a rationalist fashion and divorced from action is 
a futile endeavor. The aphorism of the picture of a drawn 
sword without a cutting edge, an eye without sight, and a 
hand without generosity reminds one of Plato's conception 
of ergon, function. Plato holds that "that which the thing 
in questions does alone or best and has excellence consists 
in the specific power that allows that function to operate 
(Rep. 353a). Aristotle says that the ergon of man 
well . ” 
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is an "energeia of the soul according to logos11 and, since 
the good of a thing is described in terms of its function, 
the good of man is this activity on a level of arete, 
excellence (N.E. 1098a). 
Function, for Aristotle is that which a thing is 
naturally alloted to do. Quickly Aristotle binds in the 
related notion of end and fulfillment (telos), since, the 
state of functioning (energeia) "tends toward" the state of 
completion and fulfillment (entelecheia). The function of 
the eye is seeing, the sword cutting, the hand generosity, 
the ear hearing and so on. On the basis of this premise, 
the purpose of education is growth, completion, development, 
and actualization. Education concentrating on subject 
matter and the mastery of them, and immersion of the stu¬ 
dent in the fixed structure of the various academic 
disciplines tends to suppress his potentialities to grow 
and develop, since, there is a forcible inhibition on 
growth and development. Rumi seems to criticize subject 
orientation and the mastery of knowledge as the basic aims 
of education. In order to prove his case against subject 
oriented curriculum he makes reference to the Qu lanic 
saying that "the likeness of those who are entrusted with 
the Law of Moses, yet apply it not is the likeness of the 
ass carrying books." (LX11, 5). Rumi in the Mathnavi 
attempts to prove that those who conceive of education as 
aiming at the mastery of knowledge without any reference 
to implementation and action, resemble asses who carry 
books (M I, 3446-49). 
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Rumi likens knowledge "to the ocean without bound or 
shore" and the learner of this knowledge to the diver in 
that ocean. He indicates that knowledge of that deep ocean 
is not realized by means of detached observation and 
logical deductions. Diving and swimming are the only means 
of acquiring this knowledge. He suggests, "knowledge (ilm) 
is an ocean without bounds or shore: the seeker of know¬ 
ledge is (like) the diver in (those) seas." (M VI, 3880). 
Thus, he denies the preference of knowing over doing. He 
does not exalt the view of knowledge apart from action. 
He expressly indicates that "ideas result from action" and 
devolve for the sake of the better control of action. This 
notion may be understood from what he says in the Mathnavi 
in the following: 
The quiet of the (expert) swimmer in swimming better 
than the exert ion...with hands and feet of one who 
is unable (to swim). 
He who can not swim throws out his hands and feet 
(desperately) and drowns, (while) the (practiced) 
swimmer moves quietly (with a steadiness) like that 
of Pillars. (M VI, 338). 
Reason, for Rumi, as Dewey suggests, "is primarily 
the law of orderly or effective action. To attempt to 
develop the reasoning powers, the powers of judgment. 
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without reference to the selection and arrangement of means 
in action" is a fundamental fallacy. Swimming is an 
experiential process. It involves the interaction of the 
the swimmer with the sea. This experience changes the 
swimmer into a swimming expert. Thus, there is a reflective 
process involved. This may be understood by a careful 
analysis of Rumi's poem just quoted above. 
For Rumi learning should not merely focus on mastery 
and retention of knowledge. The learning process, for him, 
is not limited to the exposition of knowledge through 
lectures, drills, and discussions. It should involve the 
learner in action and experience. Evaluation of the 
learner, hence, does not simply focus on how he has mastered 
the subject matter. The test of the mastery of knowledge 
is not confined to the recollection of information. It is 
basicially oriented toward performance and action. Rumi's 
allusion to the boatman as a figure representing the doer 
of actions in problematic situations and the grammarian as 
a character who possesses mastery of a conceptual framework 
in academic discipline of grammar with no association with 
practical situations seems to be an illuminating illustra- 
t ion . 
His faithful adherence to action and practice is 
revealed in the following - verses: 
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For the purpose of traversing this way there is no 
comrade more faithful than action. 
Seek help in acquiring crafts, 0 possessor of 
intelligence, from a generous and righteous crafts¬ 
man . (MV, 1055). 
Rumi seems to appreciate the importance of action as 
an experiential method conducive to understanding and 
learning. His allegory of action and the craftsman reminds 
me of Plato's theory of demiourgos (Sophist 265c) and 
Aristotle's conception of techne as a productive and 
creative process. He denigrates those who appreciate 
knowledge only in the light of logical calculations and 
syllogistic forms: 
Thou seest the dust on high, 0 infirm (of sight): 
the wind (thou) seest not, except through knowledge 
given by induction. 
Thou seest the foam moving in every direction: 
without the Sea the foam hath no turning place. 
(M V, 1030). 
For Rumi transmission of cultural values without 
dwelling and participating in them is a useless endeavor. 
It could be likened to the study of the sea foams without 
appreciation of their original source. Knowledge merely 
derived from logical forms is to study foams without theii 
relation to the sea. Sea metaphor represents the dynamic 
conception of truth and knowledge. It is not a static 
phenomenon. 
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Concerning knowledge gained from books and academic 
disciplines, Rumi seems to maintain that subject matter 
orientation can not encompass higher levels of learning. 
It can not take into account the appropriate level of 
student's development. It does not always succeed in en¬ 
gaging the student more actively in the learning process. 
It tends to concentrate more on the subject matter than the 
student. Thus, the education of the person is placed on 
the back burner. Such an orientation is inevitably idea- 
centered and coherence centered. It can not actively 
encounter impending problems, and consequently the student's 
growth. Rumi hints that text-books and academic discipline 
may point us in the right direction. But, the realization 
of knowledge is a personal problem depending on active 
experience. William C. Chittick suggests that that is why 
Rumi "never wrote any systematic treatment of Sufism and 
why his poetry is meant mainly to encourage the reader to 
enter the Way." (SPL p. 133). 
In the introduction to Rumi, it was mentioned that he 
has utilized a great variety of metaphors, allegories, and 
aphorisms in his poetry. In order to clarify Rumi's reason 
to adopt a metaphoric mode of speech in his work and its 
relation to his thought, I have to examine the new develop¬ 
ments in the field of linguistics in the light of split 
With regard to the application of brain issue. 
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hemisphericity to linguistics, there has been a tendency 
to associate verbal activity with the left hemisphere 
functions exclusively. It appears that this situation is 
the outcome of defining all linguistic articulations in 
terms of "propositional" speech-act and grammatical 
anlaysis. On the other hand, many linguists have correlated 
full brain function with "transformational grammar." For 
instance, Chomsky suggests that the connection between "the 
surface structure of language and its "deep structure" may 
be described in terms of a category broader than linear 
rational-functioning of the brain. Such a line of approach 
has been taken by some linguistic philosophers to describe 
a general "depth grammar" or "language of thought" con- 
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stituting the foundations of all natural languages. 
The laws governing this "depth grammar" are usually sub¬ 
sidiarily known. Thus, they are not the result of focal 
awareness and explicit knowledge. It is a truism that all 
speech is not propositional in character. Moreover, in 
addition to demonstrative, imperative, speculative, and 
performative modes of speech, there is another mode of 
speech which is spoken of as metaphoric. Metaphoric mode 
of speech is not a simple mode of expression. It is highly 
rich and sophisticated in implication and function. It is 
more closely correlated with the right brain function than 
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the left. It has more to do with integration and 
appositional perception, with creating and discovering the 
conceptual frame of reference within which propositional 
expression takes place. 
Metaphoric Dimension 
Linguists maintain that every propositional setting 
may have two structures. One is the structure of the sen¬ 
tence as it is pronounced or written, and the other is a 
more abstract structure and contains all the units and 
relationships that are necessary for interpreting the 
meaning of the sentence. For instance, a sentence such as 
the "old house fell down," might be said to have two 
structures. It means both "the house fell down" and "the 
house was old." The first sentence may be referred to as 
"surface structure," and the second may be called "deep 
structure♦" In other words, the actually produced struc¬ 
ture is the surface structure and the subsidiarily known 
structure is the "deep structure." The term transforma¬ 
tional is used by Noam Chomsky to refer to the relation¬ 
ship of the deep structure to the surface structure or 
vice versa. Such a relationship is a complex one. The 
transformational relationship between deep and suiface 
structures constitutes a process which is significant foi 
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linguistic understanding and cognitive development. 
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Deep structure and transformational relationship are the 
modes which involve a tacit and subsidiary dimension. Sur¬ 
face structure is associated with focal awareness and 
explicit knowing. Modern linguists have demonstrated that 
all people acquire thier mother-tongue through the isomor¬ 
phism of their subsidiary awareness and their embodied 
capacities as a function of the right hemisphere of the 
brain and, therefore, as a form of tacit knowing. The 
theory of transformational structure also attests to the 
viability of this theory. Focal knowledge of the language 
comes as a result of conscious concentration on grammatical 
structures. Such knowledge is closely correlated with the 
72 
left hemispheric function of the brain. 
As it was mentioned earlier, metaphor as a figura¬ 
tive mode of speech is closely associated with subsidiary 
awareness and tacit knowledge. So it seems that metaphor 
is not divorced from the function of the right hemisphere 
of the brain, since it involves a particular set of 
linguistic processes whereby aspects of one object are 
carried over or transferred to another object, so that the 
73 
second object is spoken of as if it were the first. 
Metaphor, hence, involves transference and analogy. 
Greeks used to associate metaphor with mimesi_s. 
Aristotle asserted that metaphor (meta-phora) consists m 
the transference of a name to some other thing, the 
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transference being either from genus to species, or from 
species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy 
and proportion (analogia) (Poetics, 1475b, 21-25). Aristotle 
associates metaphor with analogy and imitation. Aristotle 
avers that to call temperance a harmony is metaphorical , 
since properly the genus of harmony is sounds, not character. 
He, further, adds that he suspects that Empedocles general¬ 
ized love and hate from human affairs into physical prin¬ 
ciples of attraction and repulsion. He acknowledges the 
scientific significance of "metaphor" by alluding to 
Empedocles' theory of attraction and repulsion. He par¬ 
ticularly recommends the use of analogy and metaphor in 
studying biological phenomena. He uses analogy and 
metaphor to probe structural similiaries. For example, 
he compares the sting of the insect to the trunk of an 
elephant or the scales of the fish to the feathers of 
the bird. 
Plato uses metaphor and mimesis in relation to the 
productive arts (poetikai technai) in Sophist (265b). He 
says that metaphor and mimesis are closely related to the 
notion of craftsmanship (demiourgia) . He adds that mimesis 
is a practical art, the art of the painter, sculptor, and 
actor. The outcome of the mimesis or metaphor is eikones 
(images). Thus, an activity known as mimesis has as its 
product an entity whose ontological status is that of 
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hermeneutic explanation. Plato uses mimesis and metaphor to 
express the relationship of the eide to sensible particulars 
(Parm. 132c-133a). 
Metaphor and mimesis are practical instrumentalities 
by means of which ambiguous concepts and situations are 
clarified and illustrated. Aristotle points out that the 
effect of metaphor "properly" used is that of combining the 
familiar with the unfamiliar resulting in charm, distinc¬ 
tion, and clarity. Clarity comes from familiar "everyday 
words," the proper or regular class of terms used by 
everybody in conversation. Charm comes from the intellec¬ 
tual pleasure afforded by the new resemblances noted in 
the metaphor; distinction comes from the suprising nature 
of some of the resemblances discerned. (Rhet. Ill, 1406a, 
1406b). 
Aristotle holds that "a good metaphor implies an 
intuitive perception of the similarity of dissimilars." 
(Poetics, Chapter 22). Aristotle seeks to prove that 
metaphor is the means by which the less familiar is 
assimilated to the more familiar. Metaphor may be said to 
be the synthesis of several units of observation in one 
cammanding image; it is the expression of a complex idea, 
not by analysis, which is mainly the function of the left 
brain, but by a sudden perception of an objective relation. 
As Paul Henle indicates, if metaphor operates by 
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resemblance between something familiar and something un¬ 
familiar, then there are likely two kinds of resemblance 
involved: an antecedent resemblance, which justifies the 
metaphoric comparison in the first place, and an induced 
resemblance, which arises from the very fact that a com- 
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panson has been made. In dealing with metaphor 
Aristotle speaks of mimesis. This word has been rendered 
’’imitation" in English. I think there are contexts in 
which representation might do more accurate service. 
Aristotle sees nothing but a verbal difference between 
mimesis and platonic methexis, participation. (Meta. 
987b 10). Plato utilized the notion of methexis, partici¬ 
pation, in order to clarify the dynamic relationship of 
the eidos with the material world. In fact, for Plato, 
methexis serves as an intermediary between the eide and the 
sensible, particular things (aistehta). Like the eide, 
intermediaries, (metaxu), are unchanging and eternal, but 
unlike the eide, they are plural. (Meta. 987b). 
Thus, it seems not to be far-fetched to compare 
Plato's conception of methexis and metaxu with Piaget's 
theory of stages. Plato has developed the theory of 
methexis as an instrument for the analysis of formative 
processes of thought. In fact, for Plato methexis is a 
heuristic tool for studying the development of knowledge 
from the level of doxa to the level of episteme. Piaget 
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has used the notion of "stage" to conceptualize his 
cognitive growth theory. I think both Piagetian stage 
theory and Platonic methexis are metaphoric instruments to 
study the process of knowledge. These metaphors have been 
developed mainly for educational purposes. They seek to 
study the process of knowledge acquisition with a view to 
its ontogenetic and phylogentic characteristics. Plato's 
conception of methexis reveals his concern for psychologi¬ 
cal growth. Therefore, this theory serves to undermine 
the allegation that Plato is an essentialist (i.e., 
rationalist), since he seems to appreciate the significance 
of the external reality to be cognized and experienced in 
a sequential process. When Plato uses the metaphors of 
cave, aviary, midwifry and so on, he seeks to depict the 
realm of ideas in artistic images understandable for his 
students. He implies that he can make it possible to 
acquire knowledge in a sequential process. He has 
attempted to represent the realm of eidos by a thing in a 
natural condition of change. In fact, Plato applies 
"iconic signification" in order to make it possible for 
his students to grasp knowledge in a meaningfully concrete 
way. Metaphor seems to be an educational tool for him to 
explain a larger range of events. He uses antecedent 
resemblances in the light.of aesthetic image-exhibiting or 
picturing function of language to represent the significant 
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event of realizing knowledge. He, thus, shows his apprecia¬ 
tion for the presentational immediacy of metaphor. This 
apporach on the part of Plato is probably another indication 
that he is not bound to the principles of essentialism 
(i.e., rationalism). 
On the basis of our previous argument about split 
brain issue it may be said that metaphor is an aspect which 
indicates Plato's appreciation for reality. By using 
various metaphors he seeks to teach the abstract by the 
concrete, by means of actions. In other words, Plato 
realizes that the student at the early stages of his or 
her development cannot assimilate what he or she is taught. 
They need to experience new facts and ideas. 
Methexis and metaphor are notions which could be 
associated with what Piaget speaks of as figurative know¬ 
ledge. Piaget maintains that the figurative aspect of 
knowing comes from physical experience and provides the 
manifest content of actions. The figurative aspect of 
knowing involves accommodation to the sensory pattern. 
Physical experience consists of accommodation to objects. 
In all of this, orientation is towards the external 
environment, even when the actions themselves are internal¬ 
ized. It may be said that physical, figurative, and 
accommodative experiences.constitute the same category, 
while logico-mathematical modes of knowing, which are 
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assimilative in character, are referred to by Piaget as 
"operative." 
The figurative mode of knowing seems to be externally 
oriented, while the operative mode of knowing is internally 
oriented. In order to understand the relationship between 
operative and figurative aspects of knowing one has to 
differentiate between empirical aspects of abstraction and 
reflective dimension. Empirical abstraction provides us 
with knowledge of the physical characteristics of objects, 
while reflective abstraction is related to schemas and 
operations and their coordination into structures. 
Empirical abstraction is as important for our knowledge of 
reality as is the figurative aspect of knowing. The 
figurative aspect of knowledge is in general, more or less 
oriented toward a total "picture," either in perception or 
in imagery. In short, figurative knowledge is necessary 
for the use of empirical abstraction. Moreover, empirical 
abstraction requires physical activity, e.g., when weighing 
an object in one's hand to feel its heaviness or 
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lightness. 
Figurative knowledge which involves physical 
accommodation takes place in three distinct forms: pei- 
ception, imitation, and image. Perceptual adaptation are 
adaptations to specific situations and are irreversible 
while operational concepts are general and reversible. 
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Piaget shows that figurative knowledge is always closely 
linked to the operative aspect of knowledge. Every mean¬ 
ingful perception requires an assimilation into an action 
scheme. He, further, adds that specific constructions in¬ 
corporate perceptual data and form complex concepts. 
Imitation is very important in the transition from the 
sensorimotor level to that of representations. In fact, 
imitation is a prefiguration of representation. Imitation 
plays an important role in symbolic play, drawing and 
language. Piaget believes that the child, by imitating 
what he sees and hears around him, accommodates to the 
reality of his environment. Mental image is a continuation 
of perception. The image is a dynamic reproduction of 
what is perceived or experienced by the child. Piaget 
indicates that "a mental image can be a reproduction of 
an object or situation that was experienced at an earlier 
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moment or an anticipation of what is going to happen." 
Perception seems to be a reproduction of reality and images 
are a reproduction of perception. Piaget points out that 
pre-operational children who are incapable of concrete 
operations have kinetic or anticipatory images. He seems 
to maintain that there is a filiation between structures 
and imagery. 
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If we compare Piaget's conception of figurative know¬ 
ledge (i.e., perception, imitation, imagery) with Plato's 
met hex is and metaxu, we can see resemblances. In fact, 
Plato by reference to the notion of methexis seeks to show 
that it is by "participation in" or "by the presence of 
the idea of justice that a thing is just." If we 
represent the adjectival expression "just" by "Y" and its 
corresponding abstract noun by "Y-ness," then we may assert 
that it is by participation in the idea of Y-ness that a 
thing is Y. In other words, there is something, an idea, 
such that it is by participation therein, a thing is Y. 
Plato's stage of Ideas may be compared with Piaget's 
formal operational stage of development in cognitive terms 
and Kohlberg's moral notion of universal ethical principle 
orientation- (Stage 6). Thus, A. Wedberg avers that 
"whenever two things participate in the same idea, they 
resemble each other in respect of that idea; and whenever 
two things resemble each other, there is an idea in which 
they both participate, and this common participation 
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accounts for their resemblance." (Parm. 142 D-E). 
If, according to Piaget, stages are described as in¬ 
variable developmental sequences with constructive 
consequences, and each stage represents a necessarily 
invariable sequence, then- we may realize that there is a 
close resemblance between Piaget's notion of stages and 
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Plato's theory of methexis, In both Plato's methexis 
(participation) and Piaget's structure-stage there could 
be found an organized network of "family-resemblances," 
that is, they are linked by overlapping sets of resemblance. 
Consequently, it should be pointed out that the 
figurative aspect of knowledge which embodies perception, 
imitation, and image interacts with the operative mode of 
knowing. This figurative mode which accounts for the 
metaphorical tacit dimension of human consciousness serves 
as important function in a child's development. If meta¬ 
phor is understood as the transferance of a name of or a 
descriptive term to an object different from, but analogous 
to, the one to which it is properly applicable, then we 
say that the metaphoric mode of knowing, which has close 
affinity with Piaget's figurative knowledge, provides the 
child with the power of "syncretism" and "juxtaposition” 
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in the thinking of George Bereday. Syncretism and 
juxtaposition represent comparison in its simplest and 
least developed form. To juxtapose simply means putting 
together without establishing the relations of the indivi¬ 
dual items with one another. Syncretism implies thinking 
about the whole without relating it to the parts (a kind 
of Gestalt thinking and conceptualization). Piaget refers 
to all this mental activity as "pre-conceptual thinking." 
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He seeks to show that all the subsequent stages of develop¬ 
ment rest upon this second stage. 
Plato has described this stage of human development 
by recourse to the notion of mythos. He maintains that 
mythos may stand in contrast to logos. Logos is intended 
to signify a rational, analytic, and linear account of 
reality, while mythos indicates a visual, pictorial, and 
non-analytic account. (Phaedo 61b, Tim. 26e). We may 
safely compare Plato's relation of logos-mythos with right- 
left hemisphere in functions of the brain in the light of 
modern research and scholarship. Plato never denies the 
significance of mythos in the process of education (Rep. 
377a). Plato utilizes mythos in order to make it easy for 
the student to develop from the level of the pre-conception 
mode of thinking to the level of the formal operational 
mode of thinking. Plato realized that mythos is an im¬ 
perfect and irrational means of acquiring knowledge if it 
is compared with the equations of mathematical physics. 
This imperfect and irrational character of the myth does 
not necessitate the rejection of its important value for 
education. Myth for Plato is a metaphorical expression of 
reality. We cannot overcome myth, we can only misunder¬ 
stand it. It may be said that, as Plato indicates, we 
receive the "myth from the unconscious, that is, from the 
cosmic depth of our soul that reverberates into the field 
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of conscious and intelligible communication. The eikos 
mythos carries its own aletheia because in it we symbolize 
the truly experienced relation of our separate conscious 
existence to the cosmic ground of the soul. The theory of 
the myth is itself a myth; its truth is not the truth of 
intellect, but the self-authenticating truth of the 
. „ 80 
psyche.M 
This is also another proof which supports my claim 
that Plato is not a believer in the essentialist conception 
of reality. He utilized mythos in order to provide the 
basis for syncretism and juxtaposition as means of 
developing tacit, metaphoric, and subsidiary dimensions of 
learning and knowledge. He realizes that comparison as a 
mode of metaphor is inherent in human thinking and that 
the development of this one faculty is in fact entwined in 
the development of entire human thinking process. 
A good example of this metaphoric myth in modern 
science is to be found in terms widely used by cognitive 
psychologists and educationalists to describe various 
brain functions: thinking is "information processing;" 
learning to read is encoding and decoding symbols; 
consciousness is a feedback mechanism; memory is retrieval 
process and data storage. The best example ol a model n 
metaphor is that refering to the brain as a computei . 
Ernest Nagel has furnished a large variety of instances 
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from physics and m&thGnia.tics to show how general analogies 
and particular metaphors help to overcome the gap between 
familiar facts and new experiences and to articulate new 
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theories. Nagel adds that "wide-spread use of metaphors... 
testifies to a pervasive human talent for finding resem- 
blances between new experiences and familiar facts." 
"Analogies help to assimilate the new to the old, and 
prevent novel explanatory premises from being radically 
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unfamiliar." Thus, it may be said that metaphor is not 
merely an ornamental rhetorical device. It is, in fact, 
an important functioning of the human brain (i.e., right 
hemisphere activity). 
The right hemisphere of the brain functions in an 
analogical, metaphorical and visual fashion. Thus, its 
functioning involves syncretism and juxtaposition 
(figurative modes of knowing). It proceeds by comparison. 
It may be a process of calling attention to similarities 
and resemblances. It draws attention to certain aspects 
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of the one through the co-presence of the other. 
The above comparative introduction was provided in 
order to dwell upon Rumi’s utilization of metaphor as a 
comparison of familiar facts with new experiences. Rumi 
realizes that human mental activity is inclined towards 
figurative thinking, using metaphors, paradigms, models and 
analogies to explain the unknown in terms of the known. 
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He uses metaphors, myths and tales to help the student 
discover new knowledge. Metaphor, in his view, serves as a 
good launching pad to expand man's grasp of the universe. 
Rumi uses various metaphors, models, and paradigms to 
express difficult theoretical formulations. Of course, he 
realizes the difference between metaphor and theory. He 
is careful to distinguish between the model and the theory. 
He does not mistake the vehicle for the journey itself. 
Rumi alludes to the relation and correspondence between 
experience and expression and indicates that experience is 
like the hand and expression is like the instrument by 
which the hand acts, like the pen or brush by means of 
which pictures are painted on a wall. Rumi often tries to 
clarify the relationship between experience and expression, 
but he always returns to make the point that "words are 
merely dust on the mirror of experience, dust brought forth 
from the movement of the broom tongue." (T S, p. 48). It 
does not matter for him whether the words are spoken in 
Arabic, Persian, Turkish or Greek. What is important is 
meaningful communication. He relates the story of foui 
quarreling persons: the Arab wanted Inab, the Persian 
angur, the Turk uzum, the Greek estafil, but eventually 
they came to realize that they all were requesting grapes 
through different languages. (T S,49). Rumi believes that 
as far as education is concerned "common man is comparable 
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to a child whose parents explain the secrets of life in 
"simple images" or give him a "wooden sword" or "place a 
doll in his hand." (T S,p. 48). For him metaphor or word 
"is a nest in which the bird (meaning) resides." (T S, p. 49). 
For instance, when he intends to deal with the distinc¬ 
tion between true knowledge (episterne) and mere opinion 
(doxa), he cites the following tale: Once a native hunter 
saw a shadow "speeding on the earth, flying like a bird. 
He began to chase the shadow running (after it) so far that 
he became exhausted and powerless. He did not know that it 
was a reflection of a bird in the air; he did not recognize where 
the origin of the shadow is, he shot arrows at the shadow 
until his quiver was empty. He exhausted his life's energy 
in aimless pursuit of the shadow." (M I, 415, 420). Here, 
Rumi has cited the hunter metaphor to provide a visual image 
for his discussion of the realm of opinion and appearances. 
Rumi has sought to incorporate his creative talent of 
imagery and metaphor to elucidate the Platonic theory of 
Eidos. Hence, in so far as educational psychology is con¬ 
cerned we have here in this metaphor evidence of right 
brain thinking. Rumi asks the student to imagine that he 
is a hunter in pursuit of a bird. If he mistakes the 
shadow for the bird, he will lose his aim. 
This reminds me of .a teacher who asked the students 
to darken the room and visualize the studying electronics 
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image of the magnetic "field surrounding a transformer." 
The students were asked to imagine themselves as incredibly 
small pieces of magnetically charged matter-electrons. They 
saw themselves as electrons entering a force field surround¬ 
ing two largp coils of wire. The students were told to 
enter the wire of the coil and experience the movement 
generated by the rapidly changing force field. The two 
fields surrounding the coils were interacting and moving 
closer together, causing electrons to move faster and 
faster. After the fantasy the teacher discussed the ex- 
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penence with the students." 
Rumi's method of education could be construed to seek 
a balance between right brain-analogical, metaphorical 
thinking, and left brain-analytical thought. Hence, the 
metaphor of the hunter represents a good example of the 
difficult analysis of episteme and doxa in a metaphorical 
way. This metaphorical illustration of reality aims at 
the logical conclusion of the supremacy of episteme with 
an educationally visual method. Such an easy visualization 
bridges the gap between the difficult, unfamiliar, and the 
familiar or known. Rumi utilizes methods of syncrtism and 
juxtaposition to incorporate the pre-conceptual with the 
fully conceptual thought (formal operational). The meta¬ 
phor of the hunter facilitates a giant step forward from 
244 
the known (i.e., doxa, shadows) into the unknown regions of 
scientific knowledge (i.e., episteme).85 
In order to illustrate clearly the relationship of 
opinion (doxa) and knowledge (episteme) in pursuance of 
Plato's 'divided line' he provides the following meta¬ 
phoric elaboration: 
Knowledge has two wings, opinion one wing; 
Opinion is weak and lopsided in its flight. 
The bird having but one wing quickly drops 
down, and again flies on two steps or more. 
This bird of opinion goes on rising and falling. 
The one wing, in hope to reach his nest. 
When he escapes from opinion and knowledge is 
seen, 
This bird gains two wings and spreads both of 
them. 
Afterwards he goes upright on a straight path, 
Not grovelling on his face or creeping. 
(TR, p. 129). 
I believe that Rumi has utilized imaginal processes 
that are largely holistic, integrative and synthesizing. 
He seems to avoid the logic of the adult in teaching. He 
does not confine himself to verbal and symbolic informa¬ 
tion as the only appropriate method of education. His 
method, if carefully examined, encourages the teacher to 
seek a balance between rational, linear thought, and 
imaginal, analogical and right hemispheric thought. The 
relationship between opinion (doxa) and knowledge (episteme) 
is by nature an analytic issue. Rumi takes advantage of 
both convergent and divergent thinking capacities of the 
student in order to achieve an integrated and balanced 
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method of education. He does not favor a lopsided rational, 
linear, divergent method as do many essentialists. Rumi 
uses a metaphoric imagery of the bird in the above poem to 
provide the student with a visual metaphor and analogy. He 
realizes that the student is familiar with the primary 
image (i.e., bird) and is required to make a secondary 
conceptual link. The use of imagery analogs for this 
purpose has long been recognized as a valuable teaching 
strategy. In the West scholars like Baker and Talley have 
proved that the use of physical models in teaching certain 
disciplines enhances the student’s capacity to solve 
scientific problems. They have argued that handling con¬ 
crete models facilitates the development of imagery analogs 
which are mediated in the problem-solving process. A 
recent study by Gabel and Sherwood supports this conten- 
86 
tion. Rumi provides an integrated synthesis in which 
imagery involves extrapolation or abstraction into the 
realm of the possible. In this case, the imagery process 
is inteimately bound up with hypothetico-deductive reason¬ 
ing and its outcome is the student's overall intellectual 
grasp of the situation. If we examine the way in which 
Einstein claimed to have developed the notion of the 
relativity of time by visualizing what would happen if the 
train in which he was travelling approached the speed of 
light, we can appreciate Rumi's utilization of this type 
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of metaphor. Rumi seems to realize that "fantasy is a 
natural human activity. It certainly does not destroy or 
even insult Reason; and it does not either blunt the 
appetite for, nor obscures the perception of scientific 
» 
verity. On the contrary, the keener and the clearer the 
reason, the better fantasy it will make." In teaching 
science this type of metaphoric imagery is utilized. For 
instance, in appreciating Hund's Rule for distribution of 
electrons among orbitals of equal energy we may use the way 
in which bus seats tend to be filled: At first one person 
might occupy each seat, then when all seats are thus 
occupied, they begin filling up with second persons. This 
type of visual imaging is concerned with abstraction and 
analogy. This is a useful source of an instructional 
method. Platts has shown that these types of metaphors 
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and imageries assist in concept development. 
This method of metaphoric imagery is also used by 
Plato in various forms such as the hydra's heads (Euthyd 
297c), (Sophist, 240 c4), torch of life (Rep. 328A), aviary 
(Theatetus, 197 D, Euthyd. 291 B) , block of wax (Theate 
191cD, Tim 50c 2, 72c, Laws 800 E), wasp's nest (Eryxi 
392 BC,) and so on. This method has been used by various 
educationalists and scholars and its impact on the develop¬ 
ment of the student has been put to the test of experience. 
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Careful analysis of these metaphoric imageries shows 
that both Rumi and Plato have resorted to these well- 
founded techniques in order to consider age and development¬ 
al stages in*their methods. They seem to recognize 
developmental sequences, and the readiness of the student 
at a certain age for the learning of particular disciplines. 
They are well aware of the "regression effect." This means 
that persons faced with new and difficult cognitive prob¬ 
lems may return temporarily to lower levels of functioning- 
for example, from formal to concrete operations (i.e., 
from noesis to dianoia). Hence, when they present new 
material at the formal operational level, they mix in 
heavy proportions of concrete illustrations, metaphors, 
imageries, demonstrations, and experiments. The above 
considerations support the thesis that both Rumi and Plato 
are not advocates of essentialism (i.e., rationalism) as 
a reliable philosophy and method of inquiry. 
Kohlberg's Stage Seven 
Much less well known, perhaps, are the suggestions 
made by Lawrence Kohlberg concerning the metaphorical 
seventh stage. In addition to his six-stage structuial 
analysis of moral development, Kohlberg has recently 
proposed a metaphorical stage 7, to probe into the 
question of the nature of personal development in the adult 
of middle and even advanced age. 
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The idea of a metaphysical stage of life is not new 
among psychologists, of course. It has been some fifty 
years since Carl Jung suggested that the second half of 
life is defined by its concern with essential meta-' 
physical questions, questions about the ultimate meaning of 
life. Erik Erikson in his theory of psychological develop¬ 
ment describes the last stage of development in the older 
person in the metaphysical terms of a crisis of integrity 
versus despair. 
Kohlberg's research activities contain two signifi¬ 
cant phases of development. The first phase is the study 
of the moral dimension of cognitive development based on 
the Piagetian cognitive structuralist analysis. In the 
first phase of his research and theorizing (almost a period 
of fifteen years) he viewed the highest stages of moral 
reasoning as rooted in the radical breakthrough effected 
by the emergence of formal operational thought attainable 
by the adolescent. 
During the second phase of the development of his 
research and study (since 1973), he has paid more attention 
to the issue of adult moral development and with new 
available data from empirical studies. In this phase he 
has tried to incorporate Erikson's stage theory of adult 
development into his own cognitive-structural stage 
theory. 
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I think, Kohlberg has speculated about stage 7, after 
being deeply influenced by the functional stages of 
Erikson's psychological theory. Kohlberg's metaphorical 
stage seven corresponds to Erikson's stage of integrity 
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versus despair. 
Erikson seems to maintain that the ideal person re¬ 
solves the adult crisis of generativity versus self¬ 
absorption or narcissism. In this stage the achievement of 
identity is not a battle that is once won and over with. 
Adults face the challenge of either achieving generativity 
or becoming lost in self-absorption. Generativity refers 
to the trait of being concerned with the guidance and 
protection of the next generation. Failure to cope with 
this adult challenge leads to a sense of stagnation and 
interpersonal impoverishment. This Ericksonian ideal stage 
corresponds to Kohlberg's post-conventional stage 6. 
Despite this significant degree of normative development, 
however, there still remains for Erickson’s adult a. task; that 
is partly ethical, but more basically metaphysical (in the 
broadest sense of the word). Erikson refers to this eighth 
stage as senescence (mature age): (i.e., integrity versus 
despair). The crisis of integrity, as Kohlberg suggests, 
is not the problem of moral integrity, but the problem of 
integration and integrity.of the individual's life and its 
negative side, despair, which hovers around the awareness 
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of death. While he sees the integrity of the meaning of 
the self as a psychological issue, Kohlberg maintains that 
the integrity of the meaning of the self's life is a 
philosophical issue. Hence, he typifies his purely 
hypothetical notion of stage 7 in his own theory as 
"primarily an effort to make Erikson's concept (of inte- 
grlty) more explicitly philosophical." Kohlberg asserts 
that in dealing: with the possibility of a stage seven we 
must go beyond the notion of moral stages. He states that 
he has developed the notion of stage seven on the basis of 
the empirical work carried out by Fowler (1973) suggesting 
the existence of stages of "faith" or of "world outlook” 
which correspond to moral stages. He holds that attainment 
of a "given moral stage is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition" for attaining a corresponding metaphysical or 
ontological stage. He adds that stage 6 offers only an 
"imperfect integration or resolution of the problem of 
life's meaning.He states that even after the attain¬ 
ment of stage 6 awareness of rational universal human 
principles of justice, there remains the questions, "why 
„9 
be moral?" "Why be just" in a universe full of injustice. 
Ultimately, an answer to the question "why be moral?" leads, 
as Kohlberg sees it, to the question "Why live?" or "How 
face death?" For Kohlberg ultimate moral growth requiies 
an answer to the problem of the meaning of life, a problem 
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of the meaning of life, a problem which is not necessarily 
moral, but ontological in character. Such questions cannot 
be easily answered by recourse to purely logical or rational 
grounds. 
Kohlberg indicates that the transition to stage seven 
begins with despair. Such despair entails an initiation 
into a "cosmic perspective." It is when "we begin to see 
our lives as finite from some more infinite perspective 
that we feel despair." He adds that the feeling of the 
"meaninglessness of our lives in the face of death is the 
meaninglessness of the finite from the perspective of the 
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infinite." Kohlberg suggests that all ontological 
questions involve nonegoistic or non-dualistic contemplative 
experience. From a theistic point of view, the essence of 
this contemplative experience is a sense of "union with 
God," "the sense of being a part of the whole of life and 
the adoption of a cosmic as opposed to a humanistic (stage 
6) perspective." 
Kohlberg avers that even most persons who are not 
"religious" temporarily achieve "the state of the union of 
mind" with the whole of nature, when on the mountaintop 
or before the ocean. "On such occasions, what is usually 
"background becomes foreground;" and the self is no longer 
figure to the ground." We feel a kind of unity of the 
whole. 
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Kohlberg maintains that Eriksonian despair is but the 
first phase of a sense of cosmic perspective. The resolu¬ 
tion of the despair which Kohlberg refers to as stage 7 
"represents a continuation of the process of taking a more 
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cosmic perspective." Kohlberg explicitly asserts that: 
There is no single stage 7 ontological-religious 
structure, no universal religion, as there is in some 
sense a single stage 6 structure of universal ethical 
principle. 
Because of this, our notion of stage 7 does not quite 
fit the notion of a stage in the rigid structural 
sense. The rigid structural model insists that: 
(a) the nature of each new stage had a definitely 
definable structure, a structure defined by a 
logical system, and (b) each higher stages is 
logically, cognitively, philosophically more 
adequate than the preceding stage and logically 
includes it.96 
Kohlberg suggests that in stage 7 "the cosmic vision 
has a larger influx of union, love, joy, and grace as well 
as moral force." At the level of stage 7, the universal 
principles of justice (stage 6) are integrated with "a 
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perspective on life's ultimate meaning.' 
It could be claimed that in stage seven man encounters 
the question of meaning. He seeks after authenticity in 
the words of Heidegger. The quest for meaning and 
authenticity involves the quest for self-understanding which 
may lead to a change in one's existence. Heidegger states 
that "this change allows us to become more fully what we 
are: beings who understand what it means for things to 
be."98 We are no longer isolated egos aindist a collection 
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of objects. We will be open to ourselves and to the 
world. We will be integrated with the world. Being will 
cease to be a thing, it will be an event, the duality of 
subject versus object, matter versus mind, thought versus 
action, and experience versus nature, will dissolve. I 
think when Kohlberg asserts "that the characteristics of 
all stage 7 solutions is that they involve a contemplative 
experience of a nonegoistic, or non-dualistic variety" and 
involve an authentic experience of integration versus 
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dichotomy, he intends to say that we exist in a way true 
to our own Being and experience the Being of things far 
more profoundly than we do by manipulating concepts about 
being. We do not objectify ourselves as a continuous ego- 
subject. Thus, we are liberated from the distortions of 
egoism, and can be open to possibilities. 
While in earlier stages we may conceal our finitude 
and disregard the call of conscience when it summons us to 
be what we already are: temporal finite openness. 
I think Plato has implied this metaphorical stage 7 
in his works, The Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. All of these 
works express the fact that accepting death is crucial for 
leading the good and moral life. Socrates in the Apology 
represents the highest principle of morality and integrity: 
to choose to die rather than to conceal truth and 
authenticity. He, hence, seeks to prove that dying well is 
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part of what it means to live well. Socrates confronts 
his death with integrity and morality throughout his life. 
His friends still have to face and an acceptance of their 
mortality. (The stage of Eriksonian despair), (Phaedo, 
77 e-78 b). 
Rumi's Metaphoric Stage of Ishq 
Rumi suggests that the highest stage of human 
development consists in the non-dichotomizing state of 
Ishq (love). Ishq is a unifying force which integrates man 
into a state of union with himself, nature and Ultimate 
Reality. The metaphoric stage of love defies any egoistic 
separation, and objectification, it is a total experience. 
It is far from the rationalism of certain scholastics. It 
is a drive toward a communion of the separated. Separation 
is the stage of Eriksonian despair, distress and solitude. 
Communion, on the other hand, presupposes a prior stage of 
the separation of that which belongs essentially together. 
It would be wrong, however, "to give to separation the same 
ontological ultimacy as given to communion... the absolute. 
Stranger cannot enter into communion. But the estranged 
is striving for Union, in the words of Paul Tillich. 
It seems that Rumi uses separation in the same sense as 
Erikson uses despair and which may lead to integrity (Love). 
Rumi suggests that a meaningful life consists in an 
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experiential journey toward the metaphorical stage of 
communion and love. He compares the life of man to a reed 
torn from its bed and made into a flute whose music reveals 
the passionate desire to reunite with and return to the be¬ 
loved. This experiential journey is upward and takes the 
lover to the station of the beloved. The state of despair 
represents an entanglement with the phenomenal self, while 
Ishq reveals the cosmic self. The cosmic self is the image 
of the universe which must be unveiled (aletheia). Rumi 
sees the universal and cosmic self in the being of Shams. 
The conventional self reveals the state of despair while the 
cosmic self unconceals the state of being born in love. 
Thus, for Rumi, love is an experiential dimension of 
existence. It is a way to an authentic mode of existence. 
Understanding love involves personal experience. It defies 
linear, theoretical and rational formulation. It has to be 
experienced to be understood. Love exists to be realized, 
not discussed: 
"No matter what I say to explain and elucidate^ love, 
shame overcomes me when I come to love itself." 
(M I, 112). 
"Love has many expositions beyond speech." (D 4355) 
"When you become like me, then you will 
he calls you, you will recite its tale. 
know. When 
" (D 29050-51). 
"Oh you who have listened to tale of love, behold 
love! What are words in the ears compared to vision 
in the eyes?" (D 24681). 
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"What is love? Perfect thirst." (D 17361). 
"How could imperfect knowledge give birth to this 
love? It gives rise to love, but love for inanimate 
things. Deficient knowledge cannot discriminate: 
it considers lightning to be sun." (M II, 1532-33, 
35). 
Ishq for Rumi is a generative impulse. It provides 
the basic motivations in humans. The generative impulse 
is the desire to generate something enduring. Isqh is 
procreation, it is creation; it is birth. It is more than 
the love of^the beautiful; it is beauty incarnate. Rumi's 
stages of personality development may be examined within 
the framework of his conception of Ishq. 
The process of Ishq, according to Rumi, proceeds from 
love of physically beautiful shapes and forms, and ultim¬ 
ately reaches the level of beauty and integration to which 
Kohlberg alludes in his metaphorical stage seven. This 
stage of love has a theo-dimension which represents a 
transpersonal domain of reality, such as divine and cosmic 
consciousness. The three stages of love for Rumi are: 
physical love of the beautiful shapes and forms, love of 
the beautiful souls (inward beauty, virtuous souls, moral 
beauty), and love of beauty incarnate. The three modes of 
beauty represent steps or graduate levels of Ishq, beginning 
with the love of sensate realm of beauty, and then moving 
toward the inward person or the love of a moral personality, 
who is able to create transformation in the personality 
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structure of the individual, and ultimately attaining the 
theo-cosmic dimension of existence (Fana). Rumi states 
that: 
In man there is a love, a pain, an itch, and a desire 
such that, if a hundred thousand worlds were to be¬ 
come his property, he would still gain no rest or 
ease... people learn astronomy, medicine, and other 
things, but they do not find ease, since their goal 
has not been attained... All these goals are like a 
ladder. Since the rungs of a ladder are no place of 
residence, but exist only so that you can pass on, 
happy is he who quickly comes to himself and aware¬ 
ness! Then the long road becomes short, and he does 
not waste his life on the ladder’s rungs. (F 64/75). 
Rumi' s conception of scala amoris implies stages of person¬ 
ality development. He refers to the process of development 
as a ladder of love. He maintains that personality 
development involves hierarchical integration. Stages 
form transformative sequences. 
Rumi says that life is a movement toward development. 
Rumi metaphorically alludes to this development as a 
journey. The journey is upward and takes the lover to the 
stage of integration. Sense perception is a means of 
reaching such a stage. Love is a generative urge which 
helps the traveller of the path of development up the 
ladder: 
"We are a group of lovers whom desire has brought 
from a distant place on a journey.” (D 1160). 
-You still must travel a long journey before 
reach the place you .seek in your madness. CO zi^z) 
258 
In the path of love and realization, two processes are 
involved. The first experience is separation (Firaq, Higran) 
the second is the experience of communion (Wisal). Until 
the traveller reaches the very highest stage of integration, 
the experience of communion will be temporary followed by at 
least a separation from the beloved. During the journey 
(of development), man undergoes consecutive experiences of 
separation and communion. 
Rumi1s conception of separation reminds me of Plato's 
model of deficiency. Plato asserts that of necessity a 
desiring subject desires something it lacks, and when it 
does not lack something it does not desire it (Symp. 2ooab). 
Hence, eros lacks that which it loves (zolh). Eros loves 
and desires only beauty or beautiful things (201). Hence, 
eros lacks beauty or beautiful things (201 b). Thus, from 
Plato's point of view the aim of love is development and 
the overcoming of inadequacies. Such a feeling of de¬ 
ficiency and inadequacy causes in man a sense of separation 
and estrangement from what he lacks (i.e., the beloved). 
Rumi seems to believe that Ishq brings about a vital 
energy and urge in man to move and grow: 
When I start from the beginning, He is my leader; 
When I seek my heart, He is its ravisher. 
When I strive for peace, He intercedes for me. 
When I go to war, He is my dagger. 
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When I go down to the mine, He is the ruby and 
carnelian; when I dive into the sea, He is the pearl. 
When I cross the desert, He is the oasis, when I 
ascend the spheres. He is the star. (D 2251). 
For Rumi, Ishq is a form of desire. The basic human 
aspiration seems to be Ishq. It is the desire of the Good 
(sweetheart), since sweetheart is the object of love. He 
holds that we can be mistaken in our love objects and 
experience, great frustration and despair because of such 
mistakes: 
Man is called a "rational animal." So man is two 
things: the food of his animality in this world 
is his sensual passions and desires. But that which 
is his quintessence-its food is knowledge, wisdom, 
and the vision...(F LXIV 2). 
"God created the children of Adam and placed within 
them both sensuality and intellect." (M IV, between 
1496 and 97). 
I assume that a basic distinction in love is according 
to whether its object is individual or general. In the 
former case there is an emotional attachment of one person 
to another thing (person or non-person), in the latter 
there is not. For distinction's sake let us say that in 
the former case there is a presupposition of affection. 
This kind of love stretches from the love of inanimate 
things and animals to those of friendships which are 
serious enough to involve love, through the feeling of 
parent and child, through the most emotional, sexual 
relationships, and at an opposite extreme to sexual 
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relationships which are comparatively free of other in¬ 
terests and involvements. 
We also recognize a form of love which is more 
generalized: the love of mankind, justice, righteousness, 
knowledge and so on. In these cases the attitude manifests 
itself largely in the willingness and cheerfulness with 
which we engage in certain kinds of behavior and pre¬ 
ferences—the things we choose to do, to concern ourselves 
with, to nurture, as opposed to those we ignore, neglect, 
or forget. We find ourselves pleasantly occupied with 
these things and feel a sense of loss when we are kept from 
being engaged with them for great length of time. 
Rumi seems to assume that Ishq must contain a valua- 
tional and emotional element, and he seems to assume that 
people love that which they value and that whatever they 
love, they value. There is a close relationship between 
valuation and love. When we love something we value it 
intrinsically: do we love it because we value it, or do we 
value it because we love it? In the former case we must 
believe that the object of our love has certain value 
properties as a presupposition of the object of love. In 
the latter instance our love is a precondition of the 
object's having value for us. Christian agape is a concept 
of the latter kind. It is held that God's love for man is 
not due to the value of man but, rather, the love of God 
261 
is bestowed as a gift, and human beings have value through 
this bestowal. 
Platonic eros, on the contrary, is love motivated by 
the belief that the object of love is good and beautiful 
or valuable in some way. Plato's conception of love 
stretches from egocentric, hedonistic, and personal stages 
and through the acquisitive to the stage of ideocentric- 
ontocentric consciousness and morality. This final stage 
seems to be comparable to Kohlberg's metaphoric stage 
seven hypothesis. Rumi follows the same line of thought 
about Ishq. 
At every stage of personality and moral development 
the object of love and the motivation changes. In the 
primary stages of moral development the motivations seem 
to be egocentric, hedonistic and acquisitive (as in the 
case of Plato). At the highest level of development love 
tends to be nonegoistic, non-acquisitive, ideocentric, 
ontocentric, and integrational: 
Your intimacy with milk and breast has gone; 
your dread of grammar school has gone. 
That was a ray upon the wall of their existence-the 
radiance has returned to the sun. 
When that ray falls upon something, you become its 
lover oh, courageous man! (M 111,545-560). 
Through love bits of copper are made gold. 
Through love thorns become roses. 
Through love burning fire is pleasing 
Through love hard stones become soft as butter. 
Without love soft wax becomes hard iron. (I K P 80) . 
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Rumi, in the above verses attempts to point to the 
transformative character of love, to its cogent power of 
motivation and ultimate development. Such a transformative 
power is capable of dignifying its object. Thus, Rumi 
grants a valuational dimension to love. So love must have 
a moral aspect according to Rumi: 
"My religion is to love through." (M VI 4059). 
A lifetime that passes without love is of no account. 
Love is the water of life— 
The lover's teacher is the Beloved's beauty: his 
book and lesson are his face." (M III 3847). 
"Love is a physician searching for ill— 
otherwise, why should I be sick and infirm?" (D 33964). 
"The lover's grandeur is measured by his beloved. 
Oh poor lover, see to which group you belong!" 
(D 27832). 
"Mount upon love and think not about the way! For the 
horse of love is very surefooted. 
Though the path be uneven, in a single bound it will 
take you to the waystation." (D 6922-23). 
Therefore, Rumi is very cautious in his attempt to give 
a general characterization of the actual objects or motives 
of human love. He thinks that it is possible to achieve a 
theory of the proper objects of human love, but it is not 
possible to circumscribe human love within the limits of 
propriety! He suggests that love is not to be identified 
with motion or feeling but rather with valuation. He holds 
that love is the same as intrinsic valuation, and that its 
relation to emotion and feeling varies immensely accoiding 
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to the sort of love with which we are concerned. Love is 
such a complex relationship and so dependent upon circum¬ 
stances that neither love in general nor any particular sort 
of love can be defined by the pattern of feelings involved 
in it. 
The universe displays the beauty of thy comeliness: 
The goal is thy beauty — all else is pretext. (D 31554). 
I will burn if I come, for in that place there is 
love and naughting," (D 7600-02). 
"If you build yourself a hen house, try not to put 
a camel inside it—with its long neck." (D 31168-69). 
Trying to explain love, the intellect fell down in 
the mud like an ass—love and loverhood can only be 
explained by love. The sun is sun's: if you must 
have proof, then turn not your face from it. (MI, 
115-116). 
"Like a shark love has again shown its head smashing 
the intellect's rowboat in love's ocean." (D 13877). 
It is not difficult to realize that Rumi attempts to 
demonstrate that living through events, feelings, emotions, 
sufferings, happenings leads to the construction of know¬ 
ledge. For him knowledge is not derived solely from 
ratiocination and intellection. It is derived from activity 
and personal involvement. Thus, according to Rumi simple 
awareness is somehow connected to the interaction of the 
individual with the reality. It is not merely confined to 
the rational discursive knowledge. Thus, awareness and 
human understanding are not to be contrasted with sense- 
perception. The knowing process is not solely based on 
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discursive thinking and the formation of concept and judg¬ 
ment with no relation to the actual happenings. Love, as 
Rumi indicates, is an experience which does not merely rely 
upon consistency, coherence, and abstractness. Ishq ex¬ 
perience is not merely logico-mathematical and inferential. 
For Rumi reality is knowable through observation, experience 
participation and dwelling. Knowledge and learning is 
gained if there is total commitment on the part of the 
learner. 
Rumi attempts to associate Platonic divided line of 
knowledge process (i.e., doxa-episteme) to the process of 
personality development. This approach shows a thorough 
understanding of Plato’s thought by Rumi. Hence, Rumi 
associates direct vision of the Beautiful with the highest 
stages of knowledge process and physical love with opinion 
and imitation. (D 30442-44): 
’’God's aim for man was vision and comprehension-" 
(D 10906). 
"Is there no one with a pure and worthy vision with 
which to gaze upward?" 
"Is there no one who receives replenishment from 
love's fight so that his vision may fall totally 
yonder?" (D 1169). 
Plato associated truth (aletheia) with vision (eidos) 
The interplay of the two notions may be traced thiough the 
metaphor of the cave (in Book VII) of the Republic) . The 
process of knowledge and truth begins with the vision of 
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the shadows on the wall of the cave and eventually leads to 
the vision of the sun. Plato seems to disagree with the 
conception of coherence or correspondence. He attempts to 
prove that knowledge and truth result from personal ex¬ 
perience and vision gained through struggle and hardship. 
The experience paves the way for the unhiddenness (truth- 
aletheia). Unhiddenness should make vision possible. Thus, 
Plato's conception of truth seems to be a process rather 
than a product. 
Rumi also seems to associate vision with noetic truth. 
He emphasizes that the vision of the Beloved is the true 
capital of love. Before the lover catches a glimpse of the 
Beloved, his effort and endeavor is fundamentally confined 
to the limits of doxa. Rumi asserts that "man is always 
in love with that thing he has not seen or heard or under¬ 
stood. Night and day he seeks it. I am the servant of that 
which I do not see. But he becomes bored with what he has 
seen or understood, and he flees from it." (F 113-114/ 
124, 125). This statement of Rumi about the known corresponds 
to what Plato says in 201b of Symposium. Plato avers that 
"eros loves what he lacks and doesn't have." Eros then is 
wanting. It represents an inadequacy capable of being 
remedied. 
When Agathon comes to speak of eros's wisdom, he 
identifies it as poetry making (techne), rather than as 
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knowledge of the cause. Eros makes men poets, which is to 
hold that he generates in them the techne by which they ob¬ 
tain knowledge of his nature (197a 3). The wisdom of eros 
consists in generation (not merely of man) rather than in 
contemplation or knowing. 
For Rumi Ishq courses throughout the world's arteries. 
All generativity, production, and creativity come from Ishq. 
"The creatures are set in motion by Love, Love by 
eternity-without-beginning; the wind dances because 
of the spheres, the trees because of the wind." 
(D 5001) . 
"The world is like a mirror displaying Love's per¬ 
fection. Oh friends! Who has ever seen a part 
greater than its whole." (D 25248). 
"Like Adam and Eve, Love gives birth to a thousand 
forms; the world is full of its paintings but it has 
no form." (D 5057). 
"The spheres turn for the sake of lovers, the wheel 
revolves for the sake of Love." (D 12293-97). 
"Each part of the world desires its mate, just like 
amber and straw." 
"The female desires the male so that they may perfect 
each others work." (M III, 4400-03, 14-16). 
Plato indicates the same thing by stating that "who 
could deny that the creator of all living things is anything 
but the techne of love, by which all animate things come to 
and develop." (Symp. 197a-b). 
Here I intend to apply the theory of hemisphericity 
and tacit dimension to both Plato's Symposium and Rumi's 
conception of Ishq with certain reservations. I risk the 
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observation that eros is the result of a '’dialectic" between 
reason and experience. Dianoetic logos is not fully adequate 
to the context of noetic vision: the phyche is open to and 
tends towards eidos. Eros is a daimonic figure who mediates 
between the realm of spatio-temporal "receptacle" and eidos. 
In fact, the eros of Diotima's teaching is described as the 
striving for completeness and wholeness. The speech of 
Diotima is a poetic mixture of visibility and invisibility, 
between right and left hemispheric mode of thought. "It is 
not a simple, unilinear phenomenon as Stanley Rosen 
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suggests." The equilibrium established by Diotima 
between rational, analytic, linear, and metaphoric, 
intuitive modes of thought and experience indicate a bridge 
between life and the eidos. In man's daily life the powers 
of the beautiful is immediately perceptible, as the power 
of the true and the good is not. Both Plato and Rumi 
regard the beautiful as the direct presence of the divine 
in man and the cosmos. The orderly and regular is 
beautiful, since it survives the flux of genesis. It re¬ 
mains visible amid' obscuration and corruption. It is the 
light by which we are able to see the decaying and the 
obscure. Thus, mere linear, rational and analytical modes 
of consciousness and thought do not suffice to provide a 
solid framework for learning and understanding. 
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"By the time intellect has deliberated and reflected, 
love has flown to the seventh heaven." (D 182). 
The Intellect saw a bazaar and began to trade} love 
saw many bazaars beyond the intellect's bazaar." 
(D 1522-23). 
Lovers and men of intellect do not mingle, since no 
one mixes the broken with the unbroken." (D 25018-19) 
"He who has not seen Thy Beauty makes the intellect 
his kibla—a blind man carries a cane instead of a 
lamp." (D 11437). 
Rumi would not quarrel with those who hold that the 
left hemispheric mode of consciousness is far more con¬ 
strained, and it sifts through inputs and reduces functions 
to logical-rational form. Rumi would seem to criticize the 
dominant rational-oriented educational institutions-and 
curricula. At the time of Rumi most of the governing 
educational institutions used to place sole emphasis upon 
those functions that reside in the left hemisphere. The 
sufi movement, in general, and Rumi, in particular, tended 
to establish a balance between the two modes of conscious¬ 
ness. Thus, Rumi used Ishq to undermine the inviolable 
supremacy of the intellect and drew the attention of 
educators and educands to the realm of practical experience 
By the same token, he levelled vitriolic criticisms against 
rationalists. 
In conclusion, I should add that both Plato and Rumi 
attempted to establish a balance between reason and 
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experience. If we conceive of Plato's dialogues as 
sophisticated or artful imitations of the Protean nature of 
the human psyche, then we should realize that "the psyche is 
both mathematician (linear, rational, and analytical) and 
poetic (metaphoric-intuitive, appositional, visual, 
analogic, experiential) in the broadest sense of these 
terms. So too are the dialogues mathematical and poetic. 
As a dialectician the psyche weaves together mathematics and 
poetry into a tapestry which is neither the one nor the 
other. 
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Stanley Rosen seems to suggest that human wholeness in 
Plato's view involves the functioning of both modes of 
thought: left hemisphere (linear, rational, analytical) as 
well as right hemisphere (analogical, poetical, visual, 
imaginal, and experiential.) 
From an educational point of view both Plato and Rumi 
advocate a balance between verbal, numerical, analytical 
and sensory, imaginary, visual, creative, analogical and 
experiential. They do not show bias against the whole. 
They both advocate the supremacy of wisdom which serves to 
mediate between what is particular and what is general. 
They do not divorce thought from action. They attest to 
the close relation of moral judgment and action. Both of 
them advocate the quest for the metaphoric stage of 
270 
non-dualistic ontocentric integration. Therefore, both of 
them should disclaim any variety of essentialism (i.e., 
rationalism) as their orientation and method. 
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CHAPTER V 
MULLA SADRA 
Introduction 
Most western Islamic scholars have believed that 
Islamic philosophy "died" with Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and 
after al-Ghazali’s attack upon it in the eleventh century 
(A.D.). Many western scholars and students of philosophy 
outside the Islamic world are acquainted with the names and 
works of such philosophers as al-Farabi, Ibn Rushd, and 
al-Ghazzali, but few people before two decades ago had heard 
of later philosophers such as Suhravardi and Mulla Sadra. 
It was mentioned earlier that there had been a keen 
interest in the translation of Greek works into Arabic. In 
this way the legacy of Greek philosophy passed into Islamic 
civilization. The access to Greek sources by Muslim phil¬ 
osophers helped them to develop a solid and careful approach 
to the Greek intellectual heritage. Thus, Latin 
Scholastics realized that a wealthy source of Greek thought 
might be tapped by recource to Islamic scholarship. Por¬ 
tions of the works of Ibn Sina (Abicenna) were passed on to 
medieval scholastics by means of translations from Arabic 
into Latin at Toledo. 
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philosophic revolution to Mulla Sadra."3 It was Sadra 
who replaced the time honored metaphysics of essentialism 
(i.e., immutable essences), with a new metaphysics of 
dynamic being and experience. 
The Islamic world experienced an ongoing development 
of philosophy in Iran, notably upon the Safavid ascendence 
to power. This development blossomed in the thought of the 
students of the school of Ispahan, most notably in the con¬ 
tribution of Mulla Sadra. 
The Ispahan school of philosophy, which flourished 
during the reign of the Safavids, had as a curriculum core 
the study of the works of the Hellenic tradition of al- 
Tusi, al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, the oriental philosophy of 
Suhravardi and the ishq dimension of Rumi. 
The school of Ispahan paved the way for a meaningful 
systhesis of reason (al-aq1) and experience. The experien¬ 
tial dimension of this school of philosophy primarily is 
attributable to Sufi influence. Sufi scholars used such 
notions as hads (insight), firasah, dhawq, ishraq and 
badiha to indicate a kind of "experiential participation 
in a knowledge which is not simply rational and linear, but 
an integration of reason and experience. In other words, 
they attempted to establish an organic correlation between 
focal and tacit awareness. 
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On the contrary, peripatetic philosophy (mashai) 
which drew most of its teachings from scholastic 
Aristotel1anism and Neoplatonic sources based its foundation 
upon the supremacy of intellectual essence. Ibn Sina may 
be said to be the main philosophic figure who contended that 
the intellect bestowed upon man provides him with the dis¬ 
cursive faculty to acquire knowledge of reality. May be 
that is why the peripatetic school of thought is usually 
known as hikmah bahthiyah (discursive Philosophy). Ibn 
Sina, like such western metaphysicians as Aquinas and 
Augustine, subscribed to the notion of adaequatio et 
intellectus (principle of adequation) to account for the 
theory of knowledge and truth. He contended that to each 
plane of reality there corresponds an instrument of know¬ 
ledge adequate to the task of knowing that particular level 
of reality. He provided an extensive analysis of intellect 
in several of his works such as, The Book of Healing 
(al-Shifa). The Book of Salvation (Naj at) and Directives 
and Remarks (Isharat Wal-Tanbihat). He based his argu¬ 
ment of intellect upon the Aristotelian commentaries of 
4 
Themistius and Alexander Aphrodisias. 
Ibn Sina was deeply influenced by the teachings of 
al-Farabi who disseminated Greek philosophical thought 
among Muslims. Ibn Sina learned from certain hints in 
al-Farabi that the exoteric teachings of Plato regarding 
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"Forms,” "creation," and the immortality of individual souls 
were closer to the revealed doctrines than the genuine view 
4 
of Aristotle. He attempted to harmonize Aristotle's view 
with the doctrines of Plotinus and later Neoplatonic commen¬ 
taries in order to accommodate them to the divine law on 
the issues of creation, and reward and punishment on judg¬ 
ment day. For that matter, he relied on some form of 
individual immortality. 
Then, he developed the theory of being upon the 
duality of existence and essence. He contended that the 
fact of existence cannot be inferred from or accounted for 
by the essence of existing things and that form and matter 
cannot reciprocate and originate the movement of the 
universe or the progressive realization of existing beings. 
He concluded that existence originates from an agent cause 
which necessitates, imparts, gives or adds existence to 
an essence. 
Ibn Sina, thus, established a severe dichotomy 
between existence (wujud) and essence (mahiyyah), on the 
one hand, and necessity (v/ujub) and contingency (imkan) , 
on the other. 
Thus, Ibn Sina created the study of being (ontology) 
in a systematic way in the Islamic world. The reign of 
peripatetic rationalist philosophy was eclipsed by the 
dominance of Ash'arite kalam in the eastern lands of Islam. 
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after Ibn Sina. Kalam was principally based upon a volun¬ 
tarist doctrine which concentrated exclusively upon the will 
4 
of God and disregarded his being. 
The founder of the oriental school of philosophy, 
Shaykh al-Ishraq Shihabi~al-Din Suhravardi, (12 century), 
revitalized the discipline of ontology with an essentialist 
approach. His new approach to ontology was based upon the 
notion of vision. He, following Ibn Sina, considered being 
to be only an accident occurring to the mahyah (quidditas) , 
which possesses reality. 
Nasr states that Suhravardi basically created a hard 
core "essentialist ontology." This essentialist approach 
to reality attracted many followers among various ranks of 
theolgians and philosophers. He added the notion of phot ism 
to the reality of being. He considered light the very 
substance of reality. 
The school of Ispahan, founded by Mir. Damad in 
Safavid Persia, showed an interest in following the ontology 
bequeathed by Ibn Sina and the hard-core essentialism 
developed by Suhravardi. It may be said that the term 
essentialism (Isalat-at-mahiyyah) was for the first time 
coined by Muslim philosophers. Anybody familiar with 
Islamic philosophy is indisputabley acquainted with 
certain ramifications of essentialist ontology, 
epistemology, and axiology. The great bulk of literature 
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commenting on Islamic essentialism reflects this 
claim,^ 
4 
The question of being was further elaborated by the 
followers of the school of Ispahan. Indeed, during this 
period a new chapter known as (al-umur-al-amma), ontology, 
was added to the discipline of philosophy. 
Before dealing with Sadra's notion of non- 
essentialist philosophy of education an attempt will be made 
to embark upon a comparative study of the Medieval Western 
conception of existence and essence and Ibn Sina's impact 
upon the development of latter notions. 
The Origin of the Notion of Essence in the West 
Before dealing with the challenge of Mulla Sadra 
against the essentialist tradition of peripatetic followers 
of Ibn Sina, a summary outline of the Ibn Sina's philosophic 
influence (especially the dissemination of his theory on the 
distinction of Mahiyyat, quidditas and wujud (existence) on 
the Scholastic West) seems to be in order. 
Ibn Sina, who died in 1037, combined Aristotelianism 
and neo-Platonism in his system, using the metaphysics of 
Plotinus as the foundation for Aristotle's logic and 
physics. 
Indeed, Ibn Sina bequeathed to the Scholastic West 
an encyclopedic work, which is a vast paraphrase of the 
writings of Aristotle, completed by a neo-Platonic 
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interpretation of the creative causality of God, 
the eternal principle, God, in the view of Ibn Sina is the 
only eternal cause of a single effect, the First Intelli¬ 
gence. From the First Intelligence emanates the Second 
Intelligence, together with the first celestial sphere, 
which is an animated body moved by the First Intelligence. 
The last Intelligence, which is ultimately realized, is the 
active intellect of mankind, the immediate principle of 
human souls and of the whole sublunary world. 
Thus, in this world of contingent beings, the chief 
role of man is to attain knowledge of the active intellect, 
since divine knowledge pertains to the realm of universals. 
Roger Bacon called Ibn Sina "the chief authority 
after Aristotle." Aquinas compared him with Plato in 
philosophical depth and erudition. Western scholastics 
got access to certain works of Ibn Sina through transla¬ 
tions of such figures as John of Seville, (1126-1151) a 
Jewish Spanish translator who rendered important portions 
of Shifa (healing) into Latin, Arnold of Villanova (1260), 
a Christian Italian scholar, who translated On the Powers 
of the Heart (De Viribus Cardis) into Latin, and Armenguad, 
son of Blaise (~C. 1290), a Christian French man who trans¬ 
lated Ibn Sina's Al.juzat Fil Tibb (A Medical Poem) into 
Latin. Archibald Raymond of Toledo founded a translation 
order to make Islamic philosophy and centre in Spain in 
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science, especially that of Xbn Sina's, known to the 
Christian world. The translations published by the center 
covered a period from 1130 to the thirteenth century. 
During the same period of time, the school of Charters in 
France was active in translating Islamic thought, especially 
that of Ibn Sina, into Latin.7 
Dominicus Gundissalinus who died in 1151 published a 
treatise, Qrt the Soul, in which he starts from the position 
of Ibn Sina in order to analyze the thoughts of Augustine. 
He at first repeats in his treatise Ibn Sina's proof of 
the existence of the psyche (Nafs) and establishes that it 
is a substance and not an accident, and that it is immortal 
and spiritual. In fact, he refers to the Ibn Sina's 
allegory of the veiled man divorced from the external 
s 
world and this man's apperception and awareness of his 
thinking power. A.M. Goichon asserts that this metaphor 
is quoted by various medieval authors. It, thus, seems that 
Descarte was inspired by this idea and formulated his 
theory of Cogito ergo sum, I think therefore I am, on the 
basis of this allegory. Lenn Evan Goodman in his preface 
to Ibn Tufayl's Havy Ibn Yaqzan comes to the same conclusion 
and avers that "when Descarte pronounced his Cogito ergo sum, 
he was not disburdening himself of an insight which had 
sprang full-blown from the pregnant vacuum of methodological 
Rather he was responding to a challenge thrown down, doubt. 
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centuries before, by Avicenna to philosophers at large. 
Avicenna had transformed Plato’s almost axiomatic 
identification of thought with being into a cogent argument 
for the substantiality of the soul, based neither on the 
external evidence of the senses nor on a priori deduction, 
but rather on an introspective test which anyone might 
q 
successfully perform! 
Peter of Spain, author of Liber de Anima, before 
becoming Pope John XXI had taught a theory of knowledge 
based on Ibn Sina's epistemology. It is said that he 
expounded upon Ibn Sina's theory of existence and 
essence.^ The apochryphal book De Intelligentiis, added 
to the Venice edition of Ibn Sina, elaborates his theory 
of Intellects. 
A.M. Goichon states that Ibn Sina's Metaphysics was 
known to the West.almost fifty years before that of 
Aristotle. Indeed, the last two books of Aristotle reached 
the West one century after the translation of Ibn Sina's 
Shifa (Healing) had been made available to scholastics. 
Thus, Ibn Sina's style of and approach to philosophy and 
science left a great impact on the formation of Medieval 
Christian thought. 
Aquinas was heavily influenced by the philosophical 
and psychological thought of Ibn Sina. He devoted a 
great portion of his famous work, Summa Contra Gentiles, 
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d_e Potentia, to the study and evaluation of Ibn Sina's 
theories. 
Willaim of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris, who died in 
1249, and served as a professor of theology in Paris waged 
a desparate war against "Aristotle" and his followers, 
al-Farabi, al—Ghazzali and Ibn Sina, He relates to us that 
upon the critical evaluation of the philosophy of Ibn Sina, 
it was decleared condemned. The decree of'condemnation 
was issued in Paris in the years 1210 and 1215. 
Although William of Auvergne attempts to refute Ibn 
Sina's philosophical doctrines, he acknowledges the sound 
foundations of his arguments in relation to the following 
points. William admits that Ibn Sina was the first thinker 
who introduced to the Latin scholastic world the distinc¬ 
tion between essence and existence, which later supported 
some of the basic foundations of Thomist philosophy.^ 
Thomas Aquinas used the dichotomy of essence and 
existence developed by Ibn Sina. Ibn Sina's theory of 
mahiyyat was translated as quidditas in Latin. Thomas 
Aquinas treated the distinction of existence and essence 
J _ _ 12 
under ens-esse duality. 
J.C. Taylor in The New Catholic Encyclopedia contends 
that the original conception of the distinction between 
essence and existence is an Islamic souvenir introduced 
He says "Avicenna first brought the problem to the West. 
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into focus by teaching explicitly that existence is a kind 
of accident of essence, although not in the sense that 
existence comes to essence as a predicamental accident 
comes to substance. Rather Avicenna holds that essence, 
as ideally conceived, involves an element of necessity, 
whereas it is merely possible when viewed in relation to 
13 
extra-mental existence." 
He further adds that "the first of the scholastics 
to adopt as his own the position of Avicenna was William of 
Auvergne.. .Gradually the list of adherents grew. To it were 
added the names of such luminaries of the 13th century as 
14 
St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas." 
Gilson in his famous work "Pourquoi Saint Thomas A 
Critique Saint Augustin" (pp. 48-80) claims that William of 
Auvergne is one of the founders of a scholastic current 
highly dependent on Avicenna, to which the name Augustinisme 
15 
avicennisant was given. 
Steven P. Marrone in his recent book William of 
Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste seems to indicate that the 
theological and philosophical thoughts of scholastics were 
so "steeped in the writings of Arab commentators on 
Aristotle, especially Avicennathat "William never fully 
considered how agent intellect (i.e., active Intelligence) 
might be taken to refer to one of several powers belonging 
In fact, almost all of the scholastic to the sdul." 
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conceptions of knowledge and reality were based upon 
essentialist notions of Ibn Sina. 
Maybe now there are reasonable grounds for me to 
claim that the philosophy of essence and its later develop¬ 
ment (i.e., essentialism) seems to be basically an Islamic 
phenomenon. Therefore, my treatment of the development of 
Ibn Sina's thought in the Scholastic West in relation to 
philosophy in general and to the dichotomy of existence 
and essence which constitutes an important philosophic 
movement and reaches modern times does not seem to be far 
fetched.17 
The works of M. Gilson and Fr. Gorce emphasized the 
part played by Ibn Sina, in the formation of Latin thought. 
Fr. de Vaux, in 1934, made scholarly research and on the 
basis of existing texts proved that in the early thirteenth 
century we come across a significant trend which is known 
as "Latin Avicennianism." The followers of this trend who 
were basically philosophers, took over the whole of 
Avicenna's doctrines, even though some of Ibn Sina's themes 
18 
wore incompatible with Christian thought. 
Frederick Copleston, the historian of western 
philosophy indicates that: 
When portions of the writings of Avicenna were trans 
lated into Latin in the twelfth century, t e 
Christian world found itself faced for the firs 
with a closely knit system which was bound to exercis 
a strong attraction on certain minds. Ihus, 
297 
Gundissalinus (d. 1151) translated into Latin the 
Spanish translation made by Joanes Hispanus 
(Avendeath) and utilized the thought of Avicenna in 
his De Anima, following the Avicennian psychology 
(and citing the latter’s allegory of the flying man), 
though he left Avicenna for Augustine by making the 
active intellect, as a source of illumination 
identical with God...Nonetheless William (of Auvergne) 
followed Avicenna by introducing into Latin scholas¬ 
ticism the distinction between essence and 
existence.19 
On the other hand, Roger J. Sullivan of Memphsis State 
University, the author of A Commentary on Aristotle's 
Nichomachean Ethics declares that: 
Strangely enough, we do not owe the Aristotelian 
corpus we now have either to Athens or to Rome, for 
when the Emperor Justinian became a Christian, he 
closed all schools of philosophy in his empire. The 
writings of Aristotle that have survived, were saved 
primarily by Arab scholars and philosophers.20 
The purpose of citing the above quotations is to 
demonstrate that the treatment of Western philosophy of 
essence and the problems of essentialism without taking into 
account the Islamic sources of the notions of essence and 
essentialism seem to be a historical non-sequitor, since in 
such case the essentialist arguments fail to provide the 
constructive and original sources of such development. In 
fact, studying the development of essentialism without 
refering to its causal origin is to provide an amputated 
feature of the issue. 
To all Intents and purposes, Ibn Sina may be regarded 
as the founding father of the philosophical conception of 
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essence-existence duality and its offspring essentialism. 
It should be added that Suhravardi, the disciples of Ibn 
Sina, was a staunch advocate of essentialism in the Islamic 
world. 
It may be said that Ibn Sina and Suhravardi intro¬ 
duced the notion of ontology before Wolf and Suarez. In the 
following pages an attempt will be made to show how Mulla 
Sadra initiated a revolution against essentialist ontology 
and set forth his own revolutionary conception of being and 
consciousness. 
However, before dealing with Sadra's critique of 
essentialism a summary review of the literature on his works 
and an intellectual biographical sketch is in order. 
Review of the Literature on Mulla Sadra and His Life and Works 
Before two decades ago, the only study of post-Averroid 
philosophy available in the West was written by Max Horten 
with the title Das Philosophische System Von Schirazi 
(Strasbourg, 1913). This work is a summary of the Asfar, 
the magnum opus of Mulla Sadra. Two decades ago, Henry 
Corbin, a French philosopher and Islamic scholar, translated 
Sadra's treatise "al-Mashair," and published it under the 
title La Livre des Penetration Metaphysiques, Teheran, 1964.) 
Henry Corbin provided a thorough commentary on Mulla 
Sadra's philosophy in this book. 
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Fazlur Rahman, of the University of Chicago published 
his famous work, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra in 1975. 
Although this work provides a valuable contribution to the 
understanding of Mulla Sadra’s thought, it suffers from 
major deficiencies. Rahman has confined himself to "Asfar 
Arbai,” Mashair, and al-Arshiyah, and has failed to avail 
himself of the vast Arabic and Persian literature on Mulla 
Sadra. Therefore, it is encumbent upon Islamic scholars to 
move beyond Rahman's work to pave the way for further re¬ 
search and constructive studies on Mulla Sadra's thoughts. 
James Winston Morris has recently translated the 
al-Risala al-Arshiyah of Mulla Sadra and published it under 
the title The Wisdom of the Throne: An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Mulla Sadra. This work was published by 
Princeton University Press in 1981. 
The work has a valuable introduction and commentary 
along with resourceful footnotes. This is a very remarkable 
achievement for the author and translator of the work, but 
since this book mainly reflects one work of Mulla Sadra (i.e., 
Arshiyah) it has its own limitations. However, it provides 
the English reader with the historical and philosophical 
background necessary for an appreciation of Mulla Sadra's 
thought. James Winston Morris indicates that the West has, 
for too long, held that all developments of Islamic 
philosophy ceased at the end of the twelfth century with 
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the death of Ibn Rushd (Averroes). He has published the 
translation of this major work of Mulla Sadra in order to 
dispel this false notion. From this standpoint, his con¬ 
tribution is not negligible. 
Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi known as Mulla Sadra (1572/ 
1640) was born in Shiraz, a southern province of Persia, 
into an open-minded family. He received his early education 
in his native town, Shiraz, and his advanced education in 
Ispahan, the capital of Persia during the reign of the 
Safavid dynasty. In this city he continued his education 
under famous teachers and scholars such as Mir Damad and 
Baha al-Din Amili. After a long period of research and 
study in Qum, a small town near Tehran, he was invited to 
serve as a professor in the college of Allahwirdi Khan 
where he taught science and philosophy for the rest of his 
life. He passed away on his return from Mecca in 1640 
(1641) . 
Mulla Sadra created over fifty books. All of his 
works are written in Arabic with the exception of his 
personal discourse, Risala Sih Asl (The Discourse on Three 
Principles) and a few pieces of poetry and letters which 
he wrote in Persian. His magnum opus is al-Hikmat al-Muta- 
alvah Fi'l-asfar al arba'ah (The Transcendental Wisdom 
Regarding Four Journeys, here-after referred to as Asfar). 
Fazlur Rahman's work is a summary sketch of this work in 
English. 
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I attempt to study the educational thought and 
philosophy of Mulla Sadra with reference to his major works 
in addition to the vast exegetical literature available in 
Persian and Arabic, My approach to Mulla Sadra pursues the 
same line taken in the previous chapters for the exposition 
of the thoughts of Plato, Aristotle, and Rumi. I shall 
study Mulla Sadra within the scope of my project which aims 
at a comparative study and critique of essentialism. 
Mulla Sadra, it may be noted, was a contemporary of 
Descarte, Leibniz, Spinoza, Thomas Hobbes, and John Lock. 
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that he learned of the 
philosophical accomplishments of these western philosophers. 
He was an inheritor of Islamic philosophy and culture with 
its great wealth of Hellenic philosophical treasury. 
Mulla Sadra attempted to construct or reconstruct a 
philosophic system which integrated the experiential 
dimensions of reality with the intellectual gamut of 
philosophy. He consciously created a synthesis of the 
Greek tradition of al—Farabi, Ibn Sina, and the school of 
Ishraqi (i.e., the oriental philosophy of Suhravardi) 
(d. 1191). 
Mulla Sadra's Challenge to Essentialism 
It was pointed out earlier that Ibn Sina was the 
first philosopher who forged the distinction and duality of 
essence (mahiyyat) and existence (wujud) and contended that 
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existence is some sort of an accident of the essence, 
though it is not an accident of a thing. Suhravardi 
launched the most draconic attack against those who be¬ 
lieved in the reality of existence and declared that 
essence is the reality and existence (being) is simply a 
subjective abstraction. He added that essence is the sole 
reality. Suhravardi declared in his al Talwihat that: 
If existence were to be regarded as a real attribute 
of essence, then, if essence were to exist after 
existence was united to it, existence would then have 
existed per se and independently of essence; or if 
essence were to exist together with existence, then 
essence would exist together with existence, and not 
through existence and, therefore, would acquire 
this second existence. (P M S, 32). 
Mulla Sadra challenged this idea of the primordiality 
of essence. In fact, he introduced a paradigm shift in the 
prevailing trend of philosophy in the Islamic world. That 
is why Henry Corbin declares that we credit a philosophical 
revolution to Sadra. His new perspective gave birth to a 
new historic age in the Islamic world. He changed the 
framework of prevailing essentialist thought. He introduced 
a distinctly new way of thinking about old philosophical 
problems of the peripatetic and the illuminationist 
schools of thought. It was a stunning alternative which 
Sadra initiated. 
He indicated that essence per se is nothing positive 
at all. In fact, he said, in external reality essence is 
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simply not there. What is there is a mode of being. When 
this mode of being is presented to the knower, it is the 
knower who abstracts an essence from it, while being es¬ 
capes him. It is the mind that abstracts an essence from 
every bbing. The mind may conceive of essence as a pri¬ 
mordial reality and existence as a mentally posited issue 
(i.e., an accident). For Sadra, being is the only 
original reality and essence is a secondary process which 
is abstracted by the knower. There are, therefore, not two 
principal realities in existence (i.e., the duality of 
essence and existence) (A I, p. 54, line 16). Being, thus, 
for Sadra, is not a quality of essence in reality, since 
quality presupposes already something existent. (A I, 
P* 4). 
Sadra attempts to overcome the duality of essence and 
existence. For Sadra essence is a mental aspect of being. 
At first, the revolutionary view of Mulla Sadra about 
the primordiality of being was considered as an abnormal 
discourse, in the words of Richard Rorty. By normal dis¬ 
course, I imply any discourse which embodies agreed upon 
criteria for reaching agreement; by abnormal discourse I 
mean any discourse which licks such criteria, Rorty 
states that the "attempt (which has defined traditional 
philosophy) to explicate "rationality" and "objectivity 
in terms of conditions of accurate representation is a 
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self-deceptive effort to externalize the normal discourses 
of the day and that, since the Greeks, philosophy's self- 
image has been dominated by this attempt." He adds that 
"abnormal philosophy" does not conform to the traditional 
Cartesian Kantian" matrix and that this abnormal philosophy 
is closely related to normal philosophy. Rorty presents 
Wittgenstein, Dewey, and Heidegger as abnormal philosophers 
I intend to indicate that Sadra's philosophy has the same 
abnormal character, since it provides not a "systematic" 
but an "edifying philosophy" which contains a more compre¬ 
hensive view of reality. It includes the old as a partial 
truth while allowing for a new perspective to operate. 
Mulla Sadra's appropriation of the tradition, his 
deconstruction of it, is a "poetic misprison" in Bloom's 
terms which turns historical tables of influence. This 
deconstructionist approach of Mulla Sadra seems to be like 
22 '■ 
Thomas Kuhn's "revolutionary science." Rorty's abnormal 
discourse and Kuhn's "revolutionary sciences" may well 
be tomorrow's normal discourse. Thus, Sadra's paradigm 
shift and abnormal discourse regarding the primordiality 
of being was a philosophical heresy at that time. It was 
received with mockery and hostility. It was declared 
bizarre, and even fuzzy. Nevertheless, later generations 
of Islamic philosophers recognized the power of Sadra's 
views on being and essence. At that time, it was a leap 
21 
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ahead. The overcoming of the gap between essence and 
existence was, in fact, a revolutionary step which was taken 
for the first time by Mulla Sadra in the seventeenth century, 
at the same time Descarte declaring that ’’everything in 
which there resides immediately, as in its subject, or 
by which there exists, something that we conceive, i.e., 
some property, quality or attribute, of which we have in us 
a real idea is called substance, and that it has no need of 
23 
anything but itself for existence.” 
Sadra concludes that the distinction between existence 
and essence occurs only in the mind of the knower and not 
in actual reality (A I, p. 67), since existence as light 
is a fact which exists externally and makes other things 
visible by illuminating them. Thus, being is per se the 
cause of essence to occur, as light is the source of 
illumination. Being seems to be that which has priority 
over all concepts and is the condition of all meaningful 
qualifications and cannot be non-existent. By the same 
token, how can we say that existence is no more than an 
intellectual abstraction? Shall the line between being 
and non-being, between reality and unreality disappear? 
(A 1, p. 99-lines 19-20), 
Thus, Sadra does not seem to agree with Descarte who 
proclaims that "everything that can be clearly and dis¬ 
tinctly conceived in a chimera is a true being, and not 
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fictitious, because it has a true and immutable essence 
and not fictitious, and that essence comes from God just as 
does the actual essence of other things."24 Sadra's position 
challenges the description provided by Descarte to the effect 
that "in the idea or the concept of each thing, existence is 
contained, because we cannot conceive of anything except under 
the form of a thing which exists."25 Sandra presents a more 
complex view of the relationship of being and essence (i.e., 
consciousness). 
An essence for Mulla is neither one nor many, neither 
universal nor particular. Neither is it existent nor 
non-existent by itself. This is because existence and non¬ 
existence are meaningful only in the context of reality. 
If, therefore, the question is asked, does man (as an 
essence, i.e., manness) exist or not?" the appropriate 
response would be "neither the one nor the other," since an 
essence is not by itself a universal. In other words, 
essence is a function which belongs to particulars, and 
so long as one particular thing exists, this essence, as 
a functioning characteristic, will exist for the being of 
the existent thing (A I, p. 5). Sadra adds that (1) genus 
is identical with or corresponds to the potentiality 
(dynamis) of matter (hyle) while differentia is identical 
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with actualized form, (2) that genus, because of its 
deficiency and indeterminacy, is completed and consummated 
by the differentia (diaphora); (3) that differentia is the 
only reality, since genus, as a pure potentiality in the 
nature of the matter, cannot constitute part of actual 
being, (4) that, hence differentia equals existence; and (5) 
that what is called ’'species” or specific function (ousia) 
is nothing but a classification of things by the mind in 
terms of their functions. (P M S pp. 50-51). 
Sadra attempts to prove that existential reality is 
not simply composed of genuses. He asserts that the whole 
reality is a process of successive differentia, which is 
nothing but a processive passage of existence. (A I, p. 36). 
For Sadra, being is composed of a processive 
succession of stages; and, in the progression of reality, 
movement is from the potential to the actual where every 
prior matter or genus for every posterior (e.g., wood), 
is the matter of the genus for a chair. (A i, 2). Both 
matter and form are secondary ousia in view of Aristotle. 
But Mulla Sadra contends that differentia has greater 
importance since it is neither a substance nor an accident. 
Indeed, differentia is identical with individual existence. 
By differentia (diaphora) Sadra means the division of 
genus by means of distinct diaphorai (Meta 1038a, 1045a). 
In fact, diairesis of Aristotle is part of the progress from 
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genus to species, and genus is divided by differences 
(diaphorai). Differentia is the most concrete form in an 
external reality since it indicates an individual existence. 
In order to illustrate this issue Aristotle indicates 
that "forms are composed of genus and differentia. For if 
the forms are so that there would be, for example, an 
"animal" in a man and a horse, we may ask whether this 
animal is numerically one and the same in both or whether 
there is a different animal for each. Logically it is 
clearly one and the same." (Met., 1039a, 30). "Hence, 
concrete or individual primary being differs from logical 
primary being. Being in the former sense is a logical 
being taken together with a material; whereas in the latter 
sense a logical being is taken generally. Whatever beings, 
then, are so called in the former sense come into being 
and pass away, whereas logical being does not thus come 
into being and pass away." (Meta. 1039a, 20). 
Mulla Sadra relies upon being of ousia in ithe first 
category to explicate his theory of being. He maintains 
that just as hyle has only a potentiality for existence, 
so is the case with every genus relative to its former 
differentia. Since genus is only a potentiality relative 
to its differentia, and since genus at the same time is 
secondary ousia (i.e., universal-abstract), it follows that 
a secondary ousia does not exist externally. In fact, any 
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secondary ousia is a mental abstraction. It is merely 
a logical being. Real beings fall within the scope of 
differentiea. (A I, 30), We see that Mulla Sadra explicit¬ 
ly defends the existential realm of differentiae visa-vis 
the genus (genos) in his notion of reality. The differentia 
in the view of Mulla Sadra is the consummation of the genus. 
The differentia is a final cause. Genus is brought into 
existence and actualized by the differentia. (A I, p. 30), 
Differentia is the actualized genus; it is the thing. 
Sadra associates differentia with being and indicates that 
it is a mode of existence, (A I, p. 36). 
In the process of being each preceding mode of reality 
becomes genus for and "loses itself" in the succeeding 
differentia: Every existential entity is nothing but the 
consummated differentia wherein all the preceding 
differentiae which are united in it corner to be mere 
potentialities, means and conditions for the reality of 
the last differentia. (A I, p. 35). 
To summarize Mulla Sadra's conception of ousia, thus 
far, is that the world is a fabric of interdependent and 
interconnected events. What Mulla Sadra calls "last 
differentia," seems to indicate the same notion which 
Whitehead refers to as "actual entity" or "actual 
occasion." (P R 113). Actual occasion, Whitehead argues, 
is "the limiting type of an event or a thing with only one 
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member. Mulla Sadra refers to the basic reality as the 
processive flux of events. The fundamental fact of reality 
is its passage. Differentia is an entity which has a 
temproal structure. In other words, differentia is the 
final real thing of which the world is made up. There ;is 
no going behind differentiae to find anything more real. 
For Sadra differentia is not a secondary ousia; it is 
a primary one as in Aristotle's conception, for it is 
differentia that exists. When differentiae, in existential 
contexts, are presented to the mind of the knower he ex¬ 
tracts from them certain "essential" and "accidential" 
characteristics whereby he classifies them. Such a 
classification has no external reality. Classification, 
in other words, is an abstract operation of the mind 
(A I, p. 36) . 
Mulla Sadra advocates the primacy of first ousia 
for the reality of differentia. In Aristotelian terms 
ousia in "the truest primary and most definite sense of 
the word is that which is neither predicable of a subject 
nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man 
or horse. But, in the secondary sense those things are 
called ousia within which, as species, the primary ousia 
are included; also those which, as genera, include the species. 
For instance, the individual man is included in the species 
"man" and the genus to which the species belongs is 
"animal;" these, therefore—that is to say, the species man 
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the genus "animal'^-are termed secondary ousia. (Categ. 
15-20). 
We see that the secondary ousia is a mental abstrac¬ 
tion which occurs to the mind. It is used to describe genos 
and species (eidos) . Sadra contends that his position 
regarding individual existence (i.e., differentia) includes 
primary ousia. He states that primary ousia involves 
change and motion. His basic argument focuses on the issue 
of motion in the sensible primary being. (Meta, 1069a 
10-20). From this account follows the extracorporeal 
quality of species or specific essences. Since Sadra 
seems to indicate that a species is obtained by the mind 
by means of combining a genus with a differentia and 
subsuming the latter under the former. But, from an 
existential point of view, the situation is quite the 
opposite: there the genuses lose themselves in the 
concrete reality of differentia and dissolve without any 
impact. (A I, pp. 35, 36). 
If the above arguments are simplified we may see 
that Sadra provides an analysis of human experience. When 
he speaks of differentia he is referring to the sort of 
entity which is called a subject or self. By means of 
defining the realm of the sense, he attempts to pave the 
way for his discussion of the transsubstaniality of 
He attempts to bridge the gap matter. 
between conceptual 
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prehensions (i»e., secondary ousia, genus, and species) 
and corporeal prehensions (i.e., primary ousia, differentia, 
self, individual existents) in the words of Whitehead. 
(P R p. 35), For Whitehead the process by which an actual 
entity reacts to its environment is called prehension. If 
the actual entity prehends a general idea or ideal (i.e., 
secondary ousia, genus, species), this is called conceptual 
prehension. Conceptual prehensions represent the mental 
aspect of an actual entity. If an actual entity is re¬ 
acting to another particular concrete actual entity, this 
is called physical prehension. Physical prehensions con¬ 
stitute the physical dimension of an actual entity. (P R 
35) . 
Indeed, Mulla Sadra by recourse to the notion of 
differentia applied to existence attempts to overcome the 
dualistic tradition of Islamic philosophy. It is a pro¬ 
test against the ’’bifurcation of nature.” By reference 
to the notion of individual existence (i.e., differentia) 
he provides a basis for his theory of the unity of the 
knower and the known (M. Chapter 7, p. 67, WT, p. 70, 
113). For example, when a student (a knower) comes across 
a theory (datum) which appeals to him as a profound truth, 
he pounces on it with delight (subjective reaction) and 
hence forth it is part of his very being. In this process 
concrescence takes place—that is the data derived are 
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literally absorbed into the complex life of the knower. In 
other words, the data are no longer external facts, they are 
the ultimate privacy of the knower, if we want to elucidate 
it in a Whiteheadean parlance. (P E 130, 131). 
Sadra declares that truth cannot be limited to any 
single (man’s) intellect and cannot be measured by any 
single mind. He, then acknowledges his own intellectual 
limitation and states that all experiences of reality are 
partial and even though they are characterized by certain¬ 
ty, the search for truth is an endless process since 
reality is dynamic. He avers that, "I do not indeed, claim 
that I have said the final word in which I have said--not 
at all! This is because the ways of learning are not 
confined to what I have understood... for knowledge of the 
truth is a dynamic process of which a single knower cannot 
claim total comprehension. (A I, p. 10). 
Mulla Sadra*s Conception of Movement and Time 
Sadra's notion of movement is something revolutionary 
in the history of Islamic thought and is based upon the 
theory of a continuous structure of spatic-temporal events. 
For Sadra solid physical entities are to be analyzed in 
terms of the dynamic capaicty of the matter. Indeed, 
matter, in the view of Sadra, is a pure potentiality of 
movement. The actualizing factor of the matter is called 
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"physical form" or "corporeal nature" which is in a con¬ 
tinuous process of change and which constitutes a continuum 
which is spatio-temporal. A spatio-temporal continuum 
represents a unity which incorporates both time and space 
in a functional sense. This movement is evolutionary in 
character and gives rise to higher stages of a complex 
dynamic nature. 
Ibn Sina, on the contrary, contended that movement 
may be understood in two different contexts. One is the 
concept of movement as a continuity which indicates a 
passage from one point to another or from the beginning to 
the consummation as a whole. This kind of movement takes 
place only in the mind, since the mental image conserves 
various points that a physical entity has passed involving 
generation and corruption. The second kind of movement 
which takes place in the reality is an unchanging, constant 
condition of the moving entity, the condition of being 
somewhere between the beginning and the end. This second 
conception of movement does not involve change, since it 
simply observes the ob.iect at some space-point at a time- 
instant. Ibn Sina adds that the first kind of movement, 
which is a mental process makes it possible to conceive of 
time as an extension, because the observation is simply 
related to time-instants. Thus, Ibn Sina anticipated 
Descarte's conception of motion which avers that motion 
at least is that which goes from one place to another." 
(Principles X, 69 IX 2, 57), Ibn Sina's conception of 
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motion corroborates Descartes claim that "motion is 
nothing other than the action by which one body passes from 
one place to another place," (Principles, II, 24, IX, 2, 
24). 
For Mulla Sadra, on the contrary, the ousia of the 
reality is change and renewal and that this change and 
renewal as a process makes the continuum possible. In 
other words, movement in the view of Ibn Sina and other 
peripatetic philosophers applies to the category of 
accident while for Sadra it takes place in ousia and can 
bring about a difference in the being of reality. (A 
pp. 64, 81, 82). For Sadra movement takes place in the 
hypokeimenon (substratum). 
For Sadra, motion implies a transitive verb, i.e., 
a swift and continuous renewal. Everything in the world 
is constantly in process of change and renewal in the 
sense that there is absolutely no ibsiety. "Every cor¬ 
poreal thing whose being is in any way related to the 
matter is constantly renewed in its ibsiety and impermanent 
in its being and individuality." (W.T, pp. 119, 120). 
The meaning of motion (in the real and primary sense) in 
terms of a thing’s emergence and gradual passage fiom 
potentiality to actuality is only a relative, derivative 
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abstraction taking place in the mind. (W T. p, 122). 
For Sadra, nature is a continuous process of change 
but we imagine it to be constant and thereby we subsume it 
under a static condition and quality, for instance, man 
or plant. This is due to the fact that concepts and 
essences are static and serve to describe certain 
characteristics which enable us to conceptualize them in 
the form of substances, i.e., an enduring being. (A 1, 
64) . 
For Sadra a "thing" or actual entity represents a 
complex "structure of events," due to the constant move¬ 
ment of the :things._.Indeed there is nothing in the world 
but a series of forms in the constant process of renewal. 
This flux is evolutionary and irreversible. "Each 
successive form in the sense of stage contains all pre¬ 
ceding forms and transcends them." (P M S p. 97). In 
fact, Mulla Sadra explicitly advocates the same notion 
that Lawrence Kohlberg has developed in his theory of 
moral development. Sadra seems to argue that change 
(process) is toward completeness and consummation. There¬ 
fore, it is unidirectional. (A I, p. 80, last line). 
Mulla Sadra, thus, describes reality in terms of a 
structure of events in order to relieve himself from the 
cumbersome burdens of substance-oriented ontology. He 
takes Aristotelian hypokeimenon (subject, substratum) and 
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contends that what constitutes continuity is the founda¬ 
tions of a substratum which remains constant and receives 
change. In fact, Sadra's conception of substratum is 
radically different from that of former Islamic essential- 
ists in the sense that he attributes a dynamic dimension 
to it. Continuity in the structure of events involves a 
dynamic unity. The real substratum is the continuity of 
the process. (A p. 96), Such events, thus, are not 
atomistic and discrete in character, but they form a 
continuous process. Sadra contends that the unitive pro¬ 
cess can be appreciated if we regard our own conscious 
selves as individuals and scrutinize our own beings where 
consciousness presents to us a continuous process of 
existence which does not remain the same at any two moments 
(A I, p. 83). He says that "persistent being is absolutely 
identical with changing being and also absolutely identical 
with each of its (infinite) instant-manifestations... 
Therefore, if we declare that it is one, we will be right, 
if we say it is many, we are equally right." (A I, 3, 
p. 84, lines 11-15). Sadra refers to this process as the 
doctrine of harakat al-ittisali (continuous motion). 
For Sadra the world, as we experience it, is a world 
of change, of becoming, of growing and decay. To exist, 
to be real, to be fully actual, is to be in process. How- 
Mulla Sadra did not argue that everything in the ever , 
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world was in process. There were also some constant 
propositions, notions and facts, like epistemic division, 
and abstract categories, which are not in a process of 
change. But such concepts only represent certain abstract 
aspects of reality derived from the network of process- 
events influencing each other. Hence anything which is 
not in process, is purely an abstraction from that process. 
He refers to such abstract entities as Jlsm ta1 limi. What 
admits of change and growth is called Jism ta-bii by him. 
(A I, p. 96). 
The world is, therefore, viewed by him as a web of 
interconnected entities. Every event is constituted by its 
relationships, and nothing can exist except by participa¬ 
tion. Mulla Sadra refuses to take the stand-point of 
Newton or Galileo who investigated and understood reality 
from outside, as observers. He argues that we are forced 
to view reality from inside, since we participate in it 
essentially and lack access to a position external to the 
world. Thus, for him, reality consists of a system of an 
interacting plurality of individual events. Sadra dev¬ 
eloped his theory of Tashkik (graded unity of being) in 
order to reject existential monism. According to this 
theory, being itself is, in one sense, many, not one, and 
this mutiplicity of being is a consequence of the very 
t by virtue of which 
nature of the principle of existence 
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identity is correlated with plurality, multiplicity and 
difference. Being, according to Mulla Sadra, is preserved 
in relation to multiplicity, Tashkik is described by Mulla 
Sadra as the state in which being in all things is funda¬ 
mentally the same, and that being, while remaining the 
same, creates fundamental differences which cause every 
existing entity to be unique, and that due to substantive 
motion in being, all the lower forms of being are contained 
in and transcended by higher forms. Thus, for Sadra, 
stages of being transcend in a processive passage to 
higher forms and the driving force of this motion is ishq. 
This theory of Mulla Sadra is obviously an inspiration from 
Rumi. 
Temporal Dimension of Being 
Mulla Sadra's conception of time in relation to being 
is a complex issue and beyond the scope of this study. It 
suffices here to say that for him time is not an independ¬ 
ent entity in which events take place. It is an extension 
of corporeal nature. Time is associated with physical 
events in the same way that spatiality is related to them. 
For him any actual entity takes places in time. So 
physical nature has a spatio-temporal magnitude due to 
the substantive motion. Time is not an outside factoi 
added to the physical nature. The entire physical reality 
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forms a spat icotemproal, continuum, (A I, pp, 140, 141, 
147, 149). al-Tabatabai, a modern commentator of Sadra, 
argues that for Sadra time constitutes an evolutionary 
process which implies a special form of the theory of the 
relativity of time. (P M S p, 109). 
Everything that lives comes into being, grows, 
develops, matures, declines and dies. The world is a 
fabric of interconnected events. Larger events have 
smaller ones as constituents. It is therefore nearer the 
truth to state that space and time are "in" events rather 
than that events are "in" space and time. The world as 
Sadra sees it is composed of units which display spatio- 
temporal extension. The creature, in the words of 
Whitehead, "is extensive, but its act of becoming is not 
extensive. (P R, 107). The abstract space and time which 
we abstract from the flux of events can be infinitely 
divided, in thought, but the actual events from which they 
are derived cannot. (A I, pp. 151, 173, 158, 160). 
Thus, the notion of time derives from a mental ab¬ 
straction. It has no beginning just as substantive motion 
has no beginning. Time is eternal since whatever is 
regarded as "before" time, perforce, takes place in time 
since "before" in this context involves time. Every event 
therefore, has a temporal dimension, Sadra, in fact, 
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anticipated Whitehead’s contention that "time is a per¬ 
petual perishing," since a past actual entity is not present, 
in all its intensity, in a newly arising actual entity. 
The past fades, (P R 517), 
In conclusion, Sadra attempts to dismantle the time 
honored conception of absolute time. He establishes that 
clocks, by their mathematical regularity, lend themselves 
to the reification and substantialization of time. He is 
concerned to indicate that time is the sequential relations 
between causally connected events. He seems to defy the 
Newtonian conception of time which conceives of independent 
of concrete motions and changes occurring within it. 
2 6 
Sadra denies the separation of time from its content. 
He seems to challenge the Cartesian claim that "the present 
time does not depend upon that which immediately preceded 
it." He apparently refutes the notion of the spatializa- 
tion of time. He does not subscribe to the idea that 
"absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself and from 
its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything 
external." ^ Sadra does not advocate the Newtonian 
"mathematical flow" of instants and instantaneous 
spaces, (P R, P* 70), 
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Sidra’s Conception of World-Order 
As it was briefly mentioned in the chapter on Plato, 
the question of the nature of being (on) for the first 
time arose in the context of Parmenides' series of logical 
dualities between being and non-being (me on); that which 
is, cannot not be; that which is not, cannot be (Fr. 8, 
lines 26-33, 42-50). Being is originally one and not 
many. (Fr. 8 lines 22-25). 
The epistemological implication of the latter concep¬ 
tion is that being is capable of being known and named 
an non-being is incapable of being known and named. Plato 
reacted against this notion of the unity of being in an 
absolute sense. For Plato the really real were the plural 
eide (To ontos on). Plato challenges absolute unity of 
being in his Parmenides (137b-166c). For Plato absolute- 
non-being was nonsense (Soph. 238c). Plato's solution to 
the non-being paradox was proposed in his theory of space 
(hypocdoche) in which genesis stands midway between true 
being and non-being. (Tim. 52a-c). Plato formulated his 
hierarchical theory of eidos in order to resolve the 
dilemma of sensible and rational beings. He said that 
rational beings are unchanging and constant while sensible 
beings undergo change (genesis) (Timaeus 28a), In 1imaeus 
28a he provides an epistomological—ontological con elation 
formulation to the effect that beings are known by way of 
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understanding (nodsis) accompanied by a reasonable account 
(logos); generated beings are known by way of judgment 
(doxa) based on sense-perception. 
Plato by raising the question of the relationship 
between sensible and rational paved the way for the 
development of the notion of genesis (motion). At this 
point, the question of the motive force of motion was 
raised. An external force to account for kinesis and 
genesis was required. The notion of agency or efficient 
cause (kinoun) , thus, was developed. The first attempt in 
Greek thought to account for the arche of movement was made 
by Empedocles correlation of "love" and strife. (Fr. 17, 
line 19-20). Empedocles derived his conception of the 
correlation of "love" and "strife" as the arche of movement 
from the motive forces operative in man. The Empedoclean 
conception of the arche of movement has a certain moral 
dimension. (Fr, 22-24). Anaxagoras introduced a paradigm 
shift and declared that the source of motion is intelli¬ 
gence (nous). Nous is not only the initiator of motion, 
but a guiding force as well. 
Plato attributed the source of motion to the psyche 
(Sophist 248e-249b) , For Plato, the proton kinoun or 
First Mover is the noetic part of the semitranscendent 
(Psyche tou pantous). Then, he raised the issue of 
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demiurgos (Tim. 29e—30a) as the efficient cause of reality. 
He attributes the motion of every event to the living power 
inherent in the structure of that event. He states that 
"this cosmos has verily come into existence as a living 
creature endowed with psyche and reason owing to the fore¬ 
thought of God." (Tim. 30b). Thus, he maintains an or- 
ganismic conception of reality. 
Aristotle contends that genesis or kinesis is caused 
by the force of energeia of the physis. He indicates that 
in the structure of every event there is a dynamis-energeia 
correlation which accounts for the motion of everything. 
Aristotle defines motion as the fulfillment (entelecheia) 
of the movable character of whatever can be moved. It is 
change and motion that causes every process to happen. 
Motion is the efficient cause of change. Motion has no 
efficient cause. Motion is uncaused. Each particular 
motion is caused by another particular motion. We may know 
29 
the reason of motion rather than its cause. 
Mulla Sadra deals with the arche of motion by saying 
that why a certain event takes place may be answered on the 
basis of the internal structure of the event itself. (A 
I, 3, p, 139, line 12-15), Every spatio-temporal event is, 
thus, a sui generic notion. The process is self-explanatory 
and does not necessitate an external cause to account for it 
(A I, 3, 139, lines 13, 151, line 12). To change and to be 
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m a constant process is the nature of the world. There is 
a reason for change and substantive motion, but this does 
not imply that every occurance has a cause (kinoun). To 
understand motion in general, we must find and know "the 
reason why," a dioti, there is motion at all. This does not, 
in any sense, mean what caused motion, but rather, what it 
does, its excuse for being. Motion like time had no be¬ 
ginning. If we ask what is the reason of motion, a reality 
without end? The answer seems to be a principle of cosmic 
love. Sadra expresses that every process in the world 
loves and longs for completion. Therefore, it strives 
toward it. The reason (dioti) of motion, process and 
cosmos in general is love. Sadra contends that matter is 
the primary substratum of,change. So matter is understood 
by means of an analysis of motion. Matter is a pure 
potentiality; therefore, it possesses a kind of positive 
being and, hence, shares some kind of existence. Thus, we 
may attribute a kind of nebulous consciousness to matter. 
Matter is a thing which can receive new forms, eidei 
(Meta. 1039b). Nevertheless, it lacks a separate existence 
(choriston), and individuation. (Meta. 1029a). The 
yearning of matter for form (eidos) differs at different 
stages of being since matter longs for higher eidei 
(forms). Thus, matter and form are correlate notions which 
constitute a dynamic unity involving a processive passage 
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to higher states of development. Sadra argues that upward 
movement is impossible without conceiving of an intrinsic 
yearning inherent in the nature of matter. This state¬ 
ment indicates that Sadra has attempted to reconcile 
Plato’s notion of eros with the Aristotelian composite unity 
of dynamis and energeia. (A I, p. 240, line 7). As we 
said earlier, eros seems to be a motive force. It is a 
unitive power which defies any chaos and aims at consuma- 
tion and completeness. Thus, Sadra has synthetized 
Platonic eros with the Aristotelian dynamis-energeia 
principle to account for the dynamic nature of being. 
Mulla Sadra's recourse to the notion of ishq to 
account for motion may be compared to Whitehead's notion 
of the "integration of feelings." Sadra uses the theory of 
ishq to protest against the "bifurcation of nature" in the 
words of Whitehead. (P R, 339). Whitehead defines 
"feeling" as a positive prehension which consists of 1- 
subject (i.e., actual entity), 2- the out there, the data 
which are available, 3- the objective datum positively 
felt, and 4- the subjective form, which is the mode or way 
in which the data are felt. (P R, 317-372). For Whitehead 
feeling - i.e,, a positive prehension - is essentially 
a transition effecting a concrescence. Concrescence is a 
process through which a complex of prehensions become 
concrete and integral. In the lollowing pages I will 
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attempt to show how Mulla Sadra by using the notion of 
^51 paves the way for establishing the unity of the knower 
and the known and his conception of the unity of the knower 
and the known seems to anticipate, to a large extent, 
Whitehead’s notion concrescence. 
Mulla Sadra's Conception of Knowledge 
Aristotle in his famous work De Anima, defines 
psyche as the principle of kinesis (motion) and of 
aisthesis (perception). He uses psyche to account for life 
and knowledge. Life or psyche is understood by Aristotle 
to mean a certain power which all living beings share 
(empsychia). Psyche is, thus, the arche of living and 
knowing. The animate aspect of physis is referred to by 
Aristotle as the psyche. * In other words, psyche is the 
functional dimension of every living being. Psyche is not 
a substance possessing independent entity. For Aristotle 
life is the first entelechia of a natural physique capable 
of living and knowing (dynamei zoen echontos). (De an. 
412a, 27, 28). 
Mulla Sadra advocates Aristotle's conception of the 
psyche as the entelechy of the body. He, partly, sub¬ 
scribes to Aristotle's notion of the psyche. For Sadia 
the psyche, as the entelechy of the body which has a living 
and knowing dimension is not a separate entity. It is the 
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-■idos of living things. It is the dynamis of the body to 
function in an appropriate way. Psyche (nafs) involves 
the dynamis of the living body performing its specific 
function (energeia) . The relation of the nafs to the body 
is comparable to the power of seeing to the eyes, hearing 
to the ears, and walking to the feet. 
Sadra, in pursuance of the Aristotelian tradition, 
maintains that living entities do not all have the same 
kind of life (psyche). Plant life is simply growing, 
taking in nutrition, and producing seeds for new plants. 
The nafs of animals possesses sense perception, desire and 
appetition. Men, in addition to the above functions 
(energeia). have the capacity to know, ta,aghol. (A 1, 
63, 104, 307). 
Sadra, for the first time in the history of Muslim 
philosophy, attempted to bridge the gap between body and 
mind. He wanted to demonstrate that the soul is not a 
substance distinct from the body, "whose nature is nothing 
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other than thinking." 
For the first time, he put forth a new theory of 
representation which bridged the gap, bequeathed by the 
essentialists, between the mind and the external world. 
His aim was to undermine the philosopher's confidence in 
the essence, reason, mind and monistic and dualistic 
mentalism as something for which various rational 
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explications had already been provided since Ibn Sina. 
His philosophical,works left a legacy of therapeutics to 
the time honored body-mind-duality. Most of the particular 
criticisms of the tradition which were offered by Sadra 
were based upon the works of such philosophers as Ibn Sina, 
Suhravardi, Fakhr—din Razi, Ibn Arabi, Rumi, and Mirdamad. 
In order to fulfill this great enterprize he intro¬ 
duced his theory of the reality of being, the unity of 
being and consciousness, and the theory of transubstantiation 
of being. These four notions were closely intertwined and 
provided him a unique perspective to overcome the dicho¬ 
tomizing tradition of essence-existence, body-mind, 
reality-mind and theory and action. An attempt here is 
made to expound upon his notion of the unity of being and 
consciousness, then its relation to his theory of knowledge 
is dwelled upon. 
The Unity of Being and Consciousness 
Sadra advocates the unity and identity of thought and 
l^gtng, tn all knowledge. This does not mean that external 
things become objects of knowledge in a mechanical way. 
When something becomes object of knowledge, it acquires a 
new mode of existence which has peculiar characteristics. 
From an ontological point of view, everything has two modes 
of existence; one is the external existence of things and 
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the other is their epistemic being. In the process of 
knowledge every reality takes on an epistemic existence in 
the mind of the knower. By asserting that knowledge acquires 
a mental existence Sadra intends to challenge the essence 
character of knowledge. Knowing, Sadra contents, is a kind 
of processive being which is identical with its ousia 
(A I, p. 294). The status of knowledge and being are the 
same, for Sadra, since he avers that knowledge is being. In 
order that a knowing process takes place, Sadra argues, the 
being of the external things should undergo a transforma¬ 
tion. Thus, he denies the "doctrine of abstraction as 
advocated by classical philosophers." 
Sadra argues that, if we say that perception ab¬ 
stracts the form from matter to material, we indicate a 
negative process of elimination, while we know that know¬ 
ledge has a positive characteristic. When we know animal 
or man, we do not separate matter from him. Indeed, Sadra 
says the concept man or animal involves a material dimen¬ 
sion. When we say "A knows B," it would be absurd to 
declare that "A is abstract of B" or "B is abstract to A." 
Thus, we can never translate reality into knowledge in an 
abstract fashion. (A I, 3, p. 306). In perception we know 
the material things and not something that is "abstracted" 
from matter. The psychic nature of the perceptual process 
rather than abstraction of the involves transformation 
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object of perception and knowledge. (A I, p. 181, lines 
3-9). He attempts to disprove that in the knowing process 
we come to know two levels of being (i.e., external reality 
and abstracted form). Indeed, our knowledge of something 
does not imply the presence of the form of that thing in 
our mind. Knowing, in the view of Sadra, is a process of 
concrescence. The word concrescence is a derivation from 
the familiar Latin verb, meaning ’’growing together." In 
other words, Sadra seems to hint that by identity of the 
knower and the known he implies the general process of 
grasping data into the life of a newly arising actual 
entity in the words of Whitehead. (P R, 321). In the 
process of concrescence the derived data are literally 
absorbed into the complex life of the new entity (i.e., 
epistemic existence). They are no longer external facts to 
which the entity responds. They are part of the ultimate 
privacy of prehension. (P R, 130-131). Concrescence is 
the growing together of mental and physical poles in the 
form of prehensions. (P R, 212). Thus, for Sadra, 
knowledge is not a facsimile replication of external 
reality in the mind. It is, on the contrary, a construc¬ 
tionist approach to the problem of knowledge. For him, 
knowledge has an evolutionary character. In fact, he 
subscribes to the notion of cognitive evolution. His 
theory of the identity of the knower and the known is 
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fundamentally based on his conception of the transbu- 
stantiality of being or evolutional development to the 
exclusion of essence. 
Sadra argues that in evolutionary transformation the 
previous schemes and structures are not discarded by new 
structures, but are consummated and evolved. This state¬ 
ment indicates that being is an inclusive and unitary 
process which "involves growth and transubstantion of 
being." It consists in carrying over the previous stages 
of consummation and yet transcending them." (A I, 3, p. 
324, line 10; p. 325, line 9; p. 326, line 122). 
Sadra's primary assumption is one of knower-known 
unity. Knowledge does not arise from the object (known) 
nor from the subject (knower), but from interaction and 
integration, that is, between the knower and the known 
object. To know objects the knower must act upon and 
transform them. (A IV, 1, p. 175). The knowledge process, 
for Sadra, seems to take on a biological character in 
which the knower evolves his own objective sense of 
reality. Knowledge, thus, is a constant construction; and 
in each act of understanding, some degree of creativity 
is involved. When the knower knows A and then passes on 
the knowledge of B, the knowledge of A does not there¬ 
by vanish but it is consummated. New knowledge puts the 
old knowledge into a more meaningful and integrated form. 
333 
Just like being, the knowing process moves from the rudi¬ 
mentary, to the higher, more complex and inclusive forms. 
(A I, 3, p. 213; lines 13 ff.; IV, 2, p. 115, lines 11 
ff . : ). 
For Sadra knowledge occurs as a result of the inter¬ 
action of the knower with the known. Such a process con- 
tians synchronic-diachronic dimensions. Synchronic aspect 
of knowing process involves a non-transformative character. 
It concerns the forms and structures which are already in 
the mind of the knower, the conditions and limitations of 
the functioning of extant structures and schemata. Know¬ 
ledge, from a diachronic point of view, develops and 
changes. A diachronous relationship exists when a concept 
is present in one system prior to its appearance in another 
modality. Sadra uses a synchronous method to describe 
formal analysis. In studying the process of development 
and evolution he uses a diachronous method. A constructive 
process of knowing requires a diachronous method, while a 
structural description of epistemic operations 
necessitates a synchronous approach. 
It may be added that Sadra's predecessors such as 
Ibn Sina, Suhravardi and Mirdamad simply applied a syn¬ 
chronous method to expound upon the reality of essence, 
subject, object and existence. They conceived reality to 
be understandable simply within a synchronous frame of 
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reference. Mulla Sacra’s approach was a revolutionary 
paradigm shift. For him reality in the form of being had 
a temporal dimension. On the contrary, Islamic essential- 
ists contended that reality in the form of essence was of 
a rational, synchronous and non-temporal nature. 
Mulla Sadra and Tacit Dimension 
It was mentioned previously that Mulla Sadra in pur¬ 
suance of Rumi attempted to reconcile the world of reason 
with external reality and thereby overcome the dichotom¬ 
izing gap between mind and body. Therefore, he postulated 
his theory of the dynamic unity of being and consciousness 
(i.e., unity of the knower and the known). He realized 
that the human being is in the constant process of inter¬ 
acting with external reality and that knowledge is not 
always of necessary truth. He recognized that truth that 
is simply demonstrated by reason is merely one kind of 
truth. What is acquired is a result of the interaction 
between the "subject" and the "object," between the knower 
and the known, between a self and its world is neither 
solely intellectual nor merely physical but an organic 
isomorphism of both. 
Acts of consciousness for him are not only con- 
sciousness of something, but also conscious from something 
which include our body. All thought for him contains 
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components and factors of which we are subsidiarly aware 
in the focal context of our thinking process. Every think- 
process constitutes a from—to structure in the words of 
Michael Polanyi, and that all thought dwells in subsidiaries, 
as if they were parts of our body.31 
In a motoric skill, involving a co~ordination of 
bodily movements and their integration into a unified per¬ 
formance, the skill is an entity constructed out of a set 
of motions without explicit concentration on the individual 
movements themselves. When we learn a new skill one of 
our greatest problems is not to focus or concentrate on 
individual items (i.e., movements, positions, weights, etc.) 
that, in combination, constitute the skill as a unified 
entity. If we concentrate on individual items the action 
is paralyzed. For instance, typing involves not focusing 
on our fingers nor on the explicit series of movements 
that succeed one another with a quick pace. If we subject 
our movements to explicit consciousness we paralyze the 
process. We have to rely upon the particulars without con¬ 
centrating on them. 
The notion of tacit awareness challenges the view 
that experience is "the process of bringing together two 
independent, antecedent entities into a knowing relation- 
ship" as essentialists viewed it." Experience does not 
merely disclose to the subject the objects which exist 
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independently of his experience. Experience does not simply 
focus on gaining knowledge of an antecedent reality to which 
one must adjust for physical and moral survival. Tacit 
awareness involves experience and such experience is an 
active-passive affair in which something is done and some¬ 
thing is undergone in consequence thereof. In other words, 
such experience constitutes a reflective process. Self and 
other constitute an even in the making process. Experience, 
thus, is not to be understood simply as the process of 
bringing a given subject and a given object into a knowing 
relationship. 
Such an experience is not simply a left hemispheric 
function. It is not confined to an analytical rational 
dimension. It consist in an organic process of both linear, 
sequential, rational, analytical awareness, on the one 
hand and holistic, synthetic, integrative dimension on the 
other. Analytical, linear, rational awareness is logically 
insufficient for a total grasp of the reality. 
Thus, Mulla Sadra lays the foundations for a compre¬ 
hensive theory of knowledge by incorporating the rational, 
linear, analytical with the synthetic, integrative, holis¬ 
tic dimensions of consciousness. 
For Sadra knowledge is not limited to focal awareness 
which involves replicative impression of external reality 
Knowledge constitutes a broader dimension 
on the mind. 
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which is not simply replicative, analytical, rational, 
and discursive. It includes synthetic, integrative, tacit, 
and holistic aspects as well (A I, 102, 273, 309). Sadra 
thinks that the process of formalizing all knowledge to the 
exclusion of any tacit, subsidiary awareness is inadequate 
and self defeating. The knowing process involves partici¬ 
pation, indwelling, empathy and engagement. The associa¬ 
tion of knowing with participation and indwelling involves 
a state in the knower that he knows more than he can tell. 
This knowledge is basically tacit and relies on experience. 
For instance, a professional pianist has skill which out¬ 
runs what he can articulate. A teacher of art knows his 
field better than he can explain. Being able to recognize 
a face in a crowd; picking out a particular blend of tea; 
diagnosing a pathological condition, playing chess, 
grading papers, evaluating a teacher's qualifications 
include knowledge that cannot be fully articulated. The 
particular perceptions of judgments that we make in these 
instances are seldom dictated by the facts we are con¬ 
sciously appreciating. I am able, for instance, to 
recognize John. But I am not fully aware of his features 
in the same way in which I am aware of his face as a whole. 
I am aware of the particular parts only as clues to their 
integration and joint meaning. 
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Sadra speaks of such knowledge as non-discursive, non¬ 
rat ional (Huduri^) , I think he has in mind the same notion 
that is implied by Polanyi's conception of "tacit 
awareness," It is a nondichotomizing realization which 
overcomes the gap between mind and body, reason and emotion, 
man and nature, matter and soul, noumenon and phenomenon. 
When Sadra deals with experience, he refers to the 
tacit apprehension of truth. He juxtaposes pure ration- 
cination (bahth nazari or jadal ilmi) with tacit awareness. 
Thus, he challenges the essentialist position of the ration¬ 
al philosophers of peripatetic persuasion by declaring 
that: 
on the principles of these very philosophers, things 
which have causes can be known with certainty only 
through their causes. This being the case, how can 
demonstration and direct perception contradict each 
other? Those Sufis who have uttered (in the defense 
of experiences of men like Ibn Arabi) words like 
'If you disprove them by arguments, they have dis¬ 
proved you by their experience' are actually saying, 
'if you disprove them by your so-called argument...' 
Otherwise, correct rational proofs cannot contradict 
intuitive experience. (A I, 1 p. 315, lines 2-12; 
P M S, 6). 
Sadra uses the word hikma (phronesis, wisdom) to prove 
his case. The method of hikma is not confined to latio- 
cinative content of necessary truths. It includes personal 
experience as well, Hikma, in fact, transcends intellect 
by incorporating experience and tacit awareness, Hikma is 
an activity which the self experiences. Hikma is a process 
in which life is sustained and evolved. Hikma is a mode of 
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practical action. In hikma there is an application of what 
is already known to intelligent conduct of the affairs of 
human life. Action is at the heart of hikma. It has to be 
in terms of how things work and how to do things. Hikma 
involves reflective thought which is not limited to arm¬ 
chair contemplation. It starts with contemplation but 
primarily aims at implementation and enforcement. It 
amounts to an explicit rendering of the constructive 
components of our past experience. It paves the way for 
acting with an end in view. It is a direct response to the 
external world (P MS. 5). 
Hikma involves a process of engagement with reality 
and an attempt to resolve impending issues and problems 
with facility and ease. Hikma is a gestalt approach to 
problems. Thus, hikma has an integrative and synthetic 
character. It is not a left-hemispheric processing in¬ 
terested in component parts and detecting features. 
Sadra pursues an Aristotelian argument in his ex- 
plication of hikma. It is convienced that every reason¬ 
able person necessarily wishes for what is good for him 
and human kind. Thus, hikma is the name Sadra gives to 
that excellence of the deliberative capacity which enables 
us to live the best life possible. The man of hlkma is 
that man who knows what is genuinely good, who loves it and 
pursues it effectively by performing actions which are 
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good, just and noble. Since, for Sadra, hikma is a 
characteristic disposition to deliberate well in an un¬ 
qualified, synthetic sense (that is, so as to attain the 
best, ultimate, and most comprehensive ends open to man) 
it requires man to use not only his analytic, rational, 
linear capacity but also his synthetic, tacit, integrative 
faculty (i.e., right hemispheric functions). He does not 
define man merely in terms of ratiocinative activity. He 
recognizes a mode of knowing which is composed of both 
rational faculties and experiential dimensions. He does 
not consider intellect as the primary mode of knowing 
(A 1, 326; P M S 6, 22, 88, 114). He attempts to indicate 
that knowledge and truth are not acquired simply through 
the exercise of reason. Truth is not merely contained in 
universal, innate ideas. 
Educational Implications of Sadra'a Philosophy 
As it was pointed out earlier, Sadra advocates the 
reality of being, the unity of being and consciousness, 
substantive motion or transubstant ion of being, and cogni¬ 
tive evolutionism, the experiential dimension of truth 
and knowledge, and the tacit dimension of knowledge. 
It was mentioned that as a result of the conception 
of substantive motion or movement in the category of 
substance an irreversible progressive movement occurs to 
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phenomena. All qualitative change is towards completion 
and consummation and is unidrectional (P M S, 98). Sadra's 
doctrine of "continuous motion" (harakat al-ittisali) in¬ 
dicates that both identity and change are integral 
characteristics of being. In other words, Sadra attempts 
to prove that the higher realms of being contain and do 
not negate the lower scales of being, and this is the pre¬ 
mise upon which Sadra concludes that evolution is continuous. 
It is evolution becasue it represents a new emergent; it is 
continuous because it includes previous stages in a 
"higher form." In evolutionary change or development pre¬ 
vious forms are not replaced by new forms but grow to 
higher forms (P M S, 237). 
In what follows I will focus on Mulla Sadra's educa¬ 
tional ideas from the perspective of when, and see what 
his developmental scheme tells us about what and how to 
teach. Sadra wrote with a seventeenth century mind, 
whereas our interest is in producing people for modern 
industrial societies; he wrote in the intellectual context 
of post-avicennan science and culture, whereas two of the 
most prominent features of modern intellectual life are an 
increasingly sophisticated science and a complex historical 
consciousness. Consequently there are a number of points 
at which it would not serve our pragmatic educational m- 
literal details of Sadra's notions 
terests to dwell upon 
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and recommendations. In this case an attempt will be made 
to translate Sadra's thought into a modern context where it 
seems more directly beneficial to our different circumstances. 
Sadra explicitly pursues Plato's educational scheme 
with an Aristotelian methodology. He maintains that educa¬ 
tion should not merely aim at rational, universal principles, 
since the novice is not prepared to dwell upon abstract 
ideas. Education for him seems to be a process of develop¬ 
ment and growth. Thus the preliminary path from hisban 
(doxa) to mar if a-ilm (episteme) is a difficult one. Stu¬ 
dents cannot be expected to launch forward with ease and 
speed, but must gradually grow accustomed to the next 
higher stage, taking the steps calmly one at a time. For 
each stage, he seems to realize the significance of the 
most appropriate kind of curriculum, which will both 
satisfy the kind of thinking appropriate to any particular 
stage and develop the capacities that are pre-requisite 
for moving to the next (A 1, 324, lines 10, ff., P* 325, 
line 9; p. 326, line 122 IV, 2, p. 116, lines ff., 
P M S p. 238). Sadra conceives of educational development 
as beginning in a world of sensations and the manipulation 
of concrete objects and leading by degrees to sophistica¬ 
ted abstract thinking. He represents this process from 
concrete particular to abstract generalization as a 
growing capacity to see things in a broadei peispective. 
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The mind is primarily entrammeled in concrete objects. A 
sophisticated capacity to devise and contemplate more 
abstract thoughts requires becoming freer from concrete 
particulars in order to create abstract concepts which will 
provide the mind with the necessary tools to transform the 
world in terms of the mind, referring the result of such 
abstract transformation back to the concrete world (A IV, 
2, p. 115, line 5 ff; I, 3, p. 420). 
Educational growth is not only an intellectual affair, 
but it is a moral challenge as well. Sadra maintains that 
weakness of character inhibits a person's ability to 
achieve educational development. Thus, his curriculum 
contains a series of activities that are intended to develop 
strength of character. In fact, Sadra's educational con¬ 
cern is not confined to the development of an intellectual 
person, but it is concerned with the comprehensive 
development of a scholar, a warrior, a saint (Insan Kamil) 
and a faithful citizen of the Umma (community) each in 
proportionate harmony with the others (A I, 202; II, 53; 
IV, 34). 
Insan-Kamil which is almost equivalent with 
anthropos teleisos seems to exemplify the same notion that 
is characterized as a philosopher by Plato (Rep. 440; 
473c-d). Sadra believes that appropriate education may 
ultimately lead to the realization of Insan Kamil. At this 
level the contingent and eternal meet. After progressively 
attaining different levels and stages of knowledge and 
being, material form culminates in the form of complete man 
(Insan Kamil). He is a man of theory and action. In Sadra' 
parlance his acquired mind (aql Mustafad) conjoins the 
active mind, nous poietikes, (Aql-fa-al). Insan Kamil, 
like Plato's philosopher is expected to combine two 
characters which are not usually united. He is to be an 
original scientific thinker of the first order, but 
equally, he is to be a "saint," Wali (Rep. 484-b; 485-b). 
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Sadra uses the word nash-ah, to represent the notion 
of stages of development. Nash-ahs, for him, are struc¬ 
tured invariant systems of thought and being. They form 
constant sequences. They involve ascending integrations. 
A higher stage includes within it characteristics of lower 
stages. Thus, movement of thought and being is always 
progressive and upward. (A IV, 189, 102; P M S, 236, 238). 
The lowest stage of development, Sadra contents, 
involves that kind of thinking which accepts uncritically 
what it imagines to be the case from the appearnce of a 
thing. Thus, it would accept that the sun and the moon are 
about the same size and weight, and that the moon follows 
one along the street, because this is how it appears. 
Sadra refers to this stage as the natural sensible from 
(nash-ah, Nafs Suware hisi tabi-i). This stage of 
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development roughly corresponds to Piaget’s sensory-motor 
and pre-operational levels of development where the child 
relies heavily on his senses and development proceeds from 
reflex activity to pre-logical thought and solutions to 
problems. Plato characterizes this stage as eikasia. 
Stage two which Sadra calls the transphenomenal stage 
(Suwar-qa-ibah) is exemplified by the sort of thinking 
which is more sensible than the previous stage, being less 
receptive to appearances and apprehending things in the 
world more clearly. At the previous level appearance is 
all, at this stage the person is no longer taken in by 
appearances but apprehends things more clearly. At this 
stage the person begins to recognize the need to develop 
sophistication in dealing with abstract principles in order 
to avoid being caught up with concrete examples. That is, 
the examples are appreciated to be examples (mithal) of 
somthing else, and that something else needs to be formu¬ 
lated in abstract terms. Sadra attempts to indicate that 
this is a bridge from the concrete thinking of sensible 
forms (Suwar hisi tabi-i) to the more sophisticated think¬ 
ing of the next. At this stage thinking begins to be more 
discursive and rational, but its reliance upon concrete 
images is not overcome. Thus, thinking at this stage 
represents a mixture of concrete objects and abstract ideas 
it ion from perceptions 
of which they are exemplars; a trans 
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and images to intellectual operations. Such intellectual 
operations, nevertheless, do not yet amount to independent 
propositions. 
At the level of noetic forms (Suwar aqli) which is 
the highest stage of intellectual and moral development, the 
man has overcome the confusing ambiguities of the previous 
stage. He no longer relies on concrete examples, but can 
deal in a sophisticated manner with abstract systems and 
entities. At this level all concrete appearances are 
shucked away. The man is no more satisfied with concrete 
appearances and phenomena. He attempts to find a secure 
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basis for knowledge claims, if such can be found. 
In this highest stage the mind focuses on the noetic 
forms (Suwar ilmi; Suwar aqli), or what Plato characterizes 
as eidos-that is, the most abstract concepts which most 
precisely embody the reality that is being thought. Sadra 
conceives of these forms as the most secure kind of know¬ 
ledge. Indeed, Sadra expounds upon Plato’s notion of 
noesis-episteme (Rep. VII, 534). 
Noetic form is the realm where Insane-Kamil 
(anthropos teleios) resides. As it was pointed out earlier 
transubstantiality of motion, which constitutes Sadra's 
unique contribution to Islamic thought paved the way for 
him to postulate his theory of grades of being (Tashkik) 
in a dynamic perspective. This movement from inadequacy 
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to completion and consummation was considered by him 
irreversible and unidirectional. According to him being 
moves constantly and successivly through higher and higher 
forms of evolutionary modes and stages. Thus for him being 
has a natural impulsion toward taking newer forms. This 
movement, consequently, culminates in the Insane-Kamil 
(complete man). His notion of Insane-Kamil (complete man), 
as the highest grade of noetic being, contains all the lower 
forms from which he himself emerged, and which he sustains. 
Sadra defines this last stage of human consummation in terms 
of self-realization and awareness of the dynamic relation¬ 
ship with Ultimate Reality. Insane-Kamil exemplifies the 
capacity to exercise the moral and intellectual powers of 
the achiever. Insane-Kamil has attained the highest stages 
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of moral, practical and intellectual powers. 
Plato's influence on Sadra in formulating his doctrine 
of Insane-Kamil, is unquestionable; even though Sadra 
adopted the term Insane-Kamil from Ibn Arabi. Plato une¬ 
quivocally declares that ’’the philosophers rule as kings or 
these now called kings and chiefs genuinely and adequately 
philosophize, and political power and philosophy coincide in 
the same place..." (Rep. 473 d) . Plato adds that "the 
philosopher is the only one who has widsom as well as ex¬ 
perience" (IX 582). "Philosophy," in Plato's view, "is 
the acquisition of knowledge" (Euthydemus, 288). The art 
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of philosopher is capable of being carried into effect 
within a social and political framework. Thus, it has 
fundamentally social and practical implications for its 
seeker. Plato advocates the unity of philosophy and poli¬ 
tical power. Since he believes that "neither city nor 
individual can attain happiness except through a life 
wisely conducted under the rule of justice or by being 
brought up and trained in righteous habits under the control 
of holy men" (Epis. 335-e, e). 
In order to reinforce his argument about the doctrine 
of Insane-Kamil, he makes direct reference to the Quran and 
avers that the growth and development of Insane-Kamil is the 
goal of creation. Man is conceived by God as the highest 
manifestation of His qualities in His creation; and man in 
his full development is the final goal of creation. Every¬ 
thing from mineral to human, yearns Xor the station of the 
Insane Kamil, but only few are capable of attaining this 
highest stage (T S. 258). Insane-Kamil is the ruler of all 
the worlds. He is the quintessential instance of God's 
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vicegenerent on earth. 
The notion of Insane Kamil refers to an ideal (an 
entity falling in a perfect vacuum) which may actually 
seldom exist in nature, but the understanding of which en¬ 
ables one to account for particular extraordinary events. 
If one is, for instance, discussing justice, righteousness 
350 
or moderation, the thinker at the noetic stage is the one 
who has reached an understanding of the nature of justice, 
righteousness, and moderation and can refer back from these 
to resolve impending problems in the everyday world. Sadra 
does not suggest that he himself has attained such an 
understanding. However, he indicates that this is a way of 
representing the ideal of knowledge for which one should 
constantly strive. The value of an ideal does not lie in 
its practicality, but in how well it suggests the direction 
in which the educated person should move. 
It deserves to be pointed out that Sadra’s doctrine 
of Insane-Kamil seems to be suggestive rather than pre¬ 
scriptive or stipulative, since he is vague in his 
characterization of Insane Kamil. He only suggests what 
seems to him to be the direction in which one seeks the 
most secure type of knowledge. Nevertheless, he assumes 
that few people will advance beyond the transphenomenal 
stage (Suwar qa-ibah, pistis-dianoia), and that very few 
will achieve the noetic stage (Suwar-Ilm, aqli). This is 
not, however, a situation Sadra wishes to impose on people 
in order that his ideal elitist Ummah (community, state) 
may be achieved. Rather, this state is intended to be 
ideal in that it accommodates the varieties of people that 
experience shows us do exist. 
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Therefore, Sadra conceives the process of educational 
development as beginning in a world of appearances, sensa¬ 
tions (Suware-hisi) and the manipulation of concrete objects 
and leading by degrees to sophisticated abstract thinking. 
He describes this process from concrete particulars to 
abstract generalizations as a growing capacity to consider 
things as they really are. 
Curriculum Content at the Sensible Stage 
The curriculum content at the level of sensible 
forms (Suwar hisi) involves the general cultural and social 
initiation of the child. The main instruments of social 
and cultural initiation are tales, images, stories and 
parables. Sadra maintains that the tales, parables, and 
stories that a child learns are very important. He 
emphasizes that only those stories that illustrate de¬ 
sirable patterns of thought and behavior should be included 
in the curriculum at this stage. The purpose of these 
tales, traditions, parable, and stories is to expose the 
child to the possibility of learning and loving those 
aspects of human behavior and character which will be 
indispensible for the child to be ready for later develop¬ 
ment and growth (W T. 131). Sadra notes that the children 
are primarily introduced to those portions of their tradi¬ 
tions of the Ummah (community, state) which best exemplify 
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the qualities to he developed in them. Such tales and 
stories should be based on the factual history of the Ummah 
(community). Following Sadra's doctrine seems to lead to a 
curriculum for children which begin with a true account of 
their civilization, in such way that it insists upon those 
characteristics most desirable in the fully developed 
person, that is, history would be taught primarily as the 
story of the struggle for justice versus oppression and 
tyranny, knowledge versus ignorance, courage and heroism 
versus fear and timidity, and so forth. 
Sadra seems to advocate the education of "the whole 
person" rather than the cultivation of rational capacities. 
He does not subscribe to the narrow intellectualism of the 
followers of the essentialist school. For Sadra a school 
should represent a realistic social life and cannot be 
isolated from the actual process of reality (i.e., society). 
The aim of education is realized in full intellectual, 
practical and moral growth. The end of education for him 
seems to be knowledge and moral conduct. 
In short, at the first stage of child development, 
Sadra notes, the most appropriate items to be included in 
the curriculum are what Plato characterizes as eikasiac 
contents (I lm aqwal), which basically consist of sounds, 
music, fables, stories, and physical education (R S. 279, 
282) . 
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The Curriculum Content at the Second Stage 
Stage two (Suwar qaibah. pistis^dianoia) of the 
curriculum consists of more physical education, health of 
body and mind, social studies including politics, economic 
sciences, and conduct (Ulum-amal). At this state exper¬ 
ience should be given a major role to play. 
Experiential learning is an important way to what has 
recently been characterized as right hemisphere learning. 
Direct experience presents the students with an opportunity 
to approach the subject in a more holistic and tacit way. 
The student encounters the subject with all his senses and 
gets a feeling for the whole context before trying to 
master specific components of information. Various ex¬ 
periential techniques such as role playing, laboratory 
experiments, field trips and so on can help the student to 
challenge reality for himself and participate in it. 
Sadra realizes that thinking at less abstract levels 
of development is to be equated with verbal processes. Both 
the sensory and motor systems play a role in learning, 
especially in early stages of growth. They provide a 
channel through which one can reach students who have prob¬ 
lems with verbal learning. They are primary modes for 
learning movement skills involved not only in physical 
education but also in subjects such as serving and playing 
an instrument. 
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Another educational technique which Sadra seems not 
to ignore at this stage of development is ’’evocative 
language.” The precise language of scientific and philoso¬ 
phical definitions may not be used as a medium of education 
at this level. The rich associative imagery of poetry and 
metaphors, Sadra notes, may facilitate learning for the 
child. Language of scientific enquiry is rational, abstract, 
and complicated for a child who has not attained a more 
sophisticated capacity of comprehension. Evocative language, 
indeed, is rich in associations, although much less precise. 
This language is used to evoke an image and a set of 
associations which provides the learner with the means to 
place himself in an experiential context. Though, this 
language may lead to ambiguity and has a less stipulative 
character, it suggests an easy way to grasp complex and 
sophisticated problems. Evocative language, thus, has a 
live power to stimulate more interest and excitment in the 
learner. It appeals to the right hemispheric capcity of 
the learner. One important mode of evocative language is 
said to be poetry. Through poetry the educator may excite 
the student to grasp more sophisticated abstract subjects 
with facility and less difficulty. 
Poetry appeals to imagination and generates and 
manipulates mental imagery. As a teaching technique it may 
be used to translate verbally sophisticated material into 
355 
images, making information more accessible and comprehen¬ 
sible to students. It is also a way of providing the 
students with means to have easier access to the rich 
reservoir of the right hemisphere. It is interesting that 
Haj Mulla Hadi Sabsavari (1875 d), a student of Mulla Sadra, 
versified Sadra's philosophy in a few hundred lines to make 
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it easy for students to learn. This type of didactic 
poetry entails a metaphoric language which makes analogical 
and comparative thinking possible and establishes a 
connection between two things. Although, it may apparently 
escape categories and scientific classifications, it tends 
to manifest familiar relationships between phenomena. 
The Curriculum Content of the Neotic Stage 
The underlying principle of this stage seems to be 
concerned more with the pursuit of knowledge of what is 
true. It may be claimed that Sadra's curriculum for the 
noetic stage is composed of the secure knowledge of Platonic 
Forms (Suwar Nuri Aflatuni), which can be apprehended by 
proper application of the dialectical method. This method 
of inquiry, however, is useful only if the student has been 
properly prepared--that is, has passed through the previous 
two stages successfully. The propositions at the noetic 
level are immune from distortion and infections that 
result, to a great extent, from unrefined sense-perceptions 
and unsophisticated modes of thinking. 
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In the modern language of science, a person who has 
attained the noetic level of thought is able not only to use 
empirical or conceptual techniques of inquiry but also is 
competent to recognize the role of theory in a sophisticated 
way. In Thomas Kuhn’s word, he is able not only to utilize 
"normal science"—designing experiments within "paradigms" 
of current methodology, but also is aware of the pre¬ 
suppositions underlying what is called "normal science" 
and is open to debate the status and reliability of these 
presuppositions. He does not mistake presuppositions for 
reality. 
The outcome of this stage of educational development 
is ideally embodied in the person of the Insane-Kamil. 
Insane-Kamil is a man of art and science; in Plato's 
language he commands both episteme and techne. In Ryle's 
parlance, Insane-Kamil is the quintessence of "knowing 
how" and "knowing that." 
It may be pointed out that Sadra's philosophical 
ideal of Insane-Kamil is a paradigm of completeness and 
wholeness. He seems to suggest that in a just society 
everyone should have access to the highest good. Howevei , 
the advancement of a person in Sadra's educational scheme 
depends upon his capacity to proceed through successive 
stages of development. It is dependent upon the ability 
to benefit from the higher stage. In other words, Sadra's 
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educational scheme is designed to be ideal in the sense 
that it accommodates a variety of people with different 
dispositions, categories, capabilities and so forth. 
In conclusion, Sadra's developmental scheme of educa¬ 
tion aims at full growth as an end-product of an educational 
process. Indeed, Sadra, in agreement with Plato, persuades 
his students to look at development in terms of the mind 
and the structure of knowledge. Thus, his characteriza¬ 
tion of sensible forms, transphenomenal forms and noetic 
forms seeks to describe the structure of the mind and of 
knowledge in an organic and transactive fashion. There¬ 
fore, education, in Sadra's view, requires both the "method 
of philosophy" and "the method of psychology" to provide 
the educator with the means to design a balanced curriculum 
integrating philosophical structure of knowledge with due 
regard to the psychological development of the student. 
An educated person who has passed through the successive 
stages described by Sadra is not only capable of Piagetian 
formal operations, but is able to think and to act in a 
sophisticated way. He can exercise his intellectual and 
moral skills on a wide variety of topics and problems of 
salient importance. Knowledge of such topics is a part of 
erudition. The end-product of Sadra's developmental pro¬ 
cess is the kind of person who can think and act morally 
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and responsibly. He is not simply a man of knowledge, but 
his actions reflect his knowledge and insight. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The preceding chapters have considered pedagogical 
assumptions of four major philosophers and thinkers, Plato 
and Aristotle in the west, Rumi and Mulla Sadra in the 
Islamic world. More specifically, the study has concen¬ 
trated on these thinkers in the light of essentialism (and 
its more radical version perennialism). 
Essentialism is best clarified when considered in 
relationship to progressivism. Each of these two ideologies 
has made its own response to the following four basic 
questions: 
1. What should we teach ("teach" in the sense that 
implies "learn")? 
2. How should we teach these things? 
3. When should we teach them? 
4. What should our end-products be like? 
To these questions essentialists have provided 
answers which are different from the ones given by non- 
essentialists (i.e., romantics and progressives). 
From a philosophical point of view, the first question 
deals with what is presently referred to as epistemology. 
Philosophers have frequently been divided over the question 
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of how knowledge is derived. Essentialists have argued 
that knowledge is based upon the rational nature of man. 
Man acquires knowledge through an exercise of the rational 
faculty. In other words, man can manifest his highest 
potential for knowing when he uses his intellectual capa¬ 
bility. In philosophical terms, the criterion of truth for 
most essentialists is not sensory but intellectual and 
deductive. The favorite method of these essentialists 
is ratiocination which involves discursive reasoning, the 
third act of the intellect in the Aristotelian theory of 
knowledge. For instance, Hutchins states that since man 
is a rational being he can attain his highest perfection 
only through the exercise of reason.1 Admiral Richover, 
in his testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, 
appealed to the authority of Plato and Aristotle and 
emphasized that intellect, not the body, or emotion, is 
the distinctive faculty which differentiates man from 
other creatures, and that intellect should constitute a 
school's central concern.2 He is not alone in claiming that 
Plato and Aristotle are the precursors of modern 
essentialism (i.e., intellectualism). I have raised 
critical questions about this position on the basis of the 
extant texts of Plato and Aristotle. 
Essentialists (and Perennialists) constitute a wide 
spectrum ranging from idealists to realists. 
They assume 
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a universal mental power that is developed by reflecting 
upon recurrent intellectual issues. 
I have based my frame of reference upon the thought of 
Kohlberg and Mayers, who have classified educational models 
into three distinct ideologies: romanticism, cultural 
transmission (i.e., essentialism), and progressivism. I 
have examined cultural transmission idealogy, with all its 
variety, under the rubric of essentialism. Thus, I have 
assumed that essentialism, as a school of educational 
thought, involves a transmissive-assimilative dialectic. 
Kohlberg and Mayer state that the cultural transmission 
model views the growth of mind through the metaphor of the 
machine, the machine being the wax on which the environment 
leaves its imprint. The external reality (i.e., environ¬ 
ment) is conceived as an "input," as information, more oi 
less directly transmitted and accumulated in the self 
(i.e., organism). The transmissive-assimilative approach 
characterizes the purpose of education as the assimilation 
3 
of the value and knowledge of the cultural heritage. 
The only difference between traditional and modern 
essentialists (i.e., transmission-assimilationist approach) 
lies in the fact that the former emphasize the transmission 
of knowledge which is considered vital to the preservation 
of the cultural heritage, while the latter stress the 
skills and habits deemed necessary for adjustment to a 
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sophisticated post—technotronic society. In other words, 
both emphasize the significance of internalization 
(absorption) of the subject materials. They differ in the 
object of assimilation. Traditional essentialists suggest 
that the most fundamental duty of a school is the trans¬ 
mission of the bulk of information and values bequeathed 
by ancestors. Thus, the great works of the past are a 
significant repository of knowledge which has stood the 
test of time and is relevant in the present. Whereas, 
modern technology transmissionists (cybernated 
essentialists) appeal to behavior modification and 
educational technology. However, both groups emphasize 
literacy and mathematical skills. 
Both traditional and cybernated essentialists conceive 
of mind as a receptacle which sifts and stores external 
impressions. The process of education lies in an 
accumulation in the pupil of fundamental materials fed in 
from without, organized and processed in standard ways 
(i.e., the criteria of correctness and precision-coherence 
and correspondence theories of knowledge). 
It may be inferred that an assimilative conception of 
mind, in a behaviorist context, seems to suggest that 
education is a process of mental and behavioral engineering 
People are programmed by- the environment to act in certain 
They are rewarded for acting in some ways and are 
ways. 
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punished for acting or failing to act in other ways. Those 
activities and attitudes that are rewarded positively tend 
to be repeated, while those receiving negative repercussions 
tend to be abandoned. This process of reinforcement programs 
a person's behavior in certain ways. Thus, if an environ¬ 
ment is regulated, behavior may be modified in a desirable 
way. 
The teacher's role, therefore, is to create a desire- 
able learning environment. With regard to the question of 
discipline, the only difference between traditional and 
modern essentialism in its behaviorist form is that the 
former has tended to use aversive forms of discipline such 
as scolding, physical punishment, extra homework, the 
withdrawal of certain privileges, and difficult examina¬ 
tions to determine what the student doesn't know, whereas 
the latter emphasizes the arrangement of a learning environ¬ 
ment that will permit positive reinforcement of certain 
behaviors. In this way, the unrewarded activities, the 
behaviorists assume, will be relinquished over time. 
In the preceding chapters I have attempted to show 
that neither Plato and Aristotle in the West nor Rumi and 
Mulla Sadra in the Islamic world have contributed to the 
typically educational assumptions of the essentialist 
agenda. They have had agreement in the following: 
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Philosophical Assumptions 
The nature of man and reality: according to the extant 
works of the above mentioned four, they do not maintain 
that man is composed of two distinct aspects; body and 
soul (or mind). They do not agree that only soul (or mind) 
is the knowing dimension of man. In other words, they do 
not concur that spirit (mind) is superior. For them, 
human nature is not everywhere and essentially the same. 
Granted, some people are lazy, others are ambitious; some 
are good in nature others are vicious. 
They view man as an evolving organism, in a state of 
continuous change. Although man represents the highest 
state in the evolutionary process, he is not essentially 
distinct from other living, and moving organisms. Every¬ 
thing that lives comes into being, grows, develops, matures, 
declines and dies. Man differs from other living beings 
because he retains his past experiences. What occurs in 
the past is relived and restructured in memory. What 
distinguishes human beings from other living beings is the 
possibility of self-consciousness about organization present 
in the former. 
Thus, all four sages do not adhere to substance- 
oriented ontology. For them a "thing" or actual entity 
represents a complex "structure of events" due to the con¬ 
stant movement of the things. For them there is nothing in 
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the world but a series of things in the constant process 
of renewal. This flux is evolutionary and irreversible. 
Each successive form in the sense of stage contains all 
preceding forms and transcends them. They argue that the 
process is toward completeness and consummation. Therefore, 
it may be said to be unidirectional. 
The theory of knowledge. For them knowledge is an 
activity of experiencing, it involves psychical laws. 
Knowledge is not something divorced from actual life ex¬ 
perience. It is not self-sufficient. Knowledge is 
achieved by sending the mind to the school of the real 
world to learn its dynamic processes of change. Thus, 
knowledge is closely related to action. Knowledge is not 
seen by them as merely centered in man's intellect. They 
do not agree that man's knowing activities are exclusively 
rational in character and function. They seem to reject 
the unique role of abstract reasoning for the acquisition 
of knowledge. 
For them, knowledge is not derived solely from the 
application of such theories as the correspondence and 
the coherence notions of knowledge. Knowledge, accoiding 
to them, is not merely limited to the position which 
maintains that truth is predicated on a proposition by 
virtue of its capacity to. represent and portray facts. 
Knowledge is an experience which constitutes a process. 
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It is like a journey. It involves participation and 
indulgence. In other words, action is the heart of know¬ 
ledge. If we conceive of the knowing process as a journey, 
then it involves stages and phases. Knowledge, thus, is 
evolutionary in character. From an individual point of 
view acquisition of knowledge presupposes certain stages. 
Plato, Rumi, and Mulla Sadra have schematized four 
main stages in the cognitive development of an individual. 
Plato has spoken of the divided line. In the Republic, 
he provides an outline of the stages of inquiry-cognitive 
and moral development. Glaucon, Plato's brother, in Book 
VI visualizes a vertical line divided into four parts, 
each illustrating a degree of cognitive development. These 
four parts correspond to four "levels" of knowledge. The 
following is an elucidation of these stages from bottom 
to top. 
Eikasia. This stage represents the perception of mere 
images (Rep. 509e). It is described as a state in which 
the child resorts to myth and fictions. He makes no 
distinction between true and false. There is no difference 
between the "inner" and the "outer." In other words, there 
is no objectivity. This state roughly corresponds to 
Piaget's notion of the sensorimotor and the preoperatlonal 
stages where the child understands the nature of things 
only in the context of their sensory, physical presence. 
It does not recognize objects or beings separate from sell. 
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Pis tig;. The second level of knowing is called pistis. 
-Pistis represents a public world. The duality of true or 
false appears at this level (Re£. 509e-511e). Plato com¬ 
bines the stage of eikasia with pistis and refers to them 
collectively as the realm of doxa (judgment). This is the 
level where the reality is conceived in terms of specific 
instances. 
Dianoia. Pianoia which literally means thinking is a 
phase of cognitive development between doxa and noesis 
(Rep. 510-511a). At this stage the mind comes to realize 
that, for instance, models, particular cases, and images 
are merely representatives of things which are properly 
dealt with in abstract terms. Dianoetic understanding 
represents a transition from concrete operations to formal 
operations. Cognitive development is represented by a 
mixture of concrete objects and abstract forms of which 
those concrete objects are exemplars. This kind of under¬ 
standing constitutes a bridge from concrete instances 
(i.e., concrete operations) of the doxa level to the more 
complex stage of noesis (i.e., formal operations.) 
Noesis. Noesis literally means the operation of nous. 
It is the last stage of cognitive and moral development. 
It involves propositional operations. A person at this 
stage is capable of forming hypotheses and deducing 
possible consequences. The mind frees itself 1rom the 
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confusing ambiguities of previous stages. The person, thus, 
transcends sense data and indulges in highly abstract 
operations. 
Eikasia, pistis, and dianoia constitute processes. 
Noesis which is exemplified in episteme consists of 
philosophical and logical products. In Dewey's words, the 
difference between product and process is analogous to the 
relationship between a map and a journey. A map is the 
outcome of a geographical survey, while a journey constitutes 
the actual process of moving toward a destination. Thus, 
it may be suggested that episteme, in one sense, is the 
outcome, product, or the result of the actual process of 
thinking. Episteme, in Plato's model of education, is the 
5 
logical outcome of cognitive development. 
Both Rumi and Mulla Sadra have based their conception 
of knowledge upon Plato's paradigm of cognitive and moral 
development. They have developed their notions of truth, 
learning, and human nature upon this Platonic premise. 
Educational Implications 
Drawing on the ontological and epistemic notions 
originated by Plato, and developed by Aristotle, Rumi and 
Mulla Sadra, this study proceeded to spell out their 
implications for education. 
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Aim of education, ihey do not see the aim of educa¬ 
tion as the mastery of basic skills, retention of knowledge 
(i.e., traditional essentialism), or the shaping of 
desirable behavior and the modification of undesirable 
behavior (i.e., modern behaviorist version of essentialism). 
They agree that the aim of education is manifested in a 
gradual movement to higher stages of development and 
avoidance of stage arrestation. They appear to indicate 
that various aspects of development (i.e., cognitive and 
moral) are integrated. They are not separate from one 
another. In modern terms, these sages anticipate the 
balance and confluence of right and left hemispheric modes 
of thought. 
Conception of learning. Learning is not conceived of 
as a process of assimilation, digestion and reception of 
organized body of knowledge or behavior modification. In 
other words, the aim of education does not lie in the 
inculcation of values and roles that are essential to the 
preservation of an existing society. Learning is closely 
associated with growth. Cognitive and moral development 
takes place when the individual restructures his experience 
and reconstructs his thought patterns in order to be able 
to deal with cognitive and moral problems. Learning takes 
place when problems which invoke new patterns of thought 
are presented to the student. Learning is a pioce 
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whereby the student comes to identify a problem. Then he 
contemplates on various alternatives, tests hypotheses and 
finally comes to a meaningful and practical solution. 
Conception of learner. The learner is not viewed by 
them as a passive respondent or assimilator. He is not 
conceived of as someone who must adapt himself to learning 
the subject which is highly organized and possesses an 
internal logic of its own. He is not supposed to absorb 
the information and values that are passed on. The learner, 
on the contrary, is an active agent who is constantly 
structuring and restructuring his experience and thought 
patterns. The learner is, thus, conceived as a developing 
being that passes through a sequence of stages as a result 
of his interaction with environment. 
Conception of the instructional process. The in¬ 
structional process is not simply embodied in exposition 
through lectures, drill, and rote memorization (i.e., 
traditional essentialist method). Neither is it the 
manipulation of reinforcers by the teacher to shape the 
student's behavior (i.e., behaviorist version). The 
teacher should be aware of a student's developmental level. 
Then, with such an understanding, he should present 
appropriate problems and dilemmas to the student. Con¬ 
sequently, the student, with the assistance of the teacher, 
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will be able to resolve dilemmas and problems. The best 
method of instruction is represented by problem solving 
strategy. Problem solving method involves discovery and 
largely relies on actual experience. Thus, the functions 
of teaching and learning come closer together, and the 
untenable dualism between teacher and student dissipates. 
In the problem solving method which proceeds from a per¬ 
plexed, confused situation to a unitary and harmonious one, 
the student's interests are stimulated in a constructive 
and useful manner. 
Furthermore, I have said that an instructional 
method should take into account what is presently being 
referred to as the bicamerality of the brain. In the pre¬ 
ceding chapters I have shown that both Plato and Aristotle 
in the West, and Rumi and Sadra in the Islamic world have 
recognized these two dimensions of cognitive reality. 
Recent scientific findings have established that the human 
brain is divided into two hemispheres. The right 
hemisphere functions in a metaphoric, imaginative, non- 
rational, contextual and synthetic fashion, while the left 
hemisphere of the brain is logical, verbal, sequential, 
analytical, and digital. On the basis of these findings, 
this study has argued that Plato and Aristotle in an 
implicit way, and Rumi and Mulla Sadra in an explicit way 
have anticipated and recognized these two dimensions in 
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their epistemological formulations. Essentialists , in 
general, have confined themselves to the recognition of the 
functions of the left hemisphere of the brain, while our 
sages have recognized metaphoric facet of human conscious¬ 
ness. In this study allusion has been made to Michael 
Polanyi's tacit dimension in order to provide philosophical 
grounds for the metaphoric dimension of consciousness. It 
has been suggested that the right hemispheric mode of 
thinking constitutes a tacit dimension. This tacit dimen¬ 
sion is responsible for orientation to space, artistic 
endeavor, body image, crafts, and recognition of features. 
It possesses kinesthetic capabilities, while the left 
hemispheric mode is responsible for mathematical operations, 
language, and sequential processing of information. 
If the aim of education is described as the total 
growth of the child then it must seek a balance between 
right and left hemispheric modes of thought. Development 
model of Plato, Aristotle, Rumi, and Mulla Sadra has in¬ 
corporated integrative, metaphoric and synthetic aspects 
with rational, linear and analytical dimensions. Therefore, 
one can say that the notions of techne (technical know-how), 
poieses (making, creating), and phronesis (ethical know¬ 
how) explicitly address the experiential and integrative 
aspects of learning and knowing. 
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Learning onvironment. The learning environment, is 
not seen by our sages as teacher oriented. It does not 
consist in a logically, rigid structure. The learning 
environment has a dynamic quality which should be geared to 
the student's level of cognitive development and capacity. 
Materials should be organized in a way that help the 
cognitive and moral growth of the child. It should take 
into account the two modes of thought. It should not be 
confined to linear, rational and analytic modes. The 
learning environment should help the student to experience 
and perceive reality for himself. 
Teacher's role. The teacher is not seen as the cen¬ 
tral authority who singly directs the learning activities. 
He is not seen by our sages to be responsible for trans¬ 
mitting knowledge, values and role expectations to 
students (i.e., traditional essentialists), nor, is he a 
manipulator of reinforcement schedules (i.e., behaviorist 
version of essentialism). 
The teacher, is seen by our sages as a guide or 
moderator who structures the overall learning environment. 
He should gather materials appropriate for his or her 
students. The teacher's role in the educational process 
is to provide the appropriate environment which stimulates 
d orients the student's course of development. 
responses an 
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He is a pilot of the boat. The energy that moves the boat 
must come from the students. The teacher must take into 
account the sequential order or development of the 
student's capacities and interests. 
The end-product of education. Aims may be defined as 
foreseen results and consequences that give meaning and 
orientation to actions. It may be said that aims consist 
in foresight about the possible consequences of certain 
activities. Ends fall within the scope of value-laden 
criteria. Aims are ideals that are axiogenetic and moral. 
The image of end-product will provide criteria for 
determining the adequacy of the developmental process; 
the steps toward achieving the most significant features 
of this end will determine the stages which may be used to 
divide up the process either for descriptive purposes or 
because they indicate pronounced phases in the normal 
course of an orderly progress. 
This study has suggested that the choice of the 
developmental pattern of education by Plato, Aiistotle, 
Rumi, and Mulla Sadra is the result of their conception 
of man as a socially, politically, and intellectually 
evolving being; that is to say, a desirably educated 
individual presupposes the need for a desirable political, 
social, cultural context within which the particular set of 
ideal human potentials can be actualized. In other words, 
379 
development is not an internal process. It is the result 
of interaction with the environment. Developmental 
sequence, thus, implies a movement from a less adequate 
to a more adequate state. Development involves an internal 
criteria of adequacy. 
They have held that cognitive growth and moral 
maturity are dialectically interrelated and that the stages 
of moral development necessarily presuppose intellectual 
growth. It was also suggested that adequacy of ethical 
judgment and action, to a large extent, relies upon 
intellectual growth. Our thinkers maintain that growth is 
a movement toward higher epistemological and ethical 
adequacy. It has been indicated further that the in¬ 
tellectual process is irreversible. Development depends 
upon restructuring of one's thought and experience. Con¬ 
sequently, education for cognitive growth must contribute 
to moral growth. It should be remembered, though, that 
the cognitive stage is a prerequisite but not sufficient 
condition for attainment of the moral stage. Therefore, 
education should provide conditions for passing through a 
sequence of related stages. Plato in his sequential con¬ 
ception of dikosyne and doxa-dianoia has anticipated what 
modern thinkers such as Piaget and Kohlberg have suggested 
about the end-product of education. The justice structure 
that has been proposed by Plato and further developed by 
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Rumi and Mulla Sadra is a sequentially progressive notion. 
Justice structure, in other words, is transformed by passing 
through stages. Each stage represents intellectual and 
functional capacities that prior ones lack. 
In short, Plato, Aristotle, Rumi and Sadra have 
implied in their works that in order to formulate theories 
of education in general and aims of education in particular 
the application of the methods of philosophy, ethics and 
psychology is required. These disciplines should be 
jointly utilized for the formulation of the aims and end- 
products of education. Reliance upon one of these 
disciplines without taking into account the others may 
culminate in what is presently called a one-dimentional 
conception of educational ends. Dependence upon one of 
these methods to the exclusion of others by essentialists 
of various persuasions has put them in a myopic intellect- 
ualist panoply where they seem to be impervious to the 
other two methods. 
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